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Introduction
“One thing I have learned in a long life:
That all our science, measured against reality,
is primitive and childlike and yet
it is the most precious thing we have.”
Albert Eistein
1

Introduction
This Ph.D. dissertation offers an extensive analysis of the Spanish Autonomous Communities
(CCAAs, henceforth) indebtedness from complementary perspectives: debt evolution, deficit tar-
get non-compliance, commercial debt and debt market issues. CCAAs are the intermediate level
of government in Spain, between the central and the local one, and they make for an interesting
case to study for a number of reasons. First, Spain has a high level of fiscal decentralisation,
and they are responsible for some of the largest and social-targeted spending items: health and
education. Thus, Their proper functioning, stability and fiscal sustainability are essential for
the well-being of the Spanish society. Second, they have gained significant political and fiscal
autonomy over the past four decades through a process of decentralisation. This process has
been asymmetric, with a different decentralisation speed for revenue and expenditure depend-
ing on the region, leading to both temporal and cross-sectional variations in both fiscal and
political autonomy indicators. Third, they account for around a third of General Government
debt increase from 2007 to 2017. Fourth, CCAAs, as a group, have been fairly active in the
debt market until 2014. And finally, they have historically accumulated a significant amount of
commercial debt.
CCAAs’ debt became more relevant in the outburst of the European debt crisis, as the
sustainability of some European countries debt was at stake. Spain was one of these countries
that suffered a sudden increase in both public deficits and debt levels in all tiers of government.
As a consequence, sovereign risk premium surged. Subnational debt added to the sustainability
problem, as CCAAs struggled to face new funding needs generated by the accumulation of
significant deficits. Soaring CCAAs’ deficits and debt were accompanied by two additional
concerns: first, the enlargement of commercial debt and the delay in payment of suppliers;
second, the difficulties some CCAAs found to issue new debt in the markets at a reasonable
cost.
This thesis aims at analysing fiscal sustainability of CCAAs. It does so by exploring four
empirical questions that study several elements related to CCAAs’ debt. These elements are
individually studied in four chapters, although they are all part of a global vision of the CCAAs
indebtedness matter. The four chapters are therefore closely related, they have their own in-
ternal structure as they intend to be free-standing (in the sense that each one can be read and
understood independently). Chapter 1 addresses CCAAs’ debt evolution and its determinants.
Chapter 2 focuses on the analysis of the CCAAs’ deficits targets noncompliance. Chapter 3
studies the macroeconomic impact of a facility established in 2012 targeting the subnational
commercial debt. And finally, chapter 4 analyses the CCAAs primary debt market and issuance
behaviour.1
Chapter 1 main purpose is to understand the evolution of the CCAAs’ debt over the last two
decades. Subnational debt has accounted for around 35% of the increase in Spain’s public debt
1The first three chapters have been elaborated in collaboration with other authors: Javier J. Pe´rez, Pablo
Herna´ndez de Cos, Samuel Hurtado and Victor Lledo´. The author of this thesis has been a leading actor in the
research developed.
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from 2007 to 2017, which reached a historical peak in 2014, surpassing the 100% of GDP thresh-
old. Moreover, doubts about the capacity of some CCAAs to reimburse their debt has probably
pushed upwards the sovereign risk premium of Spain. Thus, it is essential to comprehend the
forces that move CCAAs’ debt in order to prevent new episodes of rapid increases.
We estimate a panel Generalised method of moments (GMM) model to assess the impact
on debt changes of economic, political, fiscal autonomy, debt structure and market discipline
factors. We used annual data of debt over regional GDP from 1995 to 2017 for the seventeen
CCAAs. Our main findings are the following: political factors played a limited role; Second,
fiscal rules also played a limited role, being effective only in bad economic times and in high
debt situations. Third, “the fiscal decentralization design”, i.e. the distribution of revenues
and expenditure competencies, is extremely relevant in keeping debt subdued. Fourth, market-
disciple had some influence in regional public finances evolution. And fifth, commercial debt
seems to have been used as a substitute for regular debt.
These results justify some basic political economy policy recommendations. Spain should
reinforce the strict application of fiscal rules and increase the accountability of each tier of
government. Encouraging co-responsibility for the subnational governments could help to tame
debt increases, as voters would perceived subnational governments as final responsible of deficits.
Controlling other alternative sources of indebtedness, such as commercial debt, is essential to
avoid possible legal circumventions. Finally, there is room for increasing the role of market dis-
cipline. CCAAs have decreased their market activity since the 2011 maximum. Some CCAAs
have even stop any kind of issuance activity. Nevertheless, with the gradual return to the mar-
ket, the discipline coming from investors demands would probably discipline more the CCAAs’
governments. Some of these factors are further developed in the following chapters: deficits,
commercial debt and the role of debt markets.
Chapter 2 examines the determinants for CCAAs deficit targets noncompliance. It is based
on the existence of a soft budget constraints, defined as the inability of subnational governments
(SNGs) to keep fiscal deficit outcomes within targets, set as part of fiscal consolidation strategies
at the general government level. Soft budget constraints have been shown to originate from the
inability of central governments (CGs) to credibly commit to not bailing out SNGs.
This chapter tries to unify two literature branches. The first is based on the idea that soft
budgets depend on political motives, i.e. election’s proximity or the defence of government
stability. They are aggravated by flawed intergovernmental fiscal institutions, including large
vertical fiscal imbalances, weak fiscal rules, and limited market discipline. The second branch
focuses on whether fiscal targets are appropriately established or if errors in forecasting may
have entailed the fixation of unachievable targets.
We propose a conceptual framework that distinguishes the impact on fiscal noncompliance
of soft budget constraints and of fiscal forecasting and target setting. The framework looks at
both, the capacity and the incentives to comply. It differentiates events when SNGs have the
capacity but not the incentives to comply with fiscal targets and when SNGs have the incentives
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but not the capacity for fiscal compliance. Fiscal noncompliance is defined as voluntary under
the former and involuntary under the latter.
Between 2010 and 2015, the aggregate of CCAAs have missed their fiscal targets system-
atically every year, constituting one of the main risks to Spain’s ongoing fiscal consolidation
process. Nonetheless, fiscal noncompliance, while widespread, varied significantly across regions
in both frequency and margins. For the empirical analysis of the noncompliance determinants,
we constructed a GMM model with annual data from 2003 to 2015. We divided the determi-
nants in two categories: voluntary and involuntary noncompliance. The main results are as
follows: First, non-compliant behaviour has some inertia; Second, from the voluntary side, non-
compliance margin is higher if fiscal autonomy is lower, in electoral years, and whenever the
parties ruling at a national and regional level coincide; And third, from the involuntary side,
noncompliance will be more likely the more exigent the targets and the larger the forecast errors
(difference between the forecast and the final GDP).
These results indicate that some institutional and procedural changes would be advisable to
increase CCAAs compliance. The two main political implications are: First, improving fiscal
institutions by increasing CCAAs fiscal co-responsibility would make CCAAs government more
prone to comply, as they would be responsible for the fiscal misbehaving; Second, the involvement
of CCAAs in the target fixation is key to ensure that CCAAs will consider the targets as their
own.
Chapter 3 treats the matter of public commercial debt. The amount of commercial debt
increased rapidly during the crisis. Total amount of consolidated Spanish general government
payment obligations outstanding reached 8.1% of GDP from 5.3% in 2007. The Spanish gov-
ernment adopted several measures geared to reducing local and regional government trade debt
volumes in 2012. Simultaneously, new regulations, aimed at structurally cutting down the pay-
ment delay, were approved. These policies have had a significant impact on the stock of trade
debt and the average supplier payment period. Hence, the consolidated general government
payment obligations outstanding in 2015 stood at 5.3% of GDP, significantly down on the 2011
figure.
These developments in general government trade credit in Spain may have exerted significant
effects on economic activity. While deferred payment is a standard practice in trade relations,
an excessive lengthening of the payment period may have harmful effects on creditor companies.
In a time of financial constraint, these firms may not find alternative sources of financing or find
them but at a high cost. Therefore, the trade debt-reducing measures implemented may have
lessened financial constraints insofar as they entailed an injection of liquidity for households and
firms. The aim of this chapter is to describe the extraordinary mechanisms for payments to
suppliers developed in Spain in recent years and to quantify their impact.
The macroeconomic impact of the measures is assessed by two independent methods: a VAR
model and the Banco de Espan˜a Quarterly Macroeconometric Model. Both models conclude that
the funds received by the suppliers had a significant impact on economic growth and employment
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generation. Thus, the facility created by the central government solved the short term problem
of non-payment to supplier. While in the long run, new laws have been implemented establishing
higher control and transparency for commercial debt in all tiers of government.
Finally, in chapter 4 analyses the CCAAs’ primary debt market. The interest of the subna-
tional governments’ securities have been a target of study mainly in the last decade, as economic
crisis endangered the fiscal sustainability of lower tiers of government, and affected the general
government credibility. Some central governments have evaded the existent bail-out clauses and
have come to the rescue of troubled subnational governments, Spanish government among them.
Nevertheless, until the creation of the Autonomous Liquidity Facility (FLA), a facility that the
central government established to cope with the inability of the CCAAs to obtained new fund-
ing, the CCAAs used to rely only on securities and private loans. Analysing the functioning
of CCAAs debt market is fundamental to ensure its proper functioning. It is crucial especially
when considering that, as a result of the FLA, some CCAAs have exited the market and they
would probably try to come back in the near future.
CCAAs behaviour towards the debt market has been very heterogeneous, regarding quantity
issued, frequency and international presence. Some CCAAs have resorted to the market in
the last decades to fund their financing needs, while others have relied more on bank loans.
Andalusia, Catalonia and Valencia have stand out in the debt markets and have been responsible
for the majority of debt issues since 1995. In this chapter, the analysis of the primary market
is twofold: first, the factors that may affect securities’ spreads; and second, the decision making
of the CCAAs in terms of timing, quantity issued and term to maturity.
The analysis is built on all information available for all CCAAs securities issued from 1995
to 2017 and includes the information available at the moment of issuance for all indicators con-
sidered. I developed several empirical models to answer the main questions related with the
issuance behaviour. First, I used an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to study the possi-
ble determinants of spreads, considering the security characteristics and the economic and risk
level indicators. Second, I divided the analysis of issuance decision in three different matters:
the timing, the quantity issued and the term to maturity. In relation with the timing question,
I estimated a non-linear probit model to analyse the factors relevant that may affect the prob-
ability of issuance. The two remaining questions are affected by a selection bias in the model
because both decisions depend on the previous decision of the moment of issuance. In order to
cope with this methodological problem, I estimated a Heckman selection sample model.
In the first stage of the analysis, spreads appear to be higher when the amount issued is
larger, and the term to maturity is shorter. They also react upwards when sovereign risk and
markets spreads rise, when economic situation of the CCAAs worsens and when the security
is issued in a foreign currency. In the second step of analysis, the most interesting results
with respect to the decision taking, is that CCAAs seem to optimise their issuance strategy,
considering their financing needs, their economic situation, the behaviour of other competitors
and the structure of their debt, whereas spreads appear to have a weak role. The lack of effect
6 Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda
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of spreads over the issuance behaviour may indicate a sort of malfunctioning in the market due
to bureaucratic rigidities that may exist. Nevertheless, the spreads data may also have some
flaws that may distort the estimation results. Finally, the amounts received from the central
government through the FLA have discourage the issuance of debt, and thus a debate is still
pending about the role of this facility and the optimal moment for some CCAAs to return to
the markets.
In conclusion, the recent economic crisis has triggered the debate of who is the ultimate
responsible for the public debt. Both, the CCAA and the central government, must ensure
that debt is sustainable: The CCAA as direct responsible for paying the debt, and the central
government because, in the end, it may affect its cost of financing and, even, it may have to
face the payment in the case of a possible bankruptcy. Better institutions, stronger control of
deficits and an increase of co-responsibility are advisable. In the end, authorities from all levels
must be responsible for their behaviour and face consequences for the bad management of public
resources. A final recommendation from this thesis is that Spanish authorities should reach an
agreement about the procedure to follow in case of future fiscal sustainability crises.
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Chapter 1
Institutional and economic
determinants of regional public
debt in Spain
“I sincerely believe...
that the principle of spending money
to be paid by posterity
under the name of funding
is but swindling futurity on a large scale.”
Thomas Jefferson
This chapter is based on Banco de Espan˜a Occasional Document 1807 titled “Institutional and Economic
Determinants of Regional Public Debt in Spain”, Delgado-Te´llez and Pe´rez (2018)
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1. Institutional and economic determinants of regional public debt in Spain
1.1 Introduction
The analysis of sub-national public debt developments has gained relevance worldwide, due to
the rising share of sub-national finance in the overall financing needs of the General Government
sector in a number of countries, following a continued process of fiscal decentralization (see
Canuto & Liu, 2010; EC, 2012). Against this framework, we study in this chapter the evolution
and the determinants of Spanish regional governments’ net financing needs (measured by the
change in public debt). We estimate empirical models in which we exploit the pool structure of
our data (17 regions over the period 1995-2017).
The Spanish case is a relevant one from a global point of view, given that in the last few
decades a process took place in which a significant degree of fiscal devolution occurred, to
heterogeneous regions, in parallel with the adoption of several national and supranational fiscal
rules, in different waves. In this framework, in addition, Spanish regional governments have been
traditionally very active in capital markets, have accumulated significant levels of public debt,
and are a recent example of a situation of sub-central fiscal stress, including central government
intervention, connected to the euro area sovereign debt crisis. We develop in the following
paragraphs these elements.
First, regional public finances were one of the major sources of national fiscal stress during
the recent economic and financial crisis. The lasting effect of the recent crisis over regional
public finances entailed a strong surge of regional debt over the last ten years, from some 6%
of GDP in 2007 to 25% in 2017. The “Comunidades Auto´nomas” (CCAA henceforth) faced
significant fiscal stress during the core years of the crisis. As a result, financial markets were
partially closed, and the central government decided to bail-out a majority of regions.1 The
CCAA debt crisis may have damaged the sovereign risk of the country as a whole, as clearly
stated by rating agencies in the midst of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.2
Second, the degree of fiscal decentralization in Spain is significant, and commensurate to
that of leading federal countries. A fast and steady decentralization process has taken place
ever since the country became a democracy in the 1970’s, entailing a progressive cession of some
key expenditure and revenue items to regional governments.3 The 17 regional governments
currently manage, among other competencies, education (including universities), health and
1The central government reacted to these lack of liquidity of some CCAA creating two specific funds. The first
one, the Fund for Suppliers Payments, targeted the commercial debt of the regions that grew strongly up to 2011
both in amount and in delay of payment. This Fund was key for enabling firms that provided services and goods
to the Public Administration to stay open and to continue investing and hiring new workers (Delgado-Te´llez et al.,
2017). The second Fund, denominated the Financial Liquidity Fund, was established to cope with the liquidity
problems of the CCAA. Both Funds entailed a change in the ownership of the CCAA debt, from the private
sector to the central government. Thus, in 2017 around 58% of the debt of the CCAA was in hands of the central
government.
2For example, as Fitch stated in its note “Liquidity for Spain Regions Positive, More Detail Needed” published
on March 20th 2012, the relevant measure of debt for Spain was not the central government’s one, but rather the
total debt of the General Government that includes the regional and local debt.
3This decentralization process emanates from the current Spanish Constitution (voted in 1978) which, in its
second article, recognizes the rights to self-government of “regions and nationalities”, within the Spanish nation.
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social services. In 2017, sub-national governments (CCAA plus municipalities) managed some
50% of total government expenditure, up from 35% in 1995 and a share below 20% in the early
1980s. In parallel to expenditure decentralization, there has also been a process of increased
fiscal co-responsibility (fiscal autonomy).
Third, this decentralization process took place in a period in which a number of supra-
national and national fiscal rules were implemented. National fiscal rules were implemented on
top of EU-wide ones. Nowadays there are four main fiscal rules: deficit, debt and expenditure
rules, similar to the European references, but subject to stricter monitoring procedures: In
addition, another set of rules govern the accumulation of regional commercial debt, and spell a
number of monitoring steps, including sanctions, in case payments are delayed with respect to
legal periods. Despite these rules being in place, deficit non-compliance has been common at
the regional level (Delgado-Te´llez et al., 2016).
Four, Spanish regions have traditionally been very active in international regional bond
markets, ranking only behind the US, Germany, Japan, China and Canada (see Canuto & Liu,
2013; Delgado & Pe´rez, 2018; Pe´rez & Prieto, 2015; Romeu, 2013). In 2017, total outstanding
regional public debt amounted to some e288 billion (about 24.8% of Spanish GDP). For the
whole period 1995-2017, average regional debt amounted to 11.1% of GDP, of which more than
40% was in the form of securities (other than shares). The weight of securities over total debt
fell sharply during the economic crisis due to a partial closure of financial markets for the CCAA
and the rising financing cost, reaching its lowest level of 16.2% in 2017.
Fifth, Spain’s CCAA’s fiscal credibility was also damaged over the past decade by the increase
of liabilities not accounted for in the standard, European concept of public debt.4 Those vehicles
include the debt issued by companies controlled by regional governments and the accounts
payable outstanding (including commercial debt). The literature suggest that these instruments
may have been used by sub-national governments to circumvent the constraints on debt issuance
they are subject to (and that only apply to conventional channels of financing) as some political
economy arguments would suggest (see Ferna´ndez Llera and Garc´ıa Valin˜as (2013)).
In this chapter we move beyond the available literature that analyses the role of fiscal fed-
eralism variables in the determination of regional public finances, the main difference being our
focus on the determinants of the dynamics of public debt, rather than on primary balances as
it is usually the case in the related literature. We deem changes in debt as our preferred object
of study instead of budget balances given that the former is a broader measure of net financing
needs and debt accumulation, and also because deficit-debt adjustments (stock-flow reconcilia-
tion) can be arbitrarily large, as in CCAAs in the period 2010-2013. In the latter respect, see
Campos et al. (2006) for an international perspective on this issue. Some papers that precede
4 Excessive Deficit Procedure debt (EDP). Public debt is defined in the Protocol No. 12 on the excessive deficit
procedure annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as “[...] total gross debt at nominal
value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and within the sectors of general government”.
Article 1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 specifies the definition of Maastricht debt and deficit in
statistical terms including the treatment of trade credits.
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in certain respects our work are Valle´s Gime´nez (2002), that also includes an excellent survey
of pre-2002 papers on the issue, Argimo´n and Herna´ndez de Cos (2012), Simon-Cosano et al.
(2013) or Mussons Olivella (2017), among others.5 In addition, we explore a more up-to-date
period of time and include a number of non-standard fundamental variables, in particular those
related to the structure and composition of public debt, the definition of fiscal rules’ variables,
and the interaction of regional public enterprises’ debt and commercial debt with regular public
debt.
Among the set of determinants we pay special attention to: (i) institutional factors, such
as fiscal decentralization and fiscal rules, including self-correcting mechanisms like the reaction
to past debt and past deviations from targets; (ii) political factors, related with the electoral
cycle and the composition of government; (iii) market-disciple indicators, such as the change in
the implicit interest rate and the structure of debt itself; (iv) non-EDP debt, focusing on public
corporations controlled by CCAA and regional commercial debt. We find that self-correcting
mechanisms and market-induced discipline, and to a lesser extent deeper fiscal decentralization,
have been associated in the sample under study with heightened fiscal discipline.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we provide some stylized facts on regional
public debt in Spain. In Section 1.3 we focus on two relevant institutional issues: the process
of fiscal decentralization since the early 1980s and the evolution of fiscal rules affecting regional
governments in Spain. Fiscal rules are are further expanded in Annex A. In turn, in Section 1.4
we perform the empirical analysis of the chapter, covering first the standard approach of papers
on fiscal federalism, and moving next to a deeper look at the role of fiscal rules and market disci-
pline indicators, to end up with some results on the link between regional governments’ standard
debt and other public debt concepts. Finally, in Section 1.5 we provide some conclusions.
1.2 Stylized facts on regional public debt
1.2.1 Some trends
Spanish General Government debt increased in the period 2007-2017 by nearly 63 points
of GDP. As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the increase in debt was visible in all the subsectors of
the General Government. In particular, central government and CCAA non-consolidated debt
moved from 29.5 and 5.7 percent of GDP, respectively, at the end of 2007, to 86.9% and 24.8%
of GDP in 2017, multiplying by 3 and 4 their amounts respectively.
The increase in public debt came hand-in-hand with increases in other liabilities not covered
by the extant definition of debt, but that are close complements, namely the aggregates of
public corporations’ debt and other accounts payable. The statistical category “other accounts
5The institutional determinants of local governments’ indebtedness have been more widely analysed in the
literature, mainly from a less aggregated-macro perspective than the standard in papers looking at the determi-
nants of CCAAs’ debt. See for example Cabase´s et al. (2007) or Bastida et al. (2013), and the references quoted
therein.
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Figure 1.1: The evolution of public debt in Spain, by subsector.
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payable” consists of financial claims which are created as a counterpart of a financial or a non-
financial transaction in cases where there is a timing difference between this transaction and
the corresponding payment. This category includes transactions in financial claims which stem
from the early or late payment for transactions in goods or services, distributive transactions or
secondary trade in financial assets. They consist of the counterpart transactions in case payment
is due and not yet paid. Debts arising from income accruing over time and arrears are also
classified under this category. This is clear from Figure 1.2. Regional public corporations’ debt
increased up to 2010 and decreased afterwards, being the difference between the maximum and
minimum over the whole period less than one percentage points of GDP. Meanwhile, the“other
accounts payable” increased steeply up to the end of 2011 beginning of 2012, to decreased then
sharply up to 2017. Nevertheless, its level is still higher than the pre-crisis one.
1.2.2 A standard decomposition of debt changes
It is worth looking at the evolution of debt in the period under scrutiny through the lens of
the government budget constraint. Let Yt be nominal GDP at t and let Dt be the nominal value
of government debt. The government budget constraint accounts for how a nominal interest
rate it, net inflation pit, net growth in real GDP, gdpt, the net-of-interest deficit as a percent of
GDP, deft, and the deficit-debt adjustment, DDAt combine to determine the evolution of the
government debt-to-GDP-ratio,
Dt
Yt
=
1 + it
(1 + pit) (gdpt)
Dt−1
Yt−1
+ deft +
DDAt
Yt
(1.1)
were the nominal yield it and the real stock of debt Dt are averages of pertinent objects across
terms to maturity. Its linearized version, suitable for accounting decomposition of the funda-
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Figure 1.2: Other Autonomous Communities’ (regional governments) liabilities not
included in the standard definition of public debt.
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mental determinants of debt, takes the standard form
Dt
Yt
= (it − pit − gdpt) Dt−1
Yt−1
+
Dt−1
Yt−1
+ deft +
DDAt
Yt
(1.2)
With this decomposition at hand it is possible to analyse the determinants of changes in the
debt-to-GDP ratio. In Figure 1.3 we decompose these determinants for each year over the period
1996-2017 for the aggregate of CCAA (see 1.4 for the evolution of individual CCAA’s debt).
CCAAs reduced marginally their stock of debt in the period till 2007, with positive factors (real
GDP growth and inflation) broadly compensating the debt-increasing effect of interest payments
and, to a much lesser extent, primary deficits. With the burst of the most recent crisis, though,
the latter equilibrium was broken and a significant contribution of public deficits pushed public
debt upwards. Deficit-debt adjustments (stock-flow reconciliation) exerted a significant impact,
in particular over the period 2010-2013.
1.3 Institutional Framework
1.3.1 The process of fiscal decentralization in Spain
Spain is currently one of the most decentralized countries in the European Union. As men-
tioned before, in 2017, 50% of general government expenditure was carried out by subnational
governments, with about 36% and 14% in the hands of regional governments and local govern-
ments, respectively (see Figure 1.5, second panel). This was the outcome of a gradual transfer
of responsibilities for the management of specific services from the central government to the
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Figure 1.3: The determinants of changes in Regional Governments’ debt (changes
as a percent of GDP) in the period 1995-2017.
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CCAAs since the beginning of the 1980s. In particular, CCAAs were responsible for 92% of
public expenditure on healthcare and 91% in education in 2016, and they managed a significant
part of other expenditure functions.
The transfer of expenditure responsibilities from the central government to the CCAAs
has, however, neither come about at the same pace, nor have they been on the same scale in all
CCAAs. The main differences concern the time at which the various CCAAs took over education
and health competencies. On the one hand, the regions that gained autonomy through article 143
of the Spanish Constitution did not assume the respective management of educational and health
services until the 1990s and early twenty-first century. On the other, Andalusia, the Canary
Islands, Catalonia, Galicia and the Valencia Community, along with the Basque Country and
Navarre, namely the regions that gained autonomy through article 151 of the Constitution and
those with their own specific status due to their historical jurisdiction (the so-called “Re´gimen
Foral”), assumed health and education responsibilities practically from the beginning of the
1980s.
In parallel to this process of devolution of expenditure responsibilities to the regions, a
financing system for the subnational governments was also progressively developed (see Figure
1.5, first panel, on the extent of revenue decentralization). Again, the process was not completely
homogeneous across regions. In particular, a distinction should be drawn between the ordinary-
regime CCAAs (all except the Basque Country and Navarre), with partial fiscal autonomy, and
the specific-status CCAAs (the Basque Country and Navarre), which have full fiscal autonomy
with the exception of customs tariffs.
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Figure 1.4: Autonomous Communities’ (regional governments) debt evolution in
the period 1995-2017: changes as a percent of GDP.
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In essence, the Basque country provincial authorities (A´lava, Guipu´zcoa y Vizcaya) and
Navarre’s regional government have the power to maintain, establish and regulate, inside their
territory, the tax regime, taking into account some coordinating provisions established with the
central government, which basically imply that the effective overall tax burden arising from their
regulatory power must not be lower than the existing in the rest of the country. Accordingly,
they are responsible for collecting all taxes except those included in Customs Revenue and those
raised through Fiscal Monopolies. As a consequence of the fact that the taxes collected by these
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regions include almost all those existing, while at the same time the central government provides
some services in these regions (defence, diplomatic representation, etc.), the Basque Country
and Navarre transfer some of their resources to the centre, by means of the so-called “Cupo”,
in order to contribute to the financing of these services.
The financing arrangements for the ordinary-regime CCAAs have been developed over time
on the basis of five-year agreements. In this regard, the so called Fiscal and Financial Policy
Council (Consejo de Pol´ıtica Fiscal y Financiera, CPFF, hereafter) played a key role. The
Council is composed of the nation-wide ministers of Economy and Finance and of the CCAA
ministers of Finance, and acts as a consultative and discussion body with wide-ranging tasks
relating to the co-ordination of the CCAAs financial activity. The agreements reached within
the CPFF form the basis for developing the CCAAs financing arrangements.
1.3.2 The fiscal rules framework
From the outset of the introduction of the modern welfare state in Spain, subnational gov-
ernments were subject to some constraints and limitations on their capacity to borrow and/or
generate budget deficits. In the case of the CCAAs, they were empowered to take on debt, albeit
subject to certain limits. Specifically, credit operations at less than one year were to be used to
cover temporary treasury requirements, while credit operations at over one year, should meet
the following requirements: (i) that the total amount of the credit is earmarked for financing
investment spending; and (ii) that the annual amount of debt repayments plus interest does not
exceed twenty five percent of the CCAAs’ current revenues. For the arrangement of credit op-
erations abroad and for debt issuance and any other resort to public credit, the CCAAs require
the authorization of the central government.
CCAAs’ credit operations should be coordinated among the CCAAs themselves and in keep-
ing with the central government’s debt policy, with the CCAAs obliged to submit an annual
debt programme to the central government. Once the programme has been agreed, it entails
the automatic authorization of all the operations contained therein. The application of the pro-
gramme may be changed by a region following a new proposal to the government. Further, the
central government itself may suspend the programme on a precautionary basis should there be
exceptional circumstances that might hamper the Treasury’s financial policy or involve imbal-
ances in the relationship between the level of external and domestic debt. For more details on
national fiscal rules of application to the conduction of CCAAs budgetary policies, see Annex
A.
1.4 Empirical analysis
In this section we move to the study of the determinants of the evolution of regional public
debt, measured its change in terms of regional GDP. We do so by estimating empirical models
in which we exploit the pool structure of our data: 17 regions over the period 1995-2017. The
analysis we exploit the rich structure of institutional changes that happened over that long time
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Figure 1.5: International comparison of sub-national governments’ revenues and
expenditures (2017).
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span6 to pose testable hypothesis on the impact of fiscal decentralization and fiscal rules. In
addition, we include in the analysis political economy and market-disciple indicators.
1.4.1 Data and hypotheses to be tested
In line with the extant literature, we include diverse channels that may affect the evolution
of debt such as economic, political and institutional factors. Table 1.1 represents the main
channels, and the variables used to test the main theoretical hypotheses. Apart from the common
variables used in the literature, we also include a number of less conventional variables linked
6The time period for the empirical analysis is selected due to data availability constraints.
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to the structure of public debt and market disciple measurement.
Table 1.1: Variables and expected impact on debt changes.
Channels Expected impact
Economic factors
Economic Cycle (t-1) -
Inflation deviation -
GDP per capita deviation +/-
House inflation deviation -
Fiscal Rules
Fiscal Rules -
FR x Economic growth deviation +
FR x Budgetary Balance deviation +/-
FR x Debt/GDP (t-1) deviation -
Institutional factors
Revenue autonomy -
Vertical Fiscal Imbalances +
Health expenditure +/-
Education expenditure +/-
Investment expenditure +/-
Political factors
Electoral date distance -
Concordance +/-
% Left-wing MPs +/-
% Regionalist MPs +/-
Market Discipline
Rating (t-1) +
Short/long term debt +/-
Securites/Loans debt -
Non-resident/resident debt -
Implicit interest -
Issuance interest -
Budget compliance (t-1) -/+
Non-EDP debt
Fund for suppliers’ payments +
Public companies debt +
Commercial debt +
Economic variables used as controls As regards the economic factors, we follow closely
the definitions and variables of Argimo´n and Herna´ndez de Cos (2012). Economic theory has
highlighted the economic cycle as a fundamental determinant of budget balances and, as a con-
sequence, of changes in public debt. We use budget compliance over GDP to understand the
effect of deficits on the debt accumulation.7 In economic downturns budget deficits increase,
either through the operation of automatic stabilizers or through the impact of counter-cyclical
discretionary fiscal policies designed to stabilize the economy, while the opposite occurs in ex-
pansions.8 In addition to this channel, economic growth erodes the stock of public debt when
measured as a percent of GDP. Indeed, even high debt ratios can be sustainable in a framework
7We measure the budget compliance as the difference between the actual budget in cash terms and the initial
budget. Thus a positive value would entail compliance.
8Some authors point out, however, that the higher revenues in economic boom periods may generally entail
pressure on the growth of public spending, in such a way that the relationship between the economic cycle and
the budget balance may be altered or, at least, evidence asymmetrical behaviour over the course of the cycle. See
Morris and Schuknecht (2007), on related grounds.
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of healthy economic growth, while in a situation of low or negative growth even low debt ratios
can turn out to be non-sustainable. We include in our analysis the lag of yearly real growth rate
of each CCAA (variable Economic cycle), taken from the Annual Regional Accounts published
by the Spanish Statistical Office (INE).
Among the set of economic factors, we also include the deviation from the regional average of
GDP per capita as control variable as a measure of the degree of economic development,9 but the
relation with the debt evolution is not straight-forward. Ceteris paribus, a richer CCAA would
have more margin of manoeuvre to cope with a debt surge, while at the same time because of
the larger resources it may find it easier to obtain private financing at a lower cost, encouraging
it to increase its debt more. In general, at a country level experiences very diverse experience,
having some of the richest countries with enormous amounts of debt, such a Japan.
Another relevant economic factor behind debt accumulation may be the evolution of prices,
as prescribed by the government budget constraint. Here the literature usually emphasizes the
role of asset prices that may affect fiscal outcomes basically through the tax system (taxes on
capital gains and losses, taxes on transaction, and tax relief, in particular, in the Spanish case,
for house purchases). In the case of Spain, financial and non-financial assets form the basis of
certain taxes managed and collected by CCAAs. Available information for variables that could
capture asset prices at the regional level is scarce. Because of its relevance in the boom period
(1995-2007) and its availability, housing prices might be a good proxy to capture the incidence
of assets on regional public finances. We define a variable as follows: deviation of the change in
each region’s index of housing prices with respect to the national mean.
More generally, overall inflation is a factor that is typically considered as key in the debt
ratio determination although it may exercise opposing forces over the debt accumulation. On
one hand, the indirect effect the inflation may have over the tax revenues (depending on the
degree of wage indexation) and the direct through its deflating effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio
may be compensated by the increase of expenditures that are indexed to price evolution. 10 The
incidence of price changes (measured by the changes in the CPI) will be captured by a variable
defined as the deviation of each region’s inflation in relation with the national mean, in such a
way that possible common trends are taken care of.
Fiscal Rules Fiscal rules in Spain have increased in variety and strength over the past decades.
Therefore, it is vital to clarify whether the rules have been effective or not. In order to do so,
we consider the measure of the strength of fiscal rules developed by the European Commission,
9This deviation is measured as the GDPpc divided by the average GDPpc multiplied by 100.
10Apart from the impact on nominal GDP (the denominator of the debt ratio), higher inflation may increase
the budget deficit through higher nominal interest rates and a higher real cost of purchases of goods and services
or investment and, in general, of those items of public spending that can be indexed (e.g., pensions and wages).
In the presence of non-indexed taxes, inflation may also generate higher revenues if, for instance, the tax rates
are progressive. See Herna´ndez de Cos et al. (2016).
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the so called Fiscal Rules Index, that is available for the whole period of study.11 Public debt
developments may be affected by the presence of different types of fiscal rules insofar as they
supposedly pose a permanent constraint on fiscal policy. In addition to their role in enhancing
fiscal discipline, such fiscal rules may further contribute to the reduction of uncertainty about
future fiscal policy developments (see Plekhanov, 2005)[, for a discussion of rules-based controls
on regional governments’ borrowing compared to other alternatives]. One of the main hypothesis
that we intend to contrast is whether fiscal rules have subdued the surge of regional debt, i.e.
if the rules have had the expected dissuasive effect. Thus, if fiscal rules are effective, we would
expect that an increase in strength of rules will entail a moderation of the upward evolution of
the debt. We also include the interaction of this index with three variables: lagged economic
growth, the lag of the deviation of budget balances with respect to the average for all CCAA,
and the lag of the deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio to the average.12 The main idea is to test
whether fiscal rules are more effective depending on the economic situation of the CCAA.
Thus, while there are no previous insights about the effectiveness of fiscal rules when economic
growth is higher or smaller, it is plausible to think that if a CCAA has a stronger growth, the
central government would be more stringer in the application of rules in this case, and thus
rules would be more effective. Therefore, we would expect a negative impact for the interacted
variable. A similar reasoning may be applied to the other interacted variables. If the budget
balance ratio is worse for a CCAA in t-1, i.e. it has a higher deficit or a smaller surplus, fiscal
rules would be effective if in the current year the debt does not grow as much. This would
mean that the rules are effective for those CCAA with less sound finances. In the case of the
debt interaction variable, when a CCAA has a higher debt the fiscal rules would be effective if
the impact is negative, meaning that the higher the debt, the less would grow the debt on the
following period. It may be noted that in previous studies, such as Argimo´n and Herna´ndez
de Cos (2012) and Delgado-Te´llez et al. (2016), fiscal rules do not seem to be very effective in
deterring the deficit non-compliance. Therefore, we would not expect a high effectiveness of
fiscal rules in controlling debt evolution.
Political and institutional factors The literature has proven the necessity of including
political and institutional factors in the standard analysis (typically focused on the study of
budget balances) to explain the persistence of budget deficits and the accumulation of debt in
advanced economies. In our analysis we include a number of political variables: (i) ideology,
measured, first, by the percentage of left-wing MPs over the total seats of regional parliaments,
and second, by the percent of regionalist parties’ MPs (parties that only operate in a given region,
and do not form part explicitly or implicitly, of a national party) over the total number of seats
11See https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/fiscal-rules-database en. The new index is a normalized one, with
an starting value of -0.45 to an ending value of 2.27. We have rescaled the variable so that there are no negative
values that could hinder the estimation sign interpretation
12Budgetary Balances are obtained from the National Accounts (NA) data published by the Finance Ministry.
Because data is only available at an annual basis from 2000 onwards, the beginning of the sample is completed
using the public accounts’ budgetary data (cash-based). This strategy will be used for all series. We use the lag
of the Budget Balance over GDP to prevent any endogeneity possible in the analysis.
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of the regional parliament; the first variable aims at capturing potential pro-spending biases
depending on the ideological orientation of the regional government, while the second could be
instrumental for testing the existence of different attitudes towards public debt accumulation
depending on the scope of the objective function of the regional government; in both cases there
are no specific assumptions; (ii) a dummy for the political concordance of the center and the
periphery (region), that measures the political alignment between the government of a given
region and the central government; (iii) electoral cycle: instead of the standard election dummy
that display a value of one in an election year and a zero otherwise, we use a transformation
of the original variable to measure proximity to elections, computed as a continuous variable
as the distance to elections (see Franzese Jr, 2002; Franzese, 2000; Mink & de Haan, 2005).13
This variable takes the value of one in the electoral year, and in the next period it would take
1/number of years left until next election, and so on14. There are two possible expectations
about the impact of the electoral cycle. First, the year after elections, governments may start
new investment projects, with the intention of finishing them before the next electoral date.
Thus, debt would increase the most in the first years of the electoral cycle. But, on the other
hand, expenditure tends to increase the near the electoral date is. Thus it would imply a surge
of debt to finance the extra-expenditure.
Fiscal federalism-related control variables The territorial organization of a country has
also been signaled by the extant literature as a further determinant of the fiscal situation, either
measured by the fiscal balance or by the stock of debt. In particular, the responsibilities assumed
by the regions, the instruments for financing them, and the relationships between regional and
central governments are all factors that certainly affect the aggregate fiscal outcomes of a given
country and, more specifically, the distribution of fiscal outcomes among the different layers of
government. In particular, the literature has devoted some effort to the existence of a so-called
soft budget constraint problem whereby a regional government may have incentives to conduct
an undisciplined fiscal policy under the expectation that the central government will intervene
in case of trouble (see Delgado-Te´llez et al., 2016; Kornai et al., 2003; Qian & Roland, 1998;
Sorribas-Navarro, 2012).
Following the literature we include in our analysis some alternative measures of fiscal co-
responsibility, measured by: (i) Tax autonomy, the ratio of taxes over which the regions do have
normative power, over their total non-financial revenues in NA terms;15 (ii) The ratios of expen-
diture on education and health over regional GDP that represent the evolution of expenditure
decentralization over the last 22 years.16 Also the ratio of investment over total expenditure is
used as a proxy of voluntary spending. (iii) Vertical Fiscal imbalances which is proxied following
13On electoral cycles and budgetary outcomes see, for example, Von Hagen (2010) or Mink and de Haan (2005).
14Thus, if there are 4 years between elections, the variable would take 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1
15The period 1995-1999 is obtained as a linear extrapolation with the execution data, as the NA accounts only
cover the period 2000-2017. All NA data comes from the General Intervention Board of the State Administration
website
16Yearly disaggregated data is available separately the COFOG publication available at the Finance Ministry,
being 2016 the last year available.
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Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) by the difference of total revenues and total expenditure, both net
of transfers with the other subsectors of public administration. The literature argues that there
should be correspondence between the extent of a given region’s spending responsibilities and
its fiscal autonomy (fiscal co-responsibility), the latter being understood as the ability of the
regions to generate income to finance that spending. Otherwise, vertical fiscal imbalances could
emerge in the regions that would be usually filled by federal transfers. These transfers distort the
relationship that should exist between the level of taxes and the benefits obtained by citizens,
creating a common pool problem. As regards the impact of own revenue decentralization on
fiscal balances, Governatori, Yim, et al. (2012) discuss that theory does not provide clear predic-
tions. On the one hand, a high value of a tax autonomy means that regional governments have
more own resources to cover a given amount of expenditures, leading to better fiscal balances.
On the other hand, one has to acknowledge that this type of variable conveys no information
on the relative size of regional own revenues compared to their expenditures, which is probably
a better way to capture regional governments incentives to behave in a financially responsible
way. In addition, the impact of revenue decentralization may also differ depending on the share
of transfers/taxes in CCAAs’ revenues.
Market discipline, structure of debt Beyond the factors analysed in the previous para-
graphs, the ability to increase debt by a given level of administration is fully determined by its
ability to raise the necessary funds. In addition to increasing taxes or decreasing expenditure,
the CCAA need external financing (national or international). Thus, either investors buy the
debt of a CCAA or banks grant loans to the regions. One may conjecture that market pres-
sure might be a key determinant on the change in public debt. The case of Spain is not one
in which there is full reliance on capital markets to contain sub-national borrowing, as in the
cases of Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. The latter are cases in which the central
government does not set any limits on regional government’s borrowing, so that these levels of
government are free to decide the form of borrowing, and may decide by themselves to adopt
a fiscal rule in an attempt to enhance their credit standing in the market.17 Before 2012, in
the Spanish framework regional governments were constrained by upper-level rules, as described
above, while at the same time were subject to strict market scrutiny. But, the introduction of
the FLA implied a change in the legal framework, imposing to those CCAA that decided to
enter the financing program a reinforced conditionality due to the factual loss of the market
discipline, as CCAA stopped depending on investors to finance their needs.
To approach the influence of market discipline, we explore the following control variables:
(i) the implicit interest rate, as a measure of the market pressure 18; (ii) the aggregate average
issuance cost rate is used, but taking into account a caveat, and that is that some CCAA do
not generally access to markets for getting financing for their debt. But it is a fair proxy for the
17In Switzerland, after an episode of soaring debt over the 90’s, the Government introduced a debt brake rule,
which is a highly strict rule, according to which the deficit of one year must be compensated in the next years, as
explained by Bodmer (2006).
18Measured as the ratio of interest payments over the stock of debt
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market distress CCAA may have to confront when they need market financing; (iii) a number
of variables linked to the composition of debt, as follows. First, the ratings in last period may
impact the debt evolution, because the lower the ratings the harder should be to issue new debt.
Second, the ratio of short-to-long run debt, being short term debt the one with a maturity less or
equal to 12 months. Short-term debt could be associated with the reaction to sudden changes in
market sentiment. Thus, it is not always a negative indicator, because a Government may expect
a reduction of interest in the near future, and therefore it would prefer short term debt until costs
decrease.19 In a framework of worsened perception about a given sovereign, though, increased
reliance on short-term debt can lead to a heightened vulnerabilities, as worsening perceptions of
a given region’s creditworthiness can quickly feed into higher interest costs. Third, the ratio of
securities to loans, with the prior in mind that loans could be more easily obtained in somewhat
“captive” markets vs. open competition to capture investors in securities. In the particular
case of the regions of Spain, regional savings banks (“Cajas de ahorros”) typically assumed a
role as CCAAs bankers. And finally, the ratio of debt held by non-resident vs. that held by
residents, might be also a measure of stress in the markets as, a priori, in the case of undisciplined
governments that are perceived as pursuing unsustainable fiscal policies, non-residents tend to
react more quickly and shift portfolios towards more secure assets than residents.
Additional control variables: pressure from units accounted for outside the bound-
aries of the General Government sector In particular, we consider the two non-EDP debt
measures described in Section 1.2: the debt of public corporations owned by a given region, and
the “other accounts payable”. Indeed, the related literature would suggest that: (i) under tight
budgetary rules a government may try to circumvent the constraints by cutting transfers to
public corporations that, in turn, can finance the same spending by issuing debt that is not
computed by means of the same accounting standards used to define the rule (typically as in
National Accounts); (ii) an excessive level of non-standard debt may end up generating pres-
sure on the responsible government to bail-out the external indebtedness vehicle.20 (iii) The
commercial debt may be used as a buffer in time of crisis, encouraging governments to delay
payments to their suppliers, as it actually occurred in Spain up to 2011. We also include an
informed dummy of the FFPP payments in percentage of GDP. This includes all the payments
of the suppliers of the CCAA made by the central government funds.
1.4.2 The empirical model
The incidence of the different determinants on the changes in public debt mentioned in the
previous section will be tested by means of a standard econometric model that can be specified
in quite general terms as:
19Some papers have found short-term debt to be an indicator of vulnerability to international financial crises:
Borensztein et al. (2004),Rodrik and Velasco (1999), Bussie`re and Mulder (1999).
20On a discussion about the role of public sector enterprises in Spain see Ferna´ndez Llera and Garc´ıa Valin˜as
(2013).
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∆
Dit
Yit
= αi +
N∑
j=1
βj Ωjit + it (1.3)
Under the proposed approach, the change in public debt of each regional government,i, at
time t, ∆DitYit , depends on a set of control variables, Ω, encompassing the economic, political,
institutional, market-induced and non-EDP factors mentioned above. Following the traditional
fixed-effects model, αi in equation (1.3) aims at capturing all the unobservable CCAA effects that
are time-unvarying, while it is an error term assumed to be white noise. As for the estimation
method, and in order to avoid any biases stemming from the possible correlation between the
individual effects and the regressors, we estimate model (1.3) in first differences. Moreover,
given the possible simultaneity of some of the control variables and the dependent variable, the
estimation is carried out by the Generalized Method of Moments (Arellano & Bond, 1991), using
as instruments lagged regressors.
For robustness, we also estimate a fix effect model that is not estimated in inter-temporal
differences. Thus we don’t include the lag of the dependent variable in this estimation. It
includes a fix effect for CCAA. Main results do no differ between both kinds of models. We
have chosen the fix effect instead of the random effect model following the Hausman test criteria
results, otherwise we would have estimated a random effect model.
1.4.3 Results
The results are shown in tables 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5. The two first result tables include two
different samples, the whole sample (1995-2017) and a sample without the recent crisis period
(1995-2007) for the sake of robustness, as well as the Fix Effect models estimation.
In Table 1.2 we explore the role of the main economic variables and of the fiscal rules. In
Table 1.3 we focus on studying the institutional and political factors. The effect of the different
measures related with the market discipline is shown in Table 1.4, while in Table 1.5 we consider
the impact of the debt (non-EDP) of public corporations and other accounts payable on the
CCAA’s debt.
Beginning with the baseline model shown in Table 1.2, there are six models included in this
table. The first two columns show the GMM model whole sample, the second two the GMM
model with a restricted sample from 1995 to 2007, and finally the last two columns show the
fix effect model for the whole sample. The dependent variable is the change in the ratio of debt
over GDP. The first conclusion we may draw from the results is that CCAA debt does not seem
to follow an explosive path as both the lagged variable and the lag level of debt show a negative
impact on the change of debt that in the case of the level of debt is highly significant. This
means that whenever the level of debt or the change in debt increases in the previous year, the
change in debt will be subdued in the current one. This is probably due to a combination of
factors, first, if CCAA debt increases, the central government would control more thoroughly
the finances of the CCAA, and second, it would be harder for the CCAA to finance this surge
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of debt at a reasonable cost, encouraging a stronger fiscal effort to reduce the deficit.
The second main result from the estimations is that among the economic evolution deter-
minants, only economic growth seems to matter in the debt evolution.21 Meanwhile, GDP per
capita deviation has a negative but weak impact, signalling that those CCAA that have a higher
GDP per capita tend to have less accumulation of debt. Nor the Price Index neither the house
price inflation seem to have any significant impact on debt evolution.
Other two relevant variables included in this table are the budgetary compliance and the
Fund for Suppliers’ Payments variable. The former, has a puzzling outcome because it is not
significant in the GMM models, and only it is significant in the fix effect model. If the sign of the
coefficient is negative, as it is in the fixed effects and the long sample GMM, it means that fiscal
non-compliance in the past does not restrict regional governments in the present. The latter has
a significant and direct effect on debt evolution as expected, because the funds received since
2012 rose directly the amount of standard debt. Thus, we use the contemporaneous data in
order to take into account this specific shock of the transformation of the commercial debt in
EDP debt.
Still in Table 1.2, the last four variables are the ones related with the fiscal rules. First, fiscal
rules strength index (FRI) in the previous period does not have a significant impact on the debt
variation. This is a very striking result, as it is expected that fiscal rules would entail a break
on the debt evolution. But, as shown in other previous studies such as Argimo´n and Herna´ndez
de Cos (2012) or Delgado-Te´llez et al. (2016), current fiscal rules are not very effective in coping
with fiscal non-compliance (deficit control). In Spain, most of the central government control
until recently was concentrated on deficit targets compliance. There were no specific debt targets
until 2012. Notwithstanding, there are some significant results when interacting the fiscal rules
index with GDP growth, the budget balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio in deviations from
the CCAA average. As it appears, fiscal rules would tend to be more effective when economic
growth is lower and when debt levels are higher and when budgetary balance are worse, but in
this case, this result is not significant in the main GMM model. Thus, the two last results are
as expected, but it is slightly puzzling that fiscal rules are more effective when economic growth
is more dimmed. This could be rationalized if one considers that in bad economic times public
finances can be at stress, and tight rules might be necessary to cope with potential sustainability
problems.
In Table 1.3 we focus on the analysis of two main channels, the political and the institutional
factors. Political factors seem to have a weak effect. Curiously, the only political variable that
has some effect is the weight of regional party parliamentarians but neither in the short GMM
nor in the FE has any significance. More interesting is the results of the institutional factors’
impact. The revenue autonomy plays a key role in debt evolution, as expected. When CCAA
have a larger share of their revenues coming from taxes and other sources of revenue that are
21We use the lag of the GDP growth to avoid possible endogeneity problems.
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directly controlled by the regional government, debt seems to be more stable. This is because
first, they can better anticipate the amounts of revenues they will have in an specific year, in
contrast to a situation of heightened dependence on central government transfers, and second,
regional governments would have more margin of manoeuvre because they could raise tax rates
instead of relying on new debt. In the same sense, Vertical Fiscal Imbalances have a direct
impact on debt increases, as expected. Finally, only the health expenditure variable displays
a direct and significant impact on the dependent variables. This may have to do with the
rigidity of health expenditure, with enormous fixed costs and the social resistance to decrease
this specific expenditure.
Table 1.4 includes the analysis of the role of market-discipline related variables. The following
additional results in this table can be underlined: (i) the two proxies for the cost of financing, the
implicit interest rate and the issuance rate behave similarly. An increase in implicit interest rate
and the issuance interest rate discourages the increases in debt. Thus the increase in costs would
have a deterrent effect on CCAA to augment the debt.22 (ii) market discipline due to ratings
evolution does not seem to work, as the results are not significant in neither of the samples and
the sign even changes. (iii) Neither the ratio of short to long term debt nor the ratio of loans
by non-residents vs. by residents has a significant effect. In the first case it matches with our
hypothesis of ambiguity of the short-long ratio. In the second, it may have to do with a problem
related with the data, because it only includes the loans held by foreigner banks and local ones.
But there is no data available about securities, and the holding structure of securities may be
different from that of loans. (iv) Finally, The ratio of securities over loans presents a negative
significant sign. This ratio would imply that regional governments with better access to less
“captive” investors (those buying securities) tend to be more disciplined from a fiscal point of
view. Thus it would seem that some degree of market discipline is in place.
Finally, in Table 1.5 we show some estimated models to assess the linkages between regional
governments’ debt and their public corporations’ (EEPP) debt and commercial debt23. There
is no significant effect of the amount of public companies debt. Meanwhile, the commercial
debt has a direct and significant impact on debt evolution, so that the dynamic evolution of
commercial debt has some predictive power over regional, EDP debt. Even though we do not
show it in the table, the results for this variable are alike for the short period 1995-2007.
22In the GMM model, the contemporaneous lag of implicit interest rate is included in the estimation so that
endogeneity problem may be solved. On the contrary, we considered that the issuance interest rate does no have
the problem of endogeneity as it is an average variable of all CCAAs and the data is common for all of them.
Therefore the increase in debt in one CCAA should not have a very significant effect on the average issuance rate
23This variable, though, is only available for the aggregate of CCAA.
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1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we study the evolution and the determinants of regional’s debt evolution
(measured by the change in public debt). The main results of the analysis are as follows. First,
political factors played a limited role. Second, fiscal rules also played a limited role, being
effective only in bad economic times periods and in situations of high debt. Third, “the fiscal
decentralization design”, i.e. the distribution of revenues and expenditure competencies, is
extremely relevant in keeping debt subdued. Fourth, market-disciple plays a role in regional
public finances evolution. And fifth, commercial debt seems to have been used as a substitute
for regular debt.
Some policy conclusions are worth mentioning. First, the lack of effectiveness of fiscal rules
might be read in relation to the economic literature that emphasizes that a set of features are
crucial to achieve a certain incidence of any fiscal rule on the behaviour of governments. In this
regard, issues such as transparency, the possibility and credibility of penalties for noncompliance,
and the existence of independent institutions responsible for monitoring compliance appear as
determinants of the success of the fiscal rules. Second, as argued by Oates (2008), fiscal discipline
may be enhanced when sub-national governments’ spending competences are funded to a larger
extent with own revenues. Indeed, in previous studies for the Spanish case, such as Delgado-
Te´llez et al. (2016), vertical fiscal imbalances play a key role in fiscal non-compliance. Third,
market discipline may be key in influencing regional governments fiscal prudence. Fourth, be
aware of possible law loopholes. The EDP debt definition does not include as part of the standard
definition of debt some potential risks, such as the commercial debt or the public companies
debt. Nevertheless, these debts may become standard debt under extraordinary circumstances.
Thus, higher level authorities should take into account possible shortcuts governments may use
to fulfil targets that do not entail a healthier financial situation. Therefore, commercial debt
and public companies debt should be considered as risk for the debt sustainability.
Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda 29
Essays on the subnational government’s indebtedness
1.6 Tables
Table 1.2: The determinants of regional governments’ debt changes (changes as a
percent of GDP): baseline models.
Dependent variable: ∆ EDP debt GMM (1995-2017) GMM (1995-2007) FE (1995-2017)
Lagged dependent variable
-0.12∗ -0.13∗ -0.13 -0.23∗ - -
(0.06) (0.07) (0.16) (0.13) - -
Economic cycle (t-1)
-0.16∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Budgetary compliance (t-1)
-0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.10 -0.30∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07)
EDP debt (t-1)
-0.15∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.17) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
FFPP
0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ - - 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) - - (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation deviation
0.06 -0.04 -0.16 -0.21∗ -0.16 -0.25
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18)
GDP per capita deviation
-0.07∗ -0.07∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
House Price deviation
-0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Fiscal Rules x Balance deviation (t-1)
- -0.03 - -0.10∗∗ - -0.10∗∗∗
- (0.03) - (0.05) - (0.03)
Fiscal Rules x growth deviation (t-1)
- 0.09∗∗∗ - 0.05 - 0.12∗∗∗
- (0.02) - (0.04) - (0.02)
Fiscal Rules x debt deviation (t-1)
- -0.03∗∗∗ - -0.05 - -0.00
- (0.01) - (0.03) - (0.00)
Fiscal Rules Index (t-1)
-0.07 - -0.04 - 0.06 -
(0.10) - (0.07) - (0.07) -
Number of observations 357 357 187 187 374 374
R-squared - - - - 0.72 0.75
Hansena 0.50 0.43 0.95 0.75 - -
m1 0.02 0.09 0.63 0.48 - -
m2 0.36 0.22 1.00 0.71 - -
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag of the endogenous variable.
a. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982), which is asymptotically
distributed chi-squared under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid. A p-value equal or
higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models m1 and m2 are
the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 1.3: The determinants of regional governments’ debt changes (changes as a
percent of GDP): Political and Fiscal decentralisation variables
Dependent variable: ∆ EDP debt GMM (1995-2017) GMM (1995-2007) FE (1995-2017)
Lagged dependent variable
-0.12∗ -0.13∗ -0.15 -0.25 - -
(0.06) (0.07) (0.17) (0.17) - -
Economic cycle
-0.16∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Budgetary compliance (t-1)
-0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.40∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06)
EDP debt (t-1)
-0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01)
FFPP
0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ - - 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) - - (0.01) (0.01)
Fiscal co-responsibility
- -0.04∗∗ - -0.02∗ - 0.00
- (0.01) - (0.01) - (0.01)
Vertical Fiscal Imbalances
- 0.09∗∗∗ - 0.07∗∗ - 0.05
- (0.03) - (0.03) - (0.03)
Education expenditure over GDP
- -0.16 - 0.01 - 0.30∗
- (0.21) - (0.13) - (0.16)
Health expenditure over GDP
- 0.48∗∗∗ - 0.25 - 0.52∗∗∗
- (0.11) - (0.24) - (0.10)
Investment expenditure over GDP
- -0.14 - 0.10 - 0.10
- (0.19) - (0.20) - (0.11)
Concordance centre-periphery
0.17 - -0.05 - 0.17∗ -
(0.19) - (0.10) - (0.10) -
% Left-wing parties MPs
-0.01 - -0.00 - 0.00 -
(0.02) - (0.02) - (0.01) -
Pro-autonomy
0.03∗∗ - -0.00 - 0.00 -
(0.01) - (0.02) - (0.00) -
Distance to elections
-0.11 - 0.04 - 0.04 -
(0.07) - (0.08) - (0.16) -
Number of observations 343 324 187 154 360 341
R-Squared - - - - 0.709 0.78
Hansena 0.565 0.496 0.96 0.98 - -
m1 0.0561 0.0162 0.64 0.86 - -
m2 0.340 0.127 0.90 0.32 - -
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag of the endogenous variable.
a. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982), which is asymptoti-
cally distributed chi-squared under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid. A p-value equal
or higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models m1 and m2
are the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 1.4: The determinants of regional governments’ debt changes (changes as a
percent of GDP): Market discipline.
Dependent variable: ∆ EDP debt GMM (1995-2017) FE (1995-2017)
Lagged dependent variable
0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 - -
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) - -
Economic cycle
-0.15∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Budgetary compliance (t-1)
0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.24∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
EDP debt (t-1)
-0.25∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
FFPP
0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rating (t-1)
-0.12 - 0.00 - - -
(0.08) - (0.06) - - -
Ratio short/long term debt
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Ratio Securities / Loans
-0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Ratio debt non-residents / residents
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Implicit interest rate
-0.39∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ - - -0.10∗∗∗ -
(0.10) (0.06) - - (0.02) -
Issuance interest rate
- - -0.04 -0.05∗∗ - -0.07∗∗
- - (0.02) (0.03) - (0.03)
Number of observations 293 357 293 357 374 374
R-squared - - - - 0.75 0.74
Hansena 0.28 0.17 0.43 0.43 - -
m1 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 - -
m2 0.20 0.29 0.94 0.62 - -
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag of the endogenous variable.
a. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982), which is asymptotically
distributed chi-squared under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid. A p-value equal or
higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models m1 and m2 are
the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 1.5: The determinants of regional governments’ debt changes (changes as a
percent of GDP): Non EDP components (public corporations owned by regional
governments and other accounts payable).
Dependent variable: ∆ EDP debt GMM (1995-2017) FE (1995-2017)
Lagged dependent variable
-0.28∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ 0.03 - - -
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) - - -
Economic cycle
-0.15∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
EDP debt (t-1)
-0.08∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EEPP debt (t-1)
-0.08 - -0.00 0.14 - 0.60∗∗∗
(0.56) - (0.68) (0.12) - (0.13)
∆ EEPP debt
- -0.24 - - -0.36∗ -
- (0.25) - - (0.20) -
Commercial debt (t-1)
1.65∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ - 1.37∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ -
(0.29) (0.28) - (0.11) (0.11) -
∆ Commercial debt (t-1)
- - 1.34∗∗∗ - - 1.18∗∗∗
- - (0.27) - - (0.16)
Number of observations 357 340 340 374 357 357
R-squared - - - 0.68 0.69 0.62
Hansena 0.10 0.12 0.03 - - -
m1 0.01 0.00 0.00 - - -
m2 0.59 0.59 0.36 - - -
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag of the endogenous variable.
a. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982), which is
asymptotically distributed chi-squared under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid. A
p-value equal or higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models
m1 and m2 are the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively.
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Annex A The fiscal rules framework affecting regional govern-
ments
From 1992, following the publication in March of Spain’s Convergence Programme, the so-
called Budgetary Consolidation Scenarios (BCS) were signed by the central government and
each of the CCAAs, further to bilateral negotiations, in which an specific maximum deficit
and debt allowed for each CCAA were determined. In March 1995, further to the revision of
the Convergence Programme in July 1994, the commitments contained in the BCS were also
revised, and the ceilings for the period 1995-1997 were specified. These were changed once again
following the approval of the first Stability and Growth Programme in December 1998.
The adoption by Spain of the Maastricht Treaty did not have any specific bearing on sub-
national governments’ fiscal rules. The subsequent milestone in the definition of the framework
of national fiscal rules took place in 2002. The budgetary stability law that came into force
in 2002 set a single limit for all CCAAs, though not in terms of debt but only in terms of the
budget balance. According to that law, CCAAs and local governments had to meet the principle
of budgetary stability, defined as the obligation to post a budget outturn that is in balance or
surplus. This law also defined the scheme of sanctions that may be imposed in the event of
non-compliance to the CCAAs.24 The law also provided that, in authorizing the arrangement
of credit operations abroad and the issuance of debt and any other resort to public credit, the
central government shall bear in mind compliance with the principle of budgetary stability.
A reform of the budgetary stability law was approved in May 2006, which entered into force
on 1 January 2008, enabling the central government and CCAAs to adapt their deficit and
surplus targets to the economy’s cyclical position. Specifically, it allowed the CCAAs to run
a deficit of 0.75 percent of GDP if economic growth was below a certain threshold25, to which
a further 0.25 percent of GDP might be added to finance increases in productive investment,
including that earmarked for research, development and innovation26. It likewise established
24Specifically, it states that if the CCAAs do not meet the obligations established under the law and if this
leads, in turn, to non-compliance with the obligations of the Stability and Growth Pact, the CCAAs shall assume,
in the portion attributable to them, the responsibilities arising from their conduct.
25These growth thresholds that determine the possibility of attaining a budget in deficit, in balance or in surplus
were set, for a period of three years, by the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the Minister of Economy
and Finance and further to a report by the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy of the Regional Governments
and the National Local Government Board. In particular, during this period of economic growth of less than 2%
was projected, the general government deficit could not exceed 1% of GDP (breaking down into a ceiling of 0.2%
of GDP for central government, 0.75% of GDP for the regional governments as a whole and 0.05% of GDP for
large municipalities). If economic growth was between 2% and 3%, general government should show a budget in
balance and, if growth exceeds 3%, a surplus should be run.
26In terms of the target-setting procedure, a report was first drawn up assessing the cyclical phase for the
following three years. On this basis, the BSL obliged the government to set, first, the budgetary stability target
for the three following years in the first half of each year, both for the general government sector as a whole and for
each of the agents comprising it; and, second, the State spending limit. Both should be approved by Parliament.
Once approved, the individual fiscal target for each regional government was set by means of bilateral negotiations
between the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the representatives of each regional government on the Fiscal
and Financial Policy Council.
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that a significant portion (in no case less than thirty percent) of investment programmes shall
be financed with gross saving of the CCAA in question, with only partial resort to debt being
permitted. In addition to the extension of the fiscal rules to the lower tiers of government,
the BSL had a clause saying that the State shall not take responsibility for the financing of
the deficits or public debt of the lower levels of government (no bail-out clause). As to the
monitoring procedure, the Ministry of Economy and Finance was required to submit a report to
the government before 1 October each year on the degree of compliance with the targets, and on
real cyclical developments during the year and deviations from the initial forecast. Should a risk
of non-compliance be discerned, a warning may be made to the government agent responsible. If
such non-compliance involved a higher-than-targeted deficit, the level of government in question
was also required to draw up an economic and financial rebalancing plan over a maximum
term of three years. Lastly, it stipulated that, if a deviation from targets prompts a breach
of the Stability and Growth Pact, the tier of government involved shall assume the attendant
proportion of the responsibilities that should arise from the breach. In addition, in the case of
the regional governments, compliance shall be taken into account in the State’s authorization
of credit operations and debt issues. Specifically, if the failure to meet the stability target takes
the form of a greater-than targeted deficit, all the regional government’s debt operations shall
require central government authorization27.
Finally, a constitutional reform was approved in September 2011 that enshrined in the Con-
stitution the obligation for all levels of government to adjust their conduct to the principle of
budgetary stability. The reform was followed by the approval of a new Law in 2012 28 that
details that the general government deficit in structural terms cannot exceed 0.4% of GDP, sets
a limit on government debt of 60% of GDP29 and an expenditure rule30. The 60% debt to GDP
limit is distributed as follows: 44% of GDP for the central government, 13% for all and each one
of the CCAAs, and 3% of local governments. Moreover, in 2014 a new law added a maximum
delay period for suppliers payments of 30 days as a stability target.
27 However, if the regional government had submitted the economic and financial plan to the Fiscal and Financial
Policy Council and the measures contained therein had been declared suitable by the Council, State authorization
for short-term credit operations that were not deemed to be external financing was not required.
28The budgetary stability and financial sustainability law (LOEFSP), for a more general description and analysis
of the 2012 budgetary stability law see Herna´ndez de Cos and Pe´rez (2013).
29Both of which should be achieved following a transition period up to 2020.
30This is an important novelty of the new rule. The expenditure rule has been defined in a similar manner as
the one incorporated in the 2011 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. In general terms the growth rate of
public spending should not exceed medium-term GDP growth unless it is accompanied by discretionary increases
in public revenue. The rule is applied not only to the central government but also to regions.
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Chapter 2
On the determinants of fiscal
non-compliance: an empirical
analysis of Spain’s regions
“La vida es una serie de colisiones con el futuro:
no es una suma de lo que hemos sido,
sino de lo que anhelamos ser”
“Muchos hombres, co´mo los nin˜os,
quieren una cosa pero no sus consecuencias”
Jose´ Ortega y Gasset
This chapter is based on Delgado-Te´llez et al. (2018).
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2. On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance: an empirical analysis of Spain’s regions
2.1 Introduction
The process of fiscal consolidation in Europe in the aftermath of the global and Euro sovereign
debt crisis has brought to the forefront the challenges of enforcing fiscal discipline in federal or
decentralized countries. The literature on fiscal federalism has attributed this challenge to the
presence of soft budget constraints at the subnational level,1 that is, the inability of subnational
governments (SNGs’) to keep fiscal deficit outcomes within targets set as part of fiscal consol-
idation strategies at the general government level. Soft budget constraints have been shown
to originate from the inability of central governments (CGs) to credibly commit to not bailing
out SNGs and, as a result, to not constrain SNGs fiscal outcomes (Vigneault, 2007). Soft bud-
gets have been shown to be driven by political motives, including re-election and government
formation and stability (Sato, 2007). They are aggravated by flawed intergovernmental fiscal
institutions, including large vertical fiscal imbalances, weak fiscal rules, and limited market disci-
pline (Rodden et al., 2003; Ter-Minassian, 2015). Flawed institutions act by raising expectations
among voters and creditors that the CG must be accountable in the event SNGs are not able to
fulfil their spending mandates or debt obligations.2 Soft budget constraints have been typically
assessed by exploring the determinants of fiscal outturns using fiscal reaction functions.3
A small but growing empirical literature on the implementation of fiscal consolidations offers
a different perspective. Rather than searching for reasons why fiscal outcomes cannot be con-
strained and targets enforced, it questions whether fiscal targets or the forecasts on which such
targets are based are set appropriately in the first place.4 A number of papers have shown that
official forecasts tend to be optimistic among advanced economies (Auerbach, 1999; Frankel &
Schreger, 2013; Jonung & Larch, 2006; Leal et al., 2008). Optimistic fiscal forecasts have been
attributed to difficulties in forecasting downturns and booms in real time (Beetsma et al., 2013).
Another set of factors is related to strategic considerations, which have been shown to be salient
in the EU among countries seeking to comply with the Maastricht convergence process (Strauch
et al., 2009) and ex ante deficit rules under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Beetsma
et al., 2013; Bru¨ck & Stephan, 2006).
This chapter contributes to both literatures by seeking to provide a better understanding
of the determinants of fiscal noncompliance at the subnational level. Fiscal noncompliance is
defined as SNG budget balance outturns below corresponding targets. The focus is to under-
stand whether fiscal noncompliance is the result of soft budgets or of technical and institutional
factors that result in unrealistic fiscal targets. An emerging empirical literature has begun to
1See Ter-Minassian (2015) for a review of this vast literature.
2Attempts to address some of the flaws in the context of the European Union (EU), in particular strengthening
fiscal rules without addressing others (for example, vertical fiscal imbalances), have been shown to be ineffective
(Foremny, 2014; Kotia & Lledo´, 2016).
3see Argimo´n and Herna´ndez de Cos (2012) for a review of this empirical literature.
4Reuter (2015) shows that the introduction of numerical fiscal limits enforced through fiscal rules, even if not
complied with, tilts fiscal policy outturns toward those numerical limits. So, in fact, compliance seems to matter
less than whether the chosen numerical limit was set to an optimal or appropriate level.
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look at the determinants of compliance in rules-based frameworks (Cordes et al., 2015; Reuter,
2015). However, this literature has mostly focused on national policies and has not discussed
the institutional and political considerations behind fiscal noncompliance.
This chapter proposes a conceptual framework that tries to distinguish the impact of a soft
budget constraint from that of fiscal forecasting and target setting on fiscal noncompliance. The
framework looks at both the capacity and the incentives to comply. It distinguishes between
events when SNGs have the capacity but not the incentives to comply with fiscal targets from
events when SNGs have the incentives but not the capacity for fiscal compliance. Fiscal non-
compliance is defined as voluntary under the former and involuntary under the latter. The
discussion argues that voluntary fiscal noncompliance is triggered by factors conducive to soft
budget constraints, whereas involuntary fiscal noncompliance is the result of factors conducive
to unrealistic or ambitious fiscal targets.
Political economy channels and politics take a front seat in this framework. The framework
shows that both voluntary and involuntary fiscal noncompliance occur mainly through political
economy channels that jointly influence CGs’ and SNGs’ decisions to, respectively, enforce and
comply with fiscal targets. Channels conducive to voluntary fiscal noncompliance act mainly by
increasing CGs’ political costs of enforcing and decreasing SNGs’ costs of noncomplying with
fiscal targets. Channels conducive to involuntary fiscal noncompliance are those that increase
CGs’ political cost of ensuring fiscal targets at the general government level are met, leading
the CG to shift the burden of meeting these targets to SNGs. Such costs are determined
by the impact such decisions have on the electoral, government formation, and other political
objectives government officials and their parties have at the central and subnational levels,
which is ultimately framed by politics and political institutions at the supranational, national,
and regional levels.
An empirical model is constructed to test this framework. From among a set of economic,
institutional, and political factors, the model identifies the ones most relevant to an understand-
ing of voluntary and involuntary fiscal noncompliance. The empirical model is estimated using
data from Spain’s Autonomous Communities. Spain’s Autonomous Communities (hereafter also
referred to as regions, regional governments, or simply RGs) makes for an interesting case study
for a number of reasons. RGs have gained significant political and fiscal autonomy over the past
four decades through a process of decentralization (Herna´ndez de Cos & Pe´rez, 2013). During
this period, regional governments have become accountable for delivering more than two-thirds
of social services, mostly in the health and education sectors (Lledo´, 2015). The Spanish de-
centralization has been asymmetric, with revenue and expenditure decentralization occurring at
different paces depending on the region, leading to both temporal and cross-sectional variations
in both fiscal and political autonomy indicators. Spain’s RGs have been subject to nominal bud-
get balance targets for the past two decades. Their record in meeting these targets, as discussed
below, has also varied significantly. And so has the rules-based framework used to monitor and
enforce compliance with those targets. In addition to fiscal rules, regions have been subject to
market imposed discipline, given that most RGs’ debt is regularly scrutinized by rating agen-
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cies. In this respect, Spain is one of the major subsovereign bond issuers worldwide, presenting
a significant heterogeneity across regions in issuing practices and amounts (Canuto & Liu, 2013;
J. J. Pe´rez & Prieto, 2015).
The post-crisis period in Spain has been marked by widespread noncompliance. Regions as
a group have missed their targets systematically every year since 2010, accounting for the bulk
of the fiscal noncompliance at the general government level and constituting one of the main
risks to Spain’s ongoing fiscal consolidation process (AIREF, 2016). Critical to this analysis,
fiscal noncompliance, while widespread, varied significantly across regions in both frequency and
margins.
The existing empirical literature has studied fiscal discipline among Spanish regions by as-
sessing the determinants of fiscal deficit and public debt outturns (for example, Argimo´n &
Herna´ndez de Cos, 2012; Herna´ndez de Cos & Pe´rez, 2013). This literature has typically looked
at economic, institutional, and political factors affecting the size of fiscal outturns irrespective
of the targets aimed at constraining them. Critical factors promoting fiscal discipline included
greater tax autonomy, higher market-financing costs and credit ratings, and the electoral calen-
dar, but fiscal rules and other political factors are excluded. Fiscal indiscipline appears to have
a strong inertial component, with the size of regions’ fiscal deficits in one year largely influenced
by the size in the previous year. A related literature has also looked at the determinants of the
CG’s budgetary deviations of the CG (Leal Linares & Pe´rez, 2011). To the authors’ knowledge,
Lago Pen˜as et al. (2016), Leal Marcos and Lo´pez Laborda (2015) are the only empirical analy-
ses examining the regional determinants of compliance with fiscal deficit targets among Spanish
regions.
2.2 Fiscal noncompliance in multilevel governments: a con-
ceptual framework
2.2.1 Defining Fiscal Noncompliance
The proposed framework defines fiscal noncompliance as the outcome when a government
is unable to meet numerical fiscal targets or ceilings. The fiscal target or ceiling could be the
numerical limit of a fiscal rule. A government unable or unwilling to meet a fiscal target or
ceiling is defined as non-compliant.
Fiscal noncompliance can be voluntary or involuntary. Fiscal noncompliance is voluntary
when the non-compliant government has the capacity but not the incentives to comply with a
fiscal target. Fiscal noncompliance is involuntary when the non-compliant government has the
incentives but not the capacity to comply with a fiscal target. A government has the capacity to
meet the target if it has sufficient fiscal resources or fiscal instruments to garner the necessary
resources to meet the target (hereafter, termed fiscal capacity). A government has the incentives
to meet the target when the costs of noncomplying with the target outweigh the noncompliance
benefits.
Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda 43
Essays on the subnational government’s indebtedness
2.2.2 The Fiscal Noncompliance Problem
The fiscal noncompliance problem can be characterized as a sequential game between a
central and a regional government (Figure 2.1). In the first stage, the CG sets a fiscal target for
the RG, knowing the RG’s expected fiscal capacity. The fiscal target is ex ante feasible. In the
second stage, the RG decides whether to comply with the fiscal target based on expectations
about its fiscal capacity and on whether the CG will enforce the fiscal target. In the third and
final stage, the CG decides whether to enforce the target based on the RG’s compliance decision
in the second stage and its expected fiscal capacity. Nature reveals itself only at the end of the
game in the form of a shock affecting the RG’s fiscal capacity and, therefore, the feasibility of
the fiscal target.5
Figure 2.1: The fiscal noncompliance problem
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Voluntary and involuntary fiscal noncompliance may also emerge as equilibrium outcomes
under this game. Voluntary fiscal noncompliance occurs when the RG is not willing to comply
with the budget balance target regardless of whether the CG is expected to enforce it, and even
when fiscal capacity to comply with the target is highly expected. Under these circumstances,
the shock can be assumed away, because the target is feasible both before and after the shock,
that is, the target is both ex ante and ex post feasible. Involuntary fiscal noncompliance occurs
when the RG is willing to and ex ante capable of complying, but does not have the ex post fiscal
capacity to do so.6
2.2.3 Voluntary Fiscal Noncompliance and Soft Budget Constraints
Voluntary fiscal noncompliance could be the result of soft budget constraints. RGs with soft
budgets are not constrained to finance their spending from an approved budget. Therefore, they
would not feel constrained to deviate from fiscal targets set in this budget if doing so will prevent
5In practice, fiscal target assessments usually occur at a time when factors underlying fiscal capacity, such as
nominal GDP, are still only estimates.
6Under an involuntary equilibrium, RGs must always be ex ante capable of complying with fiscal targets (that
is, fiscal targets must be ex ante feasible). Ex ante infeasible fiscal targets could not be credibly enforced, fostering
involuntary noncompliance.
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them from providing a desired level of public goods and services. In the multilevel government
context, the soft budget constraint problem arises from the CG’s lack of a credible no-bailout
commitment that allows RGs to overspend in the expectation of an eventual bailout.7
Soft budget constraints and voluntary fiscal noncompliance are interconnected. The theo-
retical literature models soft budget constraints as a sequential game (Bordignon, 2006; Inman,
2003; Rodden et al., 2003; Vigneault, 2007). Actions in the voluntary fiscal noncompliance game
described above are logical extensions of the soft-budget-constraint game (Figure 2.2). In the
first stage, the CG announces its intergovernmental transfer policy and sets the RG’s budget
balance target. In the second stage, the RG does not believe the CG’s transfer policy, expects
a bailout, overspends, and thus deviates from the budget balance target. In the third stage, the
CG fulfils the RG’s expectation by bailing it out, thereby not enforcing the breach in the budget
balance target.8 Much like in the voluntary fiscal noncompliance game, nature’s draw does not
make a difference and the target remains feasible.
Figure 2.2: Soft Budget Constraint and Fiscal Noncompliance Problems 
            Sequencing 
 
 
 
 
CG sets transfer or target 
RG expects bailout, overspends 
Does not comply 
CG bails out, 
Does not enforce 
 
 
Bailout and overspending incentives complement each other to spur voluntary fiscal noncom-
pliance. Two necessary but not sufficient conditions characterize soft budgets and non-compliant
governments. The first is that the CG must find it optimal not to enforce the fiscal target and
to provide additional resources to the RG in stage 3. It will do so if the economic and political
costs of denying additional resources (see below),thereby enforcing the target, exceed the bailout
or non-enforcement costs in the form of administrative, legal, or financial penalties, or if the
bailout (non-enforcement) is triggered by deviations from national or supranational fiscal rules
as well as reputation losses against financial markets and the public at large. Under these cir-
cumstances, the bailout or non-enforcement strategy is ex post optimal. The second necessary
condition is that the RG, knowing that the CG has an incentive to provide additional resources
and not to enforce the target, finds it optimal to overspend and not comply in stage 2 (that is,
overspending is ex ante optimal). An ex post optimal bailout will not lead to noncompliance
7A bailout is broadly defined to account for not only resources granted to SNGs in the event of a fiscal or
financial crisis, such as emergency liquidity funds and outright debt restructuring, but also less extreme situations
observed outside crisis. For instance, it may take the form of a change in the allocation of formula grants or simply
unconditional gap-filling transfers. A bailout may include situations in which SNGs’ borrowing restrictions are
lifted, allowing them to borrow to finance above-the-target fiscal deficit levels.
8A critical assumption here is that the compliance assessment takes place before the bailout (that is, in the
second stage). Bailouts that occur before the compliance assessment period (for example, gap-filling transfers)
would help avoid or mitigate fiscal noncompliance. This requires corrective fiscal noncompliance measures or
controlling the impact of alternative factors on uncorrected measures so as to take gap-filling transfers into
account.
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if overspending is not optimal. This may occur, for instance, if a bailout comes with costly
conditions attached (for example, loss of fiscal autonomy, unpopular reforms). At the same
time, by construction, an overspending optimal strategy cannot exist in the absence of an ex
post optimal bailout. In short, for voluntary fiscal noncompliance to occur, factors that raise
both bailout and overspending incentives must be in place.
2.2.4 Bailout and Overspending Incentives
CGs may choose to bail out RGs for economic and political reasons.
Economic motives. A benevolent CG that cares for the welfare of the whole nation would
choose to bail out a fiscally irresponsible RG to avoid the negative spillovers to other jurisdictions
and to itself. Negative spillovers to other jurisdictions,referred to as horizontal spillovers, usually
take the form of under provision of health, education, and other essential services by the non-
rescued RG to other RGs. Negative spillovers to the CG, or more broadly, to the general
government, referred to as vertical spillovers, may occur if default of a non rescued RG endangers
the banking system or the corporate sector nationwide because of their exposure to RG debt,
thereby increasing fiscal risks and lowering credit ratings at the central or general government
level (Inman, 2003). Bailout incentives are expected to decrease with bailout pecuniary costs for
CGs and increase with bailout economic benefits. Pecuniary costs are expected to increase with
the size of the region: the larger the region, the larger the cost of the public goods and services
it provides. However, the impact of region size on bailout economic benefits is ambiguous and
depends on assumptions about the “extensive” and “intensive” nature of the spillover. The
larger the region, the larger the extensive nature of the spillover: the larger the number of
regions and individuals benefiting from the public goods and services provided by that region,
the larger the bailout economic benefits (Wildasin, 1997). But the smaller the region, the larger
is the intensive nature of the spillover, and the larger the amount of public goods and services
appropriated by each citizen in the bailed-out region (Crivelli & Staal, 2013). Bailout incentives
are, therefore, expected to increase with RG size if the bailout benefits from the extensive nature
of the negative spillovers outweigh both the benefits from its corresponding intensive nature and
the bailout pecuniary costs (Wildasin, 1997). Otherwise, bailout incentives are expected to
decrease with RG size (Crivelli & Staal, 2013).
Political motives. CGs may also bail out RGs to create the conditions to govern, stay in
power, and re-elect their principals. Bailout incentives are greater if directed toward RGs that
are well represented in the national legislature, and thus influential for government stability
and the passage of critical legislation (Porto & Sanguinetti, 2001). Similar motives may also
lead CGs to bail out regions with which they are politically aligned, that is, regions where
government incumbents are from the same party or coalition of CG incumbents (Grossman,
46 Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda
2. On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance: an empirical analysis of Spain’s regions
1994).9 The CG may also offer bailouts to ensure national unity (Leite-Monteiro & Sato, 2003).
As a result, bailout incentives are likely to increase in regions where representation at the national
or subnational level of pro-autonomy parties is larger (Bolton & Roland, 1997).
Flawed intergovernmental fiscal frameworks increase bailout and overspending incentives.
They do so by raising expectations among voters and creditors that the CG must be accountable
in the event RGs are not able to fulfil their spending mandates or debt obligations (Von Hagen &
Eichengreen, 1996). Mindful of the political costs of not fulfilling those expectations, CG bailout
incentives will likely increase, raising RGs’ bailout expectations and increasing overspending
incentives. Rodden et al. (2003) and Ter-Minassian (2015) list a number of institutional flaws
that can be broadly categorized as (1) limited fiscal autonomy, (2) lack of preconditions for
market discipline, and (3) weak administrative controls and fiscal rules. Limited fiscal autonomy
may be the result of RGs’ limited taxing powers, spending discretion limited by minimum
service standards or revenue earmarking, and overlapping and unclear revenue or spending
assignment. Insufficient fiscal autonomy is usually reflected in large gaps between the RG’s
mandated spending and revenue assignments, that is, large vertical fiscal imbalances (VFIs).
The capacity of financial markets to discipline RGs is undermined by regulatory incentives and
lax prudential requirements on RG lending, RGs’ access to non-competitive financing sources
(CG onlending, public and development banks, state-owned enterprises), and lack of transparent
and comprehensive public accounts that blur RGs’ creditworthiness. Administrative controls
such as those guiding RG borrowing are usually not based on clear and objective criteria (for
example, ability to service debt). Last, fiscal rules applied to RGs are often poorly designed and
weakly enforced.
Common pool financing provides incentives for overspending. When most RG spending is
financed out of a common pool of resources with few strings attached, overspending, and by
implication noncompliance will become an attractive option. This will be the case because RGs
will bear only a fraction of the marginal costs of providing regional goods and services (Von
Hagen, 2010). Common-pool financing is usually provided in the form of general purpose, open-
ended, and equalization transfers or through debt-mutualisation schemes. The literature shows
that excessive dependency on such transfers to finance subnational public goods and services
exacerbates overspending.10
9CG preference for bailing out politically aligned regions could also reflect electoral strategies to target safe
electoral districts, that is, regions that had previously largely voted for and elected the CG party or governing
coalition (Cox & McCubbins, 1986). Such preferences may not necessarily prevail if the CG follows a swing
strategy, whereby it will attempt to target regions that have previously voted for the CG party or governing
coalition by narrow margins (Dixit & Londregan, 1996). In some cases, such narrow margins may not have been
sufficient for CG politically affiliated regional partners to win the election and form a government.
10See Ter-Minassian (2015) for a review.
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2.2.5 Involuntary Fiscal Noncompliance and Fiscal Stress
Involuntary fiscal noncompliance may become likelier in times of fiscal stress. These are pe-
riods marked by large negative fiscal shocks usually associated with significant economic down-
turns and large fiscal adjustment efforts. In combination, the two factors have been shown to
undermine RG capacity to meet fiscal targets as follows:
Shocks and forecast errors. Economic shocks commonly trigger fiscal stress, making ex ante
feasible targets ex post infeasible. Shocks could be region specific (idiosyncratic shock) or they
could affect the whole country (common shock). A common shock can affect regions differently
depending on each region’s economic structure (for example, a bust in housing prices would
affect regions where pre-shock median property values had been higher) or exposure to fiscal
risks (for example, size of explicit or implicit contingent liabilities assumed by RGs on behalf
of public enterprises or regional banks). Large shocks are usually reflected in large forecast
errors.11
Feasible targets and adjustment plans. In times of fiscal stress, CGs, as guardians of
fiscal sustainability, are under pressure from markets and supranational institutions to design
and implement ambitious but credible fiscal adjustment plans. Such pressure often leads to ex
ante feasible, but very demanding, fiscal targets for the general government (Beetsma et al.,
2009). This is particularly the case for the so-called Stability and Convergence Programs of
Europe’s SGP. In such programs, fiscal targets need to show ex ante compliance with SGP fiscal
rules. Ambitious but feasible general government targets in decentralized fiscal frameworks are,
in turn, often reflected in ambitious but feasible subnational fiscal targets,as CGs try to shift
part of the fiscal adjustment effort to regions by “passing the buck” (Vammalle et al., 2012).12
Involuntary fiscal noncompliance, as a result, is expected to become likelier as fiscal adjustment
to meet a given fiscal target increases. RG adjustment efforts, in turn, may increase if fiscal
targets are not revised following fiscal noncompliance in a given year, leading to persistent
fiscal noncompliance patterns. Similar arguments explain why CG incentives to enforce RG
fiscal targets also increase in times of fiscal stress. Failure to do so will increase the likelihood
that general government fiscal targets will be breached and that markets and supranational
institutions will hold the CG accountable for general government fiscal noncompliance.
11Large forecast errors, as discussed in the introduction, could also be the result of strategic considerations to
ensure ex ante compliance with fiscal rules. In the context of the recent global financial crisis, they have also
reflected larger-than-anticipated fiscal multipliers International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2015.
12This allows CGs to minimize the political costs of fiscal consolidations by preserving the provision of public
goods and services under their mandate, while avoiding increasing the burden of their own taxes. CGs may also
raise subnational fiscal targets to build buffers for possible noncompliance in different subsectors, RGs included.
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2.3 The Spanish fiscal governance framework
Numerical fiscal targets at the regional level go back more than two decades in Spain. They
were subject to numerous changes before and after the global financial crisis:
Budget consolidation scenarios and the 2002 Budget Stability Law. Regions were
first subject to budget balance limits in the form of fiscal deficit ceilings as part of the Budget
Consolidation Scenarios agreed to with the CG after 1992. Fiscal deficit ceilings at the regional
level came into law four years later under the 2002 Budget Stability Law (BSL). The 2002 BSL
set a single zero-deficit limit for all regions, that is, all regions were obliged to post a budget
outturn that was either in balance or in surplus. It also envisaged an adjustment plan with
corrective actions in the event of noncompliance. Throughout this period, fiscal deficit ceilings
for each region were set as a percentage of national GDP.
The 2006 Budget Stability Law. The reform of the first BSL, approved in 2006, entered
in force in 2007 and was implemented as a consequence of an EU-wide reform of the SGP. The
2006 BSL enabled the CG and RGs to adapt their deficit and surplus targets to the economy’s
cyclical position. Specifically, it allowed the RGs to run a deficit of 0.75 percent of GDP if
economic growth was below a certain threshold, to which a further 0.25 percent of GDP could
be added to finance increases in productive investment.13 Fiscal deficit ceilings were also set as
a percentage of regional rather than national GDP. The 2006 BSL included a no-bailout clause.
It also introduced monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. If a risk of noncompliance was
detected by the Ministry of Finance, a warning could be made to the responsible government
unit. In the event noncompliance materialized, the non-compliant government was required to
draw up an economic and financial rebalancing plan over a maximum term of three years. Last,
it stipulated that, if a deviation from targets were to prompt a breach of the SGP, the tier of
government involved should assume the attendant proportion of the responsibilities that should
arise from the breach. In addition, RGs that failed to meet the deficit target would require CG
authorization to initiate any debt operations.
The 2012 Budget Stability Law. Regional fiscal targets were subject to further refinements
to comply with EU-wide fiscal governance taking place in the context of the Six Pack, Fiscal
Compact, and Two Pack. A constitutional reform approved in 2011 enshrined the rules-based
framework in the Constitution. A new BSL approved in 2012 introduced structural budget
balance, expenditure, and debt rules at the regional level. The 2012 BSL refined rules-based
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to prevent, correct, and penalize deviations from fiscal
rules and targets introduced in the 2006 BSL. Monitoring and enforcement were also reinforced
13Under the second BSL, fiscal targets were set in three stages. In the first stage, a report assessing the cyclical
phase for the following three years was prepared. Taking into account the cycle, in a second stage, fiscal targets
for the general government and subsectors (central, regional, and local governments as well as the Social Security
System) taken together were set and submitted to Parliament.Once approved by Parliament and subject to the
aggregate RG target, individual fiscal targets for each RG were set by means of bilateral negotiations between
the Ministry of Finance and representatives of each RG on the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council.
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through improvements in the quality, coverage, and frequency of within the year regional and
local budget figures and the creation in 2013 of Spain’s independent fiscal council, Autoridad
Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal. Fiscal deficit limits continued to be measured as a
percentage of regional GDP.
2.4 Understanding fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions
2.4.1 Empirical Methodology
Alternative drivers of fiscal noncompliance among Spanish regions are assessed by looking at
noncompliance frequencies and compliance margins. To gather some stylized facts, the analysis
starts by examining noncompliance empirical distributions across a number of different potential
determinants of voluntary and involuntary fiscal noncompliance. An econometric analysis is then
performed to identify whether fiscal noncompliance is likely to be voluntary by looking at the
determinants of compliance margins. The sample includes 16 out of 17 Spanish regions over
the period 2002-15.14 Noncompliance events are defined as cases of negative deviations between
fiscal outturns and fiscal targets for a given region and year. That is, fit − f∗it < 0, where f , f∗,
i, and t are fiscal balance outturns, fiscal balance targets, respectively. Noncompliance events
are sourced from the annual compliance report submitted by the Ministry of Finance to the
Economic and Financial Council (CPFF).15 The CPFF comprises the Minister of Finance and
public finance authorities from each region. While the Ministry of Finance is the ultimate body
in charge of overseeing regional finances, the CPFF plays a formal role in the approval of regions’
fiscal balance targets.
Noncompliance frequencies are defined in equation 2.1 as the ratio of noncompliance cases
to the total number of cases within a particular group X. Groups are partitioned by quartiles
(q) if measured on the basis of a continuous variable.
P (fit − f∗it < 0|Xq)where q = 1, ...4. (2.1)
Compliance margins, fe = f
∗ − f , are measured in percentages of regional GDP. Officially,
they were measured as differences between fiscal outturns and targets as a percentage of national
GDP between 2003 and 2007 and as a percentage of regional GDP from 2008 onward. To
14Spain has 17 regions (Comunidades Auto´nomas). Nevertheless, two different centre-periphery financial ar-
rangements are in place. A majority of regions, 15, share the Common Regime of regional finances (Comunidades
Auto´nomas de re´gimen comu´n), with partial devolution of expenditure and revenues, while the remaining two
(Navarre and Basque Country) enjoy a special status referred to as the Foral Regime of regional finances (re´gimen
foral) under which they enjoy almost full spending and revenue autonomy. Within the latter two regions, though,
the Basque Country is further decentralized, with revenue-raising responsibilities distributed to lower government
levels (diputaciones forales) broadly resembling the provincial structure within the region. The latter region is
therefore excluded from the subsequent econometric analysis because of the absence of comparable data.
15Available at www.minhap.gob.es/esES/CDI/SeguimientoLeyEstabilidad/Paginas/InformesCompletos
LEP.aspx. Two annual compliance assessments have been conducted since 2013. Noncompliance events are
defined based on the second and final assessment.
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allow compliance margins to be compared over the years and across regions according to a
homogeneous metric that at the same time reflects differences in regions’ fiscal capacity, official
compliance margins have been re-estimated in percentage of regional GDP using the latest
nominal GDP series.16 That was accomplished in two steps: first, nominal deficit values were
uncovered by multiplying targets and outturns by the nominal GDP available around the time
targets and outturns were, respectively, set and assessed; second, the difference between nominal
deficit outturns and targets was divided by the latest nominal regional GDP series.
A dynamic panel regression analysis is used to examine potential determinants of noncom-
pliance margins. Noncompliance margins are regressed on the same variables conditioning non-
compliance frequencies. Estimates are derived using Arellano-Bond first-difference generalized
method of moments (FD-GMM) estimators to allow for possible inertial patterns in noncompli-
ance as well as endogeneity of dependent variables. Equation 2.2 summarizes the specification:
feit = αf
e
i t−1 + γINV OLit + δV OLit + ηi + it (2.2)
where INV OL and V OL are vectors with factors associated with involuntary and voluntary
noncompliance events (hereafter referred to as voluntary and involuntary factors), respectively;
η is the CCAA fixed effects, α governs the degree of persistence of RG fiscal compliance and
noncompliance, and γ and δ measure the relative contribution of involuntary and voluntary
factors to fiscal compliance and noncompliance.17
The estimation strategy aims to identify operative economic, institutional, and political fac-
tors associated with voluntary and involuntary patterns of fiscal noncompliance. In light of
the relatively short cross-sectional dimension, the identification strategy is implemented in a
parsimonious way by individually assessing the impact of a larger set of variables expected to
encourage voluntary fiscal noncompliance on a baseline that controls for lagged fiscal noncompli-
ance and the more limited number of factors associated with involuntary compliance patterns.
To address the problem of overfitting and biased estimates in small cross-section samples stem-
ming from the proliferation of GMM instruments, only the lags t-2 and t-3 are used, and the
instruments are combined into smaller sets by using the collapse option in Roodman’s xtabond2
package for Stata. The robustness of the results are checked using two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimators.
16The regional GDP series used is measured in market prices and in accordance with the new European System
of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010).
17The literature suggests that fiscal deficit at the CG level can encourage deficits at the RG level (see Molina-
Parra & Mart´ınez-Lo´pez, 2018)[for the case of Spain] through the so-called copycat or yardstick effect. Nev-
ertheless, this analysis did not find robust statistically significant evidence to support the hypothesis that fiscal
compliance at the CG level influences fiscal compliance patterns at the subnational level. The results are excluded
from the chapter for the sake of simplicity.
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2.4.2 Testable Hypotheses
The proposed multilevel governance framework developed in the second section can help us
understand fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions. It can do so by helping identify to what
extent regional fiscal noncompliance is voluntary. Voluntary fiscal noncompliance can be the re-
sult of bailout or overspending incentives driven by welfare or political motives. The framework
can also look at the role political, fiscal, and financial market institutions play in shaping such
incentives. Fiscal noncompliance could have also been involuntary because of common or asym-
metric shocks, and because of fiscal targets and adjustment plans that were borderline feasible.
Drawing from this framework and empirical analysis referenced in the previous section, Table
2.1 summarizes some testable hypothesis that are relevant in the Spanish context.
2.4.3 Facts and Factors
Fiscal noncompliance between 2003 and 2015 varied markedly across regions in both how
frequently regions missed the target and by how much these targets were missed (Figure 2.3).
Fiscal noncompliance frequencies appear to be stratified into at least three groups: (1) broadly
compliers, (2) broadly noncompliers, and (3) largely noncompliers. The broadly compliers com-
prise regions that have stuck to their fiscal targets in at least half of the years during the analysis
periods. This is a large and heterogeneous group demographically, economically, and historically.
It includes the Canary Islands, Galicia, Madrid, Asturias, Castile-Leo´n, Extremadura, Andalu-
sia, Aragon, and the Basque Country. Navarra, Rioja, Castile-La Mancha, Balear Islands,
Cantabria, and Murcia are among the broadly non-compliers regions, missing their targets in up
to two-thirds of the years. Finally, Valencia and Catalonia missed their fiscal targets in three-
fourths of the years during this period. Just like the first group, regions in the last two groups
have very distinct attributes. Noncompliance frequencies and margins appear to be broadly
correlated in the sense that more-frequent non-compliers tend to breach their targets by wider
margins than less-frequent ones.
Regions’ fiscal noncompliance increased markedly in the post-crisis years. The number of
noncompliant regions and their corresponding noncompliance margins also increased significantly
following the global financial crisis (Figure 2.4). Noncompliance peaked in the post–EU sovereign
debt crisis in 2011 when virtually all regions were unable to meet their fiscal deficit targets, most
of them by very large margins. This deviation was corrected in the following years through
more realistic projections of shared revenues advanced to the regions and supported by fiscal
adjustment plans.
2.4.4 Involuntary Channels and Baseline Specifications
Fiscal noncompliance, common shocks, and forecast errors are linked. Common shocks are
proxied by observed deviations between nominal (national) GDP growth outturns and forecasts
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Figure 2.3: Regions’ Noncompliance with Fiscal Deficit Targets
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
C
A
N
G
A
L
M
A
D
A
S
T
C
L
E
X
T
P
V
A
N
D
A
R
A
N
A
V
R
IO
C
M
B
A
L
C
A
N
T
M
U
R
C
A
T
V
A
L
p
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
y
e
a
rs
 i
n
 n
o
n
-c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
 
1. Frequency of non-compliant years over 2003-15
Official Assessment
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
C
A
N
G
A
L
M
A
D
A
S
T
C
L
E
X
T
P
V
A
N
D
A
R
A
N
A
V
R
IO
C
M
B
A
L
C
A
N
T
M
U
R
C
A
T
V
A
L
d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 f
is
c
a
l 
o
u
tt
u
rn
 a
n
d
 t
a
rg
e
t 
(p
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
re
g
io
n
a
l 
G
D
P
)
2. Median non-compliance margins over 2003-15
Homogenous Assessment
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance; and authors’ calculations.
Note: Under the official assessment, fiscal noncompliance eventes are defined as differences between fis-
cal targets and outtutns in percentage of national GDP between 2003 and 2007 and as a percent-
age of regional GDP from 2008 to 2015. Under the homogeneous assessment, gfiscal noncompliance
events are defined as differences between fiscal targets and outturns in percentage of regional GDP be-
tween 2003 and 2015 (see table 2.1). AND=Andalusia; ARA=Aragon; AST=Asturias; BAL=Balear Is-
lands; CAN= Canary Islands; CANT=Cantabria; CAT=Catalonia; CL=Castile-Leo´n; CM=Castile-La Man-
cha; EXT=Extremadrua; GAL=Galicia; MAD=Madrid; MUR=Murcia; NAV=Navarra; PV=Basque Country;
RIO=Rioja; VAL=Valencia.
set in annual budget laws (forecast errors).18 Negative (positive) forecast errors in nominal GDP
growth should undermine (bolster) compliance with fiscal deficit targets through corresponding
revenue shocks. Noncompliance margins and frequencies have clearly moved in tandem with
forecast errors (Figure 2.5). Years when fiscal noncompliance was widespread (2008–11 and
2014–15) have usually been years when forecast errors have been negative.19 Regression results
provide support for the positive correlations between forecast errors and involuntary fiscal com-
pliance, with positive and statistically significant estimates in about half of all estimated models
(Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
Idiosyncratic shocks seem to play a limited role in determining fiscal noncompliance. Mea-
sured by differences between regions’ real GDP growth, consumer price inflation, and house
price inflation, and corresponding national averages, positive idiosyncratic shocks are expected
to reduce fiscal noncompliance frequencies (Figure 2.6). Contrary to expectations, noncompli-
ance frequencies were either the same (real GDP growth) or larger (consumer price inflation and
18The key assumption here is that forecast errors are mostly driven by unanticipated changes in fundamentals
and not by technical errors, weak or untimely data, or strategic motives (for example, overestimated nominal GDP
growth forecasts to inflate revenue projections and make ex post excessive spending levels ex ante compatible with
existing fiscal targets). Strategic motives and technical errors should play less of a role here to the extent that
national growth forecasts are set by the centre, where forecasting capacity and data quality are expected to be,
on average, better than that of regions.
192010 and 2015 (widespread noncompliance and positive forecast error) were exceptions.
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of Regions’ noncompliance with fiscal deficit targets
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Figure 2.5: Forecast errors and regions’ noncompliance with fiscal targets
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house inflation) among cases in which idiosyncratic shocks were positive. Equally unexpected,
positive idiosyncratic growth shocks seem to reduce rather than increase fiscal compliance mar-
gins. However, country-specific inflation differentials are not shown to be statistically significant
(Tables 2.2 and 2.3). As discussed below, this finding may be explained by the relatively strong
transfer dependency observed in most regions and, more specifically, by the fact that a signifi-
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cant share of regional finances comes in the form of transfers from the centre allocated with the
objective of equalizing regions’ fiscal capacity to meet their spending mandates. Thus, reliance
on equalization transfers mitigates the revenue impact of region-specific shocks, helping regions
safeguard their fiscal capacity and meet their fiscal deficit targets.
Figure 2.6: Fiscal noncompliance and regions’ idiosyncratic exposure to shocks
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Fiscal noncompliance has displayed some inertial patterns. In line with Lago Pen˜as et
al. (2016), Leal Marcos and Lo´pez Laborda (2015), fiscal compliance margins appear to be
positively autocorrelated (Figure 2.7). As mentioned by Argimo´n and Herna´ndez de Cos, 2012,
this could reflect budget rigidities due to incremental budget processes or multiyear expenditure
commitments. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 confirm such inertial patterns under several specifications.
Fiscal noncompliance increases with the required adjustment effort. Adjustment effort is
measured by the difference between the fiscal deficit target in years t and t-1, both in percentage
of regional GDP, a simple proxy for the required nominal adjustment.20 Adjustment efforts have
been quite heterogeneous across regions given that fiscal deficit targets, despite the existence
of different starting fiscal positions, have been set uniformly across regions in most years. As
expected, adjustment efforts are found to have a negative and statistically significant impact
on fiscal compliance margins in most specifications (Tables 2.2 and 2.3). Estimated coefficients
20Adjustment effort could also be measured by the difference between fiscal deficit in year t and fiscal outturns
in t-1. Unlike annual changes in fiscal targets, this measure is highly correlated with lagged fiscal compliance
margins, and for this reason we have opted to exclude it from the baseline specification. Replacing it with our
chosen adjustment effort proxy delivers qualitatively similar results at the expense of rendering lagged fiscal
compliance margins statistically insignificant.
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Figure 2.7: Inertia in Regions’ noncompliance with fiscal targets, 2003-2015
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range from 0.5 to 1.0, implying that for each percentage point increase in RGs’ fiscal deficit
targets, compliance margins should be expected to decline between 0.5 and 1.0 percentage point.
Fiscal noncompliance may decrease if regions benefit from gap-filling transfers before the as-
sessment date, as discussed in the second section. To verify that, we look at differences between
actual transfers received by the RG from the CG and those originally budgeted. Noncompli-
ance margins for an RG that receives more transfers than budgeted should be smaller. This
hypothesis is rejected, with regression estimates not significant and with the wrong sign (Ta-
bles 2.2 and 2.3, model 2). One interpretation is that, while improving regions’ fiscal capacity
and thus helping stave off involuntary fiscal noncompliance, additional unbudgeted transfers
reinforce expectations of further gap-filling transfers by end-year, thus boosting voluntary fiscal
noncompliance and more than outweighing the initial deterrent effect.
2.4.5 Voluntary Channels
The analysis finds some tentative evidence of a positive impact of region size on fiscal non-
compliance. Region size is measured according to the weight of a region’s population, GDP, and
GDP per capita in the corresponding national figures. Fiscal noncompliance tends to be more
frequent among larger regions (that is, toward the end of the distribution) in all three measures,
particularly with respect to GDP per capita (Figure 2.8). Fiscal compliance margins are shown
to increase in a statistically significant way with regional GDP and regional GDP per capita
only under 2SLS models (Tables 2.2 and 2.3, models 3 to 5).
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Figure 2.8: Regions’ size and noncompliance with fiscal deficit targets
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Insufficient fiscal autonomy to adjust seems to play a role in determining regions’ fiscal
noncompliance. To assess the impact of fiscal autonomy, measures of tax and expenditure
autonomy as well as of VFIs are estimated. Tax autonomy (in line with the terminology in
the local public finance literature) is defined as the share of an RG’s total tax revenues over
which the RG has some degree of regulatory autonomy.21 The larger this share, the greater a
region’s tax autonomy or fiscal co-responsibility, as it is often referred to in the Spanish empirical
literature. However, in contrast with the local public finance literature, expenditure autonomy is
defined here by the degree of discretion over mandated expenditures. With health and education
mostly mandated to regions under centre-imposed minimum standards, and social protection
shared with the centre, a larger share of regions’ spending on these basic services limits regions’
ability to adjust and comply with fiscal targets once their revenue-raising capacity is taken into
account. That is, a region’s autonomy to cut expenditures is expected to decrease as that region’s
spending share in basic services increases. With that in mind, the shares of regions’ spending on
essential public services (health, education, and social protection) and public investment in their
total spending are computed.22 Last, following Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013), VFI indicators are
21Regions have regulatory autonomy over personal income taxes (schedules, allowances, credits), wealth and
estate taxes and property transfer taxes (schedules, deductions, credits), gambling (exemption, base, rate, credit),
and vehicle registration (rates). Significant tax decentralization took place following the 1997, 2002, and 2009
reforms of the regional financing system.
22Regions account for two-fifths of total general government spending on essential public services and more
than 90 percent when it comes to health and education (F. Pe´rez et al., 2015), but about 5 percent with respect
to social protection.
Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda 57
Essays on the subnational government’s indebtedness
estimated for each region to capture the extent to which regions are unable to finance their
own spending with own revenues, regardless of whether they have regulatory power of the
corresponding tax bases.23 As expected, noncompliance frequencies tend to be smaller among
regions in the top tax autonomy quartiles (Figure 2.9), although the relation is not significant
with respect to fiscal compliance margins (Tables 2.2 and 2.3, model 6). On the other hand, fiscal
noncompliance frequencies are not necessarily the largest among regions in the top expenditure
autonomy and VFI quartiles (that is, regions with greater social mandates and less own resources
to fund them).24 That said, as expected, fiscal compliance margins decrease as a larger share
of regions’ expenditures is allocated to social services and public investment-that is, as regions’
expenditure autonomy decreases (Tables 2.2 and 2.3, model 6). Finally, regions with large VFIs
tend to display lower compliance margins, as shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 (models 7 and 13).
Figure 2.9: Regions’ Fiscal Autonomy and noncompliance with fiscal deficit
(Frequency of noncompliant cases over 2003-14, by quartile, percent)
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Note: Tax autonomy is defined as the ration between a regional government’s own tax
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The impact of stronger rules on fiscal compliance is not clear-cut. As described in the
previous section, fiscal rules in Spain have become increasingly stronger over the years. They are
currently among the strictest fiscal rules in Europe, as measured by the European Commission
fiscal rule strength index. Stronger rules, however, have not always led to improvements in
fiscal compliance, partly because of delays in implementing existing monitoring and enforcement
procedures (Lledo´, 2015). The regression results seem to reinforce this point. Under the baseline
23VFIs are defined as [1 − OwnRevenue/OwnSpending]. Own revenue (spending) corresponds to a region’s
total revenue (spending) minus transfers received from RGs by the CG and other public entities (transfers paid
by RGs to the CG and other public entities).
58 Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda
2. On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance: an empirical analysis of Spain’s regions
GMM specification, stronger fiscal rules do not show any direct impact on fiscal compliance
margins directly. Instead, they seem to have an indirect impact on compliance margins by
helping reduce inertial patterns (Table 2.2, models 8 and 9). These results are reversed under
the 2SLS specification, which shows fiscal rules having a direct rather than an indirect impact
on fiscal compliance margins (Table 2.3, models 8, 9, and 13).
Financial markets seem to affect fiscal noncompliance through two different channels. On
the one hand, fiscal noncompliance frequencies are larger among regions with lower (poorer)
credit ratings and, to some extent, facing larger market-financing costs, which seems to provide
some support to the idea that financial markets undermine fiscal compliance by raising the
financing costs of regions that are not perceived as creditworthy (Figure 2.10).24 On the other
hand, fiscal noncompliance becomes less prevalent among regions where reliance on market-
issued securities, rather than softer bank loans, is greater. This finding indicates that greater
market exposure helps deter fiscal noncompliance because regions internalize the impact fiscal
noncompliance would have on credit ratings and market-financing costs. The regression analysis
of fiscal noncompliance corroborates the latter channel: increases in the financing costs faced
by regions in the previous year tend to increase rather than reduce compliance margins in the
following year (Tables 2.2 and 2.3, model 10). However, greater reliance on market securities
has no statistically or economically significant impact on compliance margins (Tables 2.2 and
2.3, model 10).
Fiscal compliance is weakened during election years, but the role played by politics in other
areas is less clear-cut. Fiscal noncompliance seems to increase during election years. As expected,
fiscal noncompliance is more frequent and displays wider margins during election years (Figure
2.11; Tables 2.2 and 2.3, models 11, 12, and 13). Unlike previous fiscal discipline analyses
for Spain, but as expected in this framework, political alignment or party congruence between
central and regional governments notably increases the likelihood of fiscal noncompliance. In
particular, regions politically aligned with the centre are shown to be nearly 1.5 times more
likely to deviate from targets than nonaligned regions.25 The regression results provide only
tentative support to these hypotheses: regions aligned with the centre presented smaller, albeit
statistically insignificant, compliance margins under most specifications (Figure 2.11; Tables 2.2
and 2.3, models 11, 12, and 13). Pro-autonomy regions, defined by the percentage of members
of parliament from regional pro-autonomy parties, expected to deviate from centre-imposed
fiscal targets, turned out to be only marginally more likely to deviate from fiscal targets than
regions with weaker pro-autonomy preferences, with pro-autonomy regions presenting smaller
but statistically insignificant margins under most specifications (Figure 2.11; Tables 2.2 and 2.3,
models 11, 12, and 13). Last, regions with the largest political representation in the national
24Although one cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality, with fiscal noncompliance leading to poorer
credit ratings, higher risk premiums, and costlier market financing.
25As discussed in the section titled “Testable Hypotheses,” this may be the result of the CG following a “safe”
electoral strategy. Simon-Cosano et al. (2013) show that strategy to be preferred by national incumbents running
in national elections, as reflected in the distribution of transfers to regions where the incumbent performs better.
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parliament are the most frequent non-compliers, albeit not necessarily with compliance margins
that are statistically significantly smaller (Figure 2.11; Tables 2.2 and 2.3, models 11, 12, and
13).
Figure 2.10: Financial markets andd regions’ noncompliance with fiscal targets
(Frequency of noncompliant cases over 2003-15, by quartile, percent)
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Figure 2.11: Politics and Regions’ noncompliance with fiscal deficit targets (percent)
 
Figure 12. Politics and Regions' Non-Compliance with Fiscal Deficit Targets
2. Frequency of non-compliant cases over 2003-15, by quartiles
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Non-
Election
Year
Election
Year
Non-
Election
Year
Election
Year
No Yes
National Elections Regional Elections Party Congruence (a)
1. Frequency of non-compliant cases over 2003-15 by category
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Pro Autonomy (b) Regional Seats in Parliament (c)
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance and authors’ calculations.
a. Regional governments’ credit ratings. b. Security-to-loans ratio. c. Region’s interest payment in percentage
of end-of-year regional public debt stock.
60 Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda
2. On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance: an empirical analysis of Spain’s regions
2.5 Conclusions and policy discussion
This chapter argues that in multilevel governance systems, SNGs tend not to comply vol-
untarily with fiscal targets the larger are their compliance costs as well as the costs the CG
is expected to incur in enforcing these targets. It proposes a conceptual framework in which
these costs can be, first, political and thus determined by factors directly undermining CGs’
condition to be elected and form stable government coalitions (for example, the national or
regional electoral calendar and RGs’ political representation, affiliation, and political autonomy
preferences). Second, compliance and enforcement costs are also linked to intergovernmental
fiscal frameworks-fiscal rules, tax and expenditure assignments, borrowing controls, and, more
specifically, to how these arrangements shape perceptions among voters, creditors, and politi-
cians of SNGs’ fiscal autonomy and whether they rather than CGs should be held politically
accountable for any disruption in regions’ fiscal obligations in the event of noncompliance. Lack
of fiscal autonomy shifts political accountability to CGs-thereby raising enforcement costs-while
stronger rules and access to financial markets tip the political barometer toward RGs-thereby
raising noncompliance costs.
In this chapter’s framework, involuntary fiscal noncompliance occurs when SNGs are unable
to be fiscally compliant even when they are willing to be. This pattern becomes more likely in
times of fiscal stress, defined as periods with large negative fiscal shocks. Fiscal stress times are
also periods of increasing domestic or supranational political pressure on CGs to ensure that
fiscal consolidation targets at the general government level are met. To minimize the political
costs such pressures entail, CGs tend to “pass the buck” of the adjustment down to RGs. This
leads to ambitious but feasible centre-imposed SNG fiscal targets that become infeasible once
the fiscal shock materializes.
Applied to Spain’s regions, this conceptual framework shows that fiscal noncompliance dis-
plays involuntary traits. We find fiscal noncompliance to be driven by factors partly outside the
control of Spanish regions, namely common macroeconomic shocks and large adjustment efforts.
The latter is arguably attributable to ambitious and rigid fiscal targets set by the centre as a
result of national and supranational pressures for general government consolidation referred to
above.
Fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions has also been shown to have a voluntary dimen-
sion, with fiscal rather than political arrangements playing a somewhat more prominent role.
Fiscal deficit targets were missed more frequently and by wider margins the lower a region’s
autonomy to cut spending due to expenditure mandates and the larger the gap between the
resources they can raise to deliver these mandates and their actual costs (that is, the larger
VFIs are). Contrary to expectations, stronger and well-enforced fiscal rules have not made
fiscal compliance more frequent or compliance margins wider. The analysis has also identified
some tentative support for the disciplinary role of financial markets, with increases in regions’
market-financing costs reducing fiscal noncompliance margins. The frequency and margins of
fiscal noncompliance have also been shown to increase during election years. Other political
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factors expected to induce voluntary fiscal noncompliance, such as political autonomy prefer-
ences, political alignment with the centre, and political representation, demonstrate ambiguous
or non-significant regression estimates.
The main policy lesson in this analysis is that enhancing fiscal compliance in multilevel gov-
ernance systems requires a more comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrange-
ments that goes beyond strengthening formal rules-monitoring and enforcement procedures.
This assessment should include not only rules-based fiscal frameworks but also the assignment
of revenue raising and spending mandates and the burden-sharing of fiscal consolidation efforts
and related setting of fiscal deficit targets. All that should be accompanied by a focus on making
CG enforcement politically credible. In particular:
Rules-based frameworks. To strengthen fiscal compliance at the national level, much em-
phasis has been placed on the need to bolster rules-based fiscal frameworks with formal enforce-
ment procedures such as financial and administrative sanctions and automatic mechanisms that
correct for past deviations from fiscal targets (Schaechter et al., 2012). That has been the case in
Spain, particularly after the most recent reforms, which, as discussed, introduced some of these
procedures aimed at tackling regional fiscal noncompliance. Looking ahead, there is still some
scope to further strengthen existing procedures by making their activation more automatic and
by tightening the legal requirements to publicly explain deviations from fiscal targets (Lledo´,
2015). Such measures may come in particularly handy during election years when the political
costs for the CG to enforce targets are more salient and noncompliance has been shown to be
more pervasive than in non-electoral years.
Intergovernmental fiscal responsibilities. In line with previous work looking at the ef-
fectiveness of subnational fiscal rules (Kotia & Lledo´, 2016), this analysis stresses the need to
revisit, and possibly reduce, existing VFIs by ensuring SNGs’ revenue-raising and borrowing
mandates are consistent with their spending mandates. These measures would help strengthen
SNG fiscal autonomy and policy accountability, including for fiscal deficit targets. In doing
so, it would make CG enforcement of SNG fiscal deficit targets politically less costly and more
credible.
Fiscal consolidation burden sharing. The negative impact of increases in fiscal targets on
compliance margins warrants a review of how the burden of fiscal consolidation is shared across
and within government levels and, correspondingly, how realistically fiscal deficit targets are
set. SNG reputational costs for noncompliance with fiscal targets that are widely perceived as
infeasible among voters, markets, and politicians are minimal, rendering even well-designed and
well-implemented enforcement mechanisms toothless. In the case of Spain, this may call for the
adoption of differentiated fiscal targets across regions to balance adjustment needs with existing
fiscal capacity. In light of the impact of negative growth shocks on fiscal compliance, a review is
also warranted of how appropriate the technical capacity and procedures behind the formulation
of macroeconomic forecasts informing central and subnational budgets and fiscal plans are.
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Two additional qualifications are worth mentioning with regard to the normative proposals
outlined above that go beyond the scope of this chapter:
First, while the adoption of differentiated fiscal targets might be efficient when conditioning
on a given fiscal starting position (that is, a given level of regional deficit and debt), in a more
general, dynamic setting, moral hazard arguments dictate that SNGs may develop incentives not
to conduct sound fiscal policies in good times. This might be the case when SNGs anticipate that
additional room for fiscal manoeuvre is to be granted in crisis times to those governments with
weaker initial fiscal positions. The strict implementation of fiscal rules is crucial for the develop-
ment of ex ante fiscal margins against adverse shocks, and to guarantee that the heterogeneity
of structural fiscal positions among regions in normal times is minimized.
Second, international experience shows that the occurrence of subnational fiscal crises cannot
be ruled out, even in a setting in which national fiscal rules are fully credible and intergovern-
mental fiscal responsibilities are set at an optimal level. In the latter regard, the recent Spanish
experience indicates that granting to regions additional instruments to prevent liquidity crises
is warranted, so that pressure on the CG to financially support or bail out SNGs is reduced. In
particular, the possibility of designing rainy day funds with regular contributions during periods
of economic prosperity could be studied, along with the development of tools that guarantee
the regular access of regions to financial markets even in periods of fiscal stress (Delgado et al.,
2016).
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
Variable Description Source
Lagged non-compliance margin
Regional Fiscal non compliance: difference between
the first year deficit estimation and the target
Ministry of Finance
Growth forecast errors
National GDP minus the Ministry of Finance fore-
cast
Region-National growth differen-
tial
Regional GDP growth minus national GDP growth.
National Statistics Bureau
Region-National inflation differ-
ential
Regional CPI growth minus national CPI growth.
Central government non-
compliance margin
Central Government Fiscal non compliance: differ-
ence between the first year deficit estimation and the
target
Ministry of Finance
Cutout
Deficit in the current year minus the deficit in the
former one
Execution minus budgetary
transfers (in regional GDP)
Transfers received by the regions from the central
government minus the ones included in the budget
over the regional GDP.
Ministry of Finance and
National Statistics Bureau
Region weight in national popu-
lation
Regional population over national population.
National Statistics BureauRegion weight in national GDP Regional GDP over national GDP.
Region weight in national per-
capita GDP
Regional GDPph over national GDPph.
Tax autonomy
Regional taxes over which they had some decision
power over total regional tax income
Own calculation from
Ministry of Finances
Social spending share in regional
government spending
Regional spending in basic social services (health ed-
ucation and others) over their total spending.
IVIE and Ministry of Fi-
nances.
Investment share in total re-
gional spending
Regional investment over total spending Ministry of finances
Vertical fiscal imbalances
(1-own income/own expenditure), where own income
and expenditure is their respective total amounts net
of transfers with the Central Goverment
Own calculation from
Ministry of Finances
Fiscal Rule Index
Numerical Fiscal rules index calculated by the Euro-
pean Commission
European Commission
Fiscal Rule Index X Lagged non-
compliance margin
Interactions between the lag of non-compliance mar-
gin and the Fiscal rule index
Region Ratings
Average rating numerical index, taking into account
three rating agencies: Fitch, S&P and Moody’s
Authors calculation from
rating agencies data
Implicit interest rates
Budgetary interest payments expenditure over the
regions debt
Ministry of Finance
Ratio of security to loans Total securities issued by the regions over their loans Banco de Espan˜a
National election dummy Dummy for the year of national parliament elections.
Different news papers,
webpage of the national
and regional parliaments.
Regional election dummy Dummy for the year of regional parliament elections.
Party congruence dummy
Political party congruence between national and re-
gional government.
Pro-autonomy party share
Number of regional MPs that belong to a non-
national party over total MPs
Regions’ seats in national parlia-
ment
Number of national MPs elected in each region over
total national MPs
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Table 2.2: First-Difference GMM Estimates of Fiscal Compliance Margins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Lagged non-compliance margin 0.74∗ 1.09** 0.76∗ 0.83∗ 0.76 0.70∗∗∗ 0.37 0.91∗∗ 2.42*** 0.31∗ 0.73∗ 0.49 0.24
Growth forecast errors 0.09∗ 0.04 0.09 0.10∗ 0.10∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.12∗∗∗ 0.04
Region-National growth differential -2.09∗ -2.67∗ -2.16∗ -2.13 -2.00 -0.73 -0.60 -2.32∗ -1.82∗ -0.36 -2.17∗ -1.19 0.24
Region-National inflation differential -0.36 -2.08 -0.39 -1.10 -1.28 -1.27 -2.41∗∗ -1.23 -1.68 -2.83∗ 0.86 -1.29 -1.19
Fiscal Adjustment -0.80∗∗ -1.13∗∗ -0.81∗∗ -0.94∗∗ -0.85∗ -0.35 -0.82∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -0.68∗ -0.52 -0.49
Execution minus budgetary transfers (in regional GDP) -0.48
Region weight in national population 3.86
Region weight in national GDP 7.12
Region weight in national percapita GDP 0.36
Tax autonomy 0.03
Social spending share in regional government spending -0.33∗∗
Investment share in total regional spending -0.24∗∗∗
Vertical fiscal imbalances -0.15∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗
Fiscal Rule Index 0.05 0.02 0.01
Fiscal Rule Index X Lagged non-compliance margin -0.06∗∗
Lagged Annual in Change Region Ratings 0.00
Lagged Annual Change in Implicit interest rates -0.09
Ratio of security to loans 1.03∗∗∗ 0.19
National election dummy -0.60***
Regional election dummy -0.36∗ -0.50∗
Party congruence dummy -0.18 0.40 -0.41∗∗∗
Pro-autonomy party share -0.31 -0.86
Regions’ seats in national parliament -0.03 0.00
Number of observations 176 160 176 176 176 160 160 160 160 145 176 176 144
Number of regions 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 16 16 16
Number of instruments 16 15 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 17 17 14
Hansen 0.60 0.80 0.44 0.87 0.66 0.28 0.37 0.82 0.65 0.14 0.68 0.15 0.05
m1 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.00
m2 0.39 0.61 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.48 0.61 0.66 0.77 0.16 0.28 0.22 0.67
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Dependent variable is the difference between regions’ fiscal deficit outturns and fiscal deficit targets. The larger this difference is, the larger is the fiscal compliance margin.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag of the explanatory variables.
Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982), which is asymptotically distributed chi square under the null hypothesis that these moment
conditions are valid. A p-value equal or higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models.
m1 and m2 are the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively, using residuals in first differences. The null hypothesis under both m1 and m2 tests is that there is
no correlation between variables in the instrument set and the residuals. Observed p-values higher than 0.05 under the m2 test for all models indicates that there is no correlation with
the instrument set defined in second lags.
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Table 2.3: Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Lagged non-compliance margin 0.49∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.46 0.14 0.30∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.79∗
Growth forecast errors 0.04∗ 0.01 0.04∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.05∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.02
Region-National growth differential -0.42∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.42∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗ -0.41∗ -0.39∗∗ -0.12 -0.26 -0.27∗∗ -0.38∗∗ -0.40∗
Region-National inflation differential -0.47 -0.50 -0.45 -0.54 -0.55 -0.28 -0.50 -0.46 -0.17 -0.44 0.00 -0.51 -0.55
Fiscal Adjustment -0.71∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -1.05∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗
Execution minus budgetary transfers (in regional GDP) -0.22
Region weight in national population -2.59
Region weight in national GDP 2.73∗∗∗
Region weight in national per capita GDP 0.21∗∗∗
Tax autonomy 0.02
Social spending share in regional government spending -0.29∗∗∗
Investment share in total regional spending -0.06∗∗∗
Vertical fiscal imbalances -0.16∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
Fiscal Rule Index 0.14∗∗∗ 0.04 0.07∗
Fiscal Rule Index X Lagged non-compliance margin -0.02
Lagged Annual in Change Region Ratings -0.15
Lagged Annual Change in Implicit interest rates 0.26∗∗∗ -0.07
Ratio of security to loans 0.00∗∗∗
National election dummy -0.64∗∗∗
Regional election dummy -0.20 -0.27∗
Party congruence dummy 0.04 0.13 -0.19
Pro-autonomy party share -0.58∗∗ -0.78∗
Regions’ seats in national parliament 0.00 0.00
Number of observations 144 128 144 144 144 128 128 128 128 131 144 144 128
Number of regions 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Number of instruments 6 7 7 7 7 9 7 7 8 9 10 10 11
Hausman test for endogeneity
21.27 24.21 21.1 15.99 12.73 10.28 15.97 12.64 0.01 1.6 9.77 12.68 12.7
0 0 0 0 0 -0.01 0 0 -0.93 -0.23 -0.01 0 0
Dependent variable is the difference between regions’ fiscal deficit outturns and fiscal deficit targets. The larger this difference is, the larger is the fiscal non-compliance margin. All variables
defined in level differences.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag of the explanatory variables.
Standard errors allow for correlation within regions but not among regions (cluster robustness specification).
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Chapter 3
Extraordinary mechanisms for
payment of general government
suppliers in Spain
“You cannot escape
the responsibility of tomorrow
by escaping it today”
Abraham Lincoln
A shorter version of this chapter is published in Public Finance and Management Review (Delgado-Te´llez
et al., 2017).
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3. Extraordinary mechanisms for payment of general government suppliers in Spain
3.1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis has had a most adverse effect on public finances in a number of
EU countries, with a significant increase in the budget deficit and public debt (see e.g. Bird &
Mandilaras, 2013). One phenomenon associated with this deterioration in public finances has
been the significant increase in the time taken by governments to pay its suppliers and, therefore,
in its trade debt (Flynn & Pessoa, 2014). In some countries, public sector trade debt doubled
over the initial few years of the crisis, reaching unprecedented levels. Nevertheless, surprisingly
enough, the issue of the macroeconomic impact of government trade debt and arrears on private
sector activity has received very limited attention in the literature (see Checherita-Westphal
et al., 2016).1
The recent experience of Spanish public finances poses a natural example to study the impact
of government trade debt on the economy. The total amount of consolidated Spanish general
government payment obligations outstanding increased to e87.3 billion in 2011 (8.1% of GDP)
from e57.1 billion in 2007 (5.3% of GDP). As of 2012, the Spanish government adopted various
measures geared to reducing (local and regional) government trade debt volumes. At the same
time new regulations, aimed at structurally reducing the payment time, were approved. These
policies have had a significant impact on the stock of trade debt and the average supplier
payment period. Hence, the consolidated general government payment obligations outstanding
in 2013 stood at e58.7 billion (5.6% of GDP), significantly down on the 2011 figure. The
reduction is apparently concentrated at the regional and local government level, whose weight
in total outstanding general government payment obligations fell to around 50%. Also, on
the data recently provided by the Ministry of Finance and General Government (“MHAP”
by its Spanish abbreviation), the average payment period for supplier invoices issued between
January and November 2014 was around 58 days and 27 days for regional government and local
government, respectively, i.e. lower levels than observed in previous years.These policies have
had a significant impact on the stock of trade debt and the average supplier payment period.
Hence, the consolidated general government payment obligations outstanding in 2015 stood at
e57.2 billion (5.3% of GDP), significantly down on the 2011 figure.
These developments in general government trade credit in Spain may have exerted significant
effects on economic activity. Deferred payment is a standard practice in trade relations. However,
an excessive lengthening of the payment period may have harmful effects on creditor companies,
which are obliged to resort to alternative sources of financing. In a setting of financial constraints
such as that seen during the crisis, these alternatives may not be available or their cost may
be very high. Countering this, the trade debt-reducing measures implemented have entailed
an injection of liquidity for households and firms, against a backdrop of widespread economic
weakness, fiscal consolidation and difficulties for economic agents in gaining access to credit.
1As discussed by Checherita-Westphal et al. (2016), the existing literature on government arrears is mostly
concerned with measurement issues (see for example Diamond & Schiller, 1993; Ramos, 1998).
Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda 73
Essays on the subnational government’s indebtedness
This chapter describes the extraordinary mechanisms for payments to suppliers developed
in Spain in recent years and quantifies their impact, at least approximately. The chapter is
structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly describes the trend of general government accounts
payable in Spain and in other European countries. Section 3.2.2 reviews the various policies
implemented to reduce both the stock of trade debt and general government payment periods
in Spain. Section 3.3 looks at the main channels through which these policies might exert
an influence on the economy’s private sector, and the potential effects are quantified using
two analytical instruments. First, a purely data based VAR model, estimated over the period
1995Q1-2015Q4. Second, an estimated, large scale macroeconometric model for the Spanish
economy that allows for a discussion and quantification of the impact of various theoretical
channels. Section 3.4 draws the main conclusions of our study.
3.2 Government accounts payable in Spain: recent trends and
policy measures
3.2.1 General government accounts payable from an European perspective
The general government sector commonly uses private suppliers to provide public goods and
services, and in doing so it incurs payment obligations with them under certain conditions.
The payment of these obligations by general government, as in the case of the private sector,
occasionally involves a time lag relative to when the services or goods were actually provided
or delivered. Amounts whose payment has been deferred are statistically recorded in what are
known as “accounts payable”. This trade debt forms part of total general government liabilities,
although under European statistical standards it is not part of the public debt for the purposes
of the Excessive Deficit Protocol (EDP debt).2 In Spain’s case, the information on this debt is
published by the Banco de Espan˜a in its quarterly financial accounts.3
From 1997 to 2007, in the upturn prior to the economic crisis, consolidated accounts payable
stood in Spain at around 4% of GDP or 10% of total public expenditure in annual average
terms. In comparative terms (see figure 3.1), this figure was slightly below the average for other
European countries, which nonetheless show high heterogeneity, ranging from practically zero
in Germany to percentages of around 10% of GDP in France, reflecting the different practices
prevailing in relations between the general government sector and its suppliers in the different
countries.
In terms of agents, most outstanding payment obligations in Spain’s case were concentrated
2Non-recourse factoring and long-term trade credit are included in EDP debt.
3Eurostat only publishes comparable cross-country data of the aggregate “Other accounts payable”. Data on
accounts payable to non-financial corporations and households are available for the Spanish general government
sector. It should be borne in mind, however, that the definition of households includes sole proprietors. Moreover,
the data for this distinction are based on estimates. Further, for each “Other accounts payable” figure, there is
a breakdown into “Trade credits and advances” and “Other accounts receivable/payable, excluding trade credit
and advances”.
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Figure 3.1: Accounts payable of general government: international comparison (a)
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SOURCE: EUROSTAT.
a. Does not include accounts payable to other general government units.
b. EU average does not include Estonia, Croatia, Malta and Slovenia at the start of the time series because of
lack of data. Neither does it include Greece for the whole period, as it is no longer available in Eurostat database.
in local and regional government, which accounted for around 65% of such obligations in the
1997-2007 period, with somewhat more than 30% owed by regional government. By type of
creditor, almost three-quarters of this debt was to non-financial corporations and the remainder
to households.
A supplementary variable that allows for analysis of the volume of outstanding obligations is
the average supplier payment period. According to data based on surveys of firms,4 the general
government payment period differs substantially from one country to another (see figure 3.2),
both in relation to the usual contractual practices prevailing and to the average delays observed
4Source: Intrum Justitia. Written, national language survey conducted in 31 EU countries in the first quarter
of the year. In terms of company size, the sample (2014 wave) is made up as follows: 40% of the companies have
fewer than 19 employees, 27% between 20 and 49 employees, 27% between 50 and 249, 3% between 250 and 499,
2% between 500 and 2,499, and 1% more than 2,500.
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with respect to those practices. Specifically, prior to the crisis, the usual contractually stipulated
general government payment period was around 80 days in the case of Spain and Italy, while
it stood at 31 days in Germany and the United Kingdom. According to the surveys, payment
delays in relation to contractual commitments were especially high in Portugal and Italy, where
they exceeded 80 and 60 days, respectively. In Spain’s case, these delays stood at around 30
days on average.
Figure 3.2: General government’s average supplier payment period: international
comparison
 
SOURCE: Intrum Justitia.
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a. Average of the EU-28 excluding Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia.
The stocks of outstanding payment obligations of most EU countries generally tended to
increase during the crisis. These increases were especially significant in Spain and particularly
in Portugal and Greece. Specifically, in the case of Spain, accounts payable reached 8% of GDP
at end-2011. This increase was seen in all tiers of government and, accordingly, the accounts
payable in that period reached 2.4% of GDP in central government, 3.4% of GDP in regional
government and 2.1% of GDP in local government. The increase was in payables to both
companies and households. The average delays in payments relative to the contractually agreed
period are estimated to have increased by approximately 30 days compared with those before
the crisis.
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Against this backdrop, several countries, including Spain, Italy and Portugal, implemented
plans in 2011 and 2012 to reduce their general government trade debt. In general, these plans
have managed to reduce or stabilise the trade debt of these countries. In the specific case of
Spain, the accounts payable of Spanish general government as a whole to other economic sectors
(firms and households) stood in 2013 at around e58 billion (5.5% of GDP), a decrease of 2.5
percentage points (pp) of GDP relative to 2011, which was apparently concentrated in regional
government (1.8% of GDP between 2013 and 2011) and local government (0.8% of GDP in the
same period). This reduction seemingly occurred in payables to both non-financial corporations
and households (see figure 3.3). The most recent data, relating to 2014, show that this trend
has continued, taking the ratio of outstanding payment obligations down to 4.5%.
Figure 3.3: General government: Accounts Payable (a) (b)
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SOURCES: Banco de Espan˜a and MHAP.
a. 2016 data relates to the third quarter of the year. 2016 GDP is the aggregation of the quarterly GDP of the
last four quarters available.
b. Excluding accounts payable to other general government units.
Although surveys of firms do not seem to show a significant decrease in the average delay in
payment in the last few years (see figure 3.2), the information published by the MHAP5 indicates
that the average time taken to pay suppliers of State, regional and local governments as at 31
5See the MHAP website: http://www.hacienda.gob.es/es-ES/CDI/Paginas/PeriodoMedioPago/
PeriodoMedioPago.aspx.
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December 2012 was 60, 181 and 109 days, respectively, while the average payment period of
supplier invoices issued between January and November 2014 is estimated at around 11, 58 and
27 days for central government, regional government and local government, respectively.6
As described in detail in the next section, the various plans to reduce general government
trade debt in Spain were financed by the central government, which raised on the financial
markets the funds needed to pay the suppliers of regional and local government. The settlement
of regional and local government payables under these plans has meant that these tiers of
government have replaced their trade debt with debt to central government. Consequently,
the EDP debt of regional and local government to the State tripled in the period 2012-2013,
such that the percentage of regional government debt which is owed to the State increased from
zero to 37% in September 2014 (see figure 3.4).7
Figure 3.4: Weight of loans from central government in the total debt of regional
governments (a)
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SOURCES: Banco de Espan˜a and INE.
a. The regions of Galicia, Navarre and Basque Country have not received any financing from Central Government
loans.
b. Computed as the ratio of the aggregation of all financing received by the regional government from the FLA
and FFPP to total regional debt.
c. At 30 November the following regional governments were in the FLA programme: Andalusia (AND), Asturias
(AST), Balearic Islands (BAL), Canary Islands (CAN), Cantabria (CANT), Catalonia (CAT), Castilla la Mancha
(CM), Murcia (MUR) and Valencia (VAL).
d. Aragon (ARA), Castilla y Leon (CyL), Extremadura (EXT), Madrid (MAD), La Rioja (RIO).
e. Extremadura joined the FLA programme on 11 December 2014.
6Several partial sources give a similar picture. More detailed information is available for the State (see
the MHAP website: http://www.hacienda.gob.es/es-ES/CDI/Paginas/PeriodoMedioPago/InformacionAAPPs/
PMPdelasAAPP.aspx). According to that information, the average payment period of this sub-sector was 38.5
days at end-2011, it increased to 60 days in 2012 and it decreased to 30 days in 2013. The National Feder-
ation of the Self-Employed (the “ATA” by its Spanish abbreviation) regularly publishes the results of surveys
of the self-employed (http://www.ata.es/), which show that the average payment periods of amounts owed to
this group by the various general government units in December 2012 stood at 69, 149 and 177 days for central
government, regional government and local government, respectively, whereas in December 2014 these periods
were 45, 106 and 74 days, respectively. Lastly, the economic consultancy group SIELOCAL (Sistema de Trans-
parencia Econo´mica Municipal – Municipal Economic Transparency System) publishes an annual report on the
average payment period of local government, which fell from its peak of 122 days in 2011 to 74 days in 2013
(http://www.sielocal.com/informe/327/Periodo-medio-de-pago).
7For an analysis of the implications of these operations for the debt of general government overall, as well as
for the State, regional and local governments, see Gordo et al. (2013, 2014).
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3.2.2 Measures to reduce trade debt in Spain
Since early 2012 the central government has applied several measures to mitigate the liquidity
problems of regional and local government. Thus, in response to the resolutions of the Fiscal and
Financial Policy Council (Consejo de Pol´ıtica Fiscal y Financiera, the “CPFF” by its Spanish
abbreviation) of 17 January 2012, two courses of action were undertaken. Firstly, in relation
to the regional financing system, the system of advanced payments and deferrals on account8
was modified. Secondly, the 2012 ICO-regional government facility9 was set up to cover two
tranches: one intended to provide regional governments with funds to meet their payment
obligations associated with maturities of regional government financial debt incurred before 1
January 2012 and maturing up to or on 30 June 2012 (refinancing tranche), and another relating
to outstanding payments to suppliers.
Subsequently, Royal Decree-Law 4/2012 of 24 February 2012 established an extraordinary
financing plan for the payment of local government suppliers, which was later extended to
regional governments. This plan set in place a temporary mechanism for the payment of certain
trade accounts payable by local and regional governments as at December 2011. The plan was
financed by a syndicated loan10 taken out by the Supplier Payment Financing Fund (Fondo
para la Financiacio´n de Pago a Supplier, the “FFPP” by its Spanish abbreviation), created by
the Government and 26 financial institutions, and endowed with e30 billion, extendable to e35
billion. The FFPP came into being as a public law entity with legal personality and capacity to
issue and raise funds on the markets.11 To draw on the FFPP, local and regional governments
had to commit to an adjustment plan assessed by the MHAP.12
Royal Decree-Law 4/2013 of 22 February 2013 gave rise to a second phase of the supplier
payment mechanism, which regulated the inclusion of the governments and invoices excluded
8The central government undertook to: (1) shift forward to the first half of 2012 50% of the estimated amount
of the 2010 financing system settlements in favour of those regional governments which so request; (2) defer up to a
maximum of 120 monthly instalments the outstanding amount of the negative settlements of the financing system
relating to 2008 and 2009 for those regional governments which so request and which agree on an adjustment
programme with the MHAP. The 2008 and 2009 settlements in favour of the State amounted to e5,922 million
and e18,947 million, respectively, according to the MHAP.
9It was set up in February 2012 to make special-purpose loans under which the ICO paid the financial creditor
directly. The maximum interest rate was referenced to the ICO’s cost of debt. Thus regional governments had
to pay this interest rate plus the ICO’s financial market search costs. However, the ICO’s search costs and its
limited ability to obtain financing on the markets meant that its borrowing conditions were worse than those of
the financing obtained by the Treasury (see Gonza´lez, 2013). A total of e5,333 million of loans were granted (see
ICO press release of 11 February 2013 reporting the 2012 results).
10The syndicated loan was secured by a Treasury guarantee which in turn was secured by the share in State
revenue of municipal and regional governments. The loan maturity initially set was 5 years, with a 2-year grace
period. The cost for local and regional government is that of the syndicated loan plus operating costs of 0.3
pp and they had to repay the loan in 10 years with a 2-year grace period. These conditions are now softer for
municipalities.
11As stipulated in Royal Decree-Law 7/2012 of 9 March 2012.
12A favourable assessment of the adjustment plan entailed the transformation of the trade debt of local and
regional governments into financial debt to the State, while an unfavourable assessment or lack of an adjustment
plan could entail retention of the share in State tax revenue.
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in the first phase.13 It was endowed with around e2.6 billion, the amount remaining from the
FFPP’s initial endowment of e30 billion after deducting the amount of e27.4 billion finally used
in 2012.14
Finally, in the fourth quarter of 2013 the third phase of the supplier payment plan was
approved. It was implemented in two tranches, paid in November 2013 and February 2014,
which extended not only the scope of the mechanism,15 16 but also the time horizon of the
outstanding payment obligations covered by it. Hence this could be used by local and regional
governments to settle due and payable obligations to 31 May 2013. In total, the FFPP has, in
its three phases between 2012 and 2014, paid e30.2 billion to regional governments and e11.6
billion to local governments (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Financing received by the sub-national governments from the supplier
payment financing fund (a) (b)
By regional governments By municipalities
Eur. Million Total 2012 2013 2014 Total
Total 30,219 17,705 4,544 7,970 11,595
Andalusia 4,955 2,694 634 1,628 3,405
Aragon 513 429 10 74 227
Asturias 243 243 82
Balearic Islands 1,274 842 85 347 450
Canary Islands 315 231 24 59 502
Cantabria 327 327 51
Castilla y Leon 1,052 1,052 453
Castilla La Mancha 3,957 2,918 339 699 569
Catalonia 6,466 2,020 2,169 2,277 820
Extremadura 392 228 7 157 153
Galicia 220
Madrid 1,347 1,257 89 2,882
Murcia 1,789 1,0382 253 499 419
Navarre 1
La Rioja 71 71 7
Valencia 7,519 4,355 934 2,230 1,271
SOURCE: MHAP.
a. The regional and municipal governments of the Basque Country have not received
any financing form the FFPP.
b. There have been 4 payments from the FFPP: Phase I in June 2012, Phase II in August
2013, Phase III Tranche I in November 2013 and Phase I, Tranche II in February 2014.
Phase II for municipalities took place in June 2013.
Simultaneously with the FFPP, the Government set in train a supplementary mechanism
initially designed to provide liquidity to the regional governments so requesting. Its purpose
was to cater for situations of strong need for financing at times of tight credit. To this end,
Royal Decree-Law 21/2012 of 13 July 2012 on general government liquidity measures set up
13Specifically, the expansion of the mechanism affected associations of municipalities, Navarre and Basque
municipalities, and new types of contract (administrative licences, management contracts, agreements, property
lease contracts and public-private sector cooperation contracts).
14For more information see the presentation of the MHAP of 15 November 2013.
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the regional government liquidity fund (Fondo de Liquidez Autono´mica – “FLA” by its Spanish
abbreviation). This is a fund from which regional governments can voluntarily obtain funds,
which from the outset has been financed by Treasury debt issuance, so its cost is lower than that
of the FFPP. Like the FFPP, the FLA directly services the security and loan maturities which
regional governments are unable to refinance. Since it was set up, nine regional governments have
joined it.17 Despite its initial purpose, since the end of 2012 the FLA has devoted somewhat more
than a quarter of its funds to paying outstanding invoices from suppliers, particularly those for
works contracts, supplies and services, and health agreements and pharmacies. In total, between
2012 and 2014, the MHAP released e25.1 billion for supplier payments of regional governments
belonging to the FLA (see Table 3.2).15
Table 3.2: Financing received by the sub-national governments from the regional
government liquidity fund (a)
By regional governments
Eur. Million Total 2012 2013 2014
Total 25,073 6,298 7,019 11,756
Andalusia 5,997 1,729 1,661 2,607
Asturias 586 234 353
Balearic Islands 1,328 343 533 452
Canary Islands 1,365 406 473 486
Cantabria 510 117 233 160
Castilla la Mancha 1,416 254 431 732
Catalonia 7,339 1,821 1,892 3,626
Extremadura 158 158
Murcia 1,306 241 318 747
Valencia 5,067 1,153 1,125 2,789
SOURCE: MHAP.
a. Includes payments to suppliers, co-financed grants, dependency, subsidies or transfers
to local authorities and universities and others. Therefore, it is the total amount of FLA
financing that is not used to pay the debt and interest thereon. Extremadura joined the
FLA in December 2014. Aragon, Castilla y Leon, Galicia, Madrid, Navarre, La Rioja and
the Basque Country have not received any financing from the FLA.
Thus, between 2012 and 2014, the FFPP and the FLA supplier facility paid outstanding
invoices of local and regional governments amounting to e66.9 billion, of which e11.6 billion
related to local government and e55.3 billion to regional government (see Tables 3.1 3.2 and
figure 3.5). Of the amounts disbursed by the FFPP, somewhat more than 50% was devoted to
paying the invoices of large firms, nearly 50% to SMEs and 1% to the self-employed (see Chart
5, left-hand panel).
As a supplement to programmes of this type, different legislative measures were adopted
to reduce structurally the payment periods of general government. Specifically, EU Directive
2011/7/EU aims to harmonise at European level the time taken by general government to pay
companies and also shorten the payment periods between private sector firms. For dealings
15The amount also included co-financed subsidies and those for dependency, local government and universities,
and taxes and other.
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Figure 3.5: Funds received by the regional and local government for supplier pay-
ments (a)
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a. Includes payments to suppliers, co-financed grants, dependency, subsidies or transfers to local authorities and
universities and others. Therefore, it is the total amount of the FLA that is not used to pay the debt and interest
thereon.
between general government and private sector firms it sets a payment period of 30 days from
receipt of the invoice or, if none, from receipt of the goods or services. This period may be
extended in certain circumstances to 60 days. The Directive also establishes minimum financial
costs for general government if these deadlines are not met. In 2010 Spain enacted Law 15/2010
of 5 July 2010 amending Law 3/2004 of 29 December 2004 on measures to combat late payment
of commercial transactions, which anticipated several of the measures subsequently included
in the aforementioned Directive, particularly in relation to payment periods.16 The transposi-
tion was completed by Royal Decree-Law 4/2013 of 22 February 2013 on measures to support
entrepreneurs and stimulate growth and job creation.
Also, to strengthen compliance with this legislation, the law on control of trade debt in the
public sector came into force in January 2014. This law amends the budgetary stability and fi-
nancial sustainability law so as to broaden the meaning of the principle of financial sustainability
to include trade debt in its scope, since under the budgetary stability and financial sustainability
law as originally drafted, the limits on public indebtedness only included the control of public
debt as defined in the Excessive Deficit Procedure, which as noted above, excludes trade credit.
In addition, it obliges general government to make public its average supplier payment period
and approves various measures which general government has to apply unilaterally when the
permitted average payment periods are exceeded. Accordingly, the average payment period
becomes a crucial tool within the framework of the budgetary stability and financial sustain-
ability law, which establishes a detailed monitoring and sanctioning procedure in the event of
non-compliance. Since September 2014 all tiers of general government have made public their
average payment periods.
16It came into force in January 2013.
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3.3 Impact on economic activity of supplier payment funds
3.3.1 Theoretical channels
As noted in the Introduction, the measures to reduce the government’s trade debt have
entailed an injection of liquidity into firms and households and a normalization of the time taken
by general government to pay its suppliers. This increase of liquidity may have had a significant
impact due to the contemporaneous situation of economic weakness, fiscal consolidation and
lack of market financing.
Quantifying this impact is, however, complex and it is first necessary to identify the trans-
mission channels. For this purpose, it is useful to analyse the effect which may arise from
default or late payment. Although deferred payments are normal in trade relationships, exces-
sive lengthening of payment periods has harmful effects on the creditor company.17 Long delays
force businesses to look for alternative means of financing, such as bank loans or they may also
delay the payment of their own invoices. But, in times of financial constraint, as the recent
crisis, these alternatives may not be available or they may be very costly, thus reducing firms’
profitability and perhaps even jeopardizing their liquidity, and ultimately resulting in lowered
investment, delays in paying employees and, in extreme cases, closure of the firm.18
The impact of lengthening the time taken to pay suppliers probably depends on firm size.
Large firms are generally better equipped to mitigate the effect of delays in customer payments
by passing on the trade credit fully or partly to their own creditors and being in a better
position to negotiate alternative financing with banks. Delayed payment is therefore probably
more harmful when the creditors are small and medium-sized enterprises.
The macroeconomic effect of the various supplier payment programs mentioned above is
related with the loosening of firms’ liquidity constraints. The final effect will depend on whether
the creditors consider the plan as a mere early payment of amounts they expected to receive
later, or whether this payment is unexpected, i.e. the economic agents did not expect to collect,
at least partially, the trade accounts payable. In this second case, the expected multiplier effect
will obviously be greater. The effect will also depend crucially on the use made by firms of the
funds paid by the government. Generally, firms will use these funds to repay bank loans, to pay
possible arrears in their employees’ wages, to undertake new investment projects or simply to
increase their saving for precautionary reasons. The multiplier effect on the economic activity
of each of these uses will also differ. The effect can be expected to be larger when the funds are
used for investment in fixed capital formation and smaller when they are used to repay bank
loans, since in this case the effect on economic activity takes a more indirect path: the positive
impact on investment will depend on the extent to which financial institutions use the amounts
to grant new loans. Similarly, if the final use is to pay employees’ wage arrears, its short-term
17See, for example, Connell (2014).
18Connell (2014) estimates that in a hypothetical scenario in which delays in general government payments to
the business sector were reduced to zero, the firm shut-down rate would be reduced by somewhat more than 7%.
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impact will depend on whether the amounts are used for consumption or saving.
Furthermore, the effects of these extraordinary supplier payment mechanisms may depend
crucially on the macroeconomic setting in which they arise. The significant lengthening of
regional and local government payment periods in the middle of an economic crisis and fiscal
consolidation process, added to tight credit conditions, have probably magnified the positive
effects of the policy measures taken.
A proper analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the supplier payment plans would there-
fore require individual data on the firms (and households) affected and knowledge of their credit
restrictions and their decisions before and after the supplier payment measures were imple-
mented. That information is not available. There is, however, some disaggregated information
on the use of funds which may help to approximate these effects. The data provided by the
Ministry of Finance show that 55% of payments from the FFPP were to large firms, 43% to
SMEs and the other 2% to self-employed persons. Moreover, 20.3% of payments from the FFPP
and 13.5% of the total payments from the FLA were made directly to financial institutions.
Based on this information, the macroeconomic impact of supplier payment programs is esti-
mated below using two analysis tools. First, we construct an illustrative empirical exercise based
on a VAR model. Second, a series of simulations, including quantitative estimates, is performed
using the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de Espan˜a Hurtado et al. (2014).
This model is specified as a large set of error correction mechanism equations, and is designed
for a small open economy within a monetary union, such as Spain. This model enables us to
characterize some of the channels through which the supplier payment mechanisms may have
operated.
3.3.2 Illustration of the impact of supplier payment mechanisms using a
VAR model
The macroeconomic impact of a change in trade credit can be approximated, firstly, by a
VAR model including the variables of interest in the analysis. A VAR model is a system of
equations which takes each variable included as being endogenous with respect to the others
and is thus particularly appropriate for an analysis of these characteristics in which the causal
relationships between the variables being analysed may run in different directions.
The fact that the sample has a sufficient, although not prolific, number of observations,
would advise a gradual approach to the phenomenon under study. Hence the variables included
in the basic VAR model used are general government trade credit, real GDP and government
expenditure. The variable used to represent trade credit is general government accounts payable
to non-financial corporations. We do not estimate the amount of payments in arrears because
our main interest is to evaluate the impact of the extraordinary liquidity for households and
firms. Nevertheless, there are other papers that calculate a proxy for the arrears combining
the accounts payable with the period estimated from survey data (Checherita-Westphal et al.,
2016). They use a GMM model and a Bayesian VAR to estimate the impact of the increase in
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arrears on the profitability of firms and on GDP, as well as on the probability of bankruptcy.
Meanwhile, in this chapter we estimate the impact of a sudden drop on the trade credits that
has been already delayed, and we know the exact amount paid during those years.
In the VAR model we also include the level of government expenditure (in logarithms) to con-
trol for the fact that an increase in government expenditure may be associated with an increase
in trade credit, since the latter consists of a delay in payment of the former (see Checherita-
Westphal et al., 2016).19 However, against a background in which general government has
limited access to financial markets, the relationship between these variables could reverse if gen-
eral government responded to this situation by simultaneously cutting government expenditure
(fiscal adjustment) and delaying payment to suppliers.
The following additional variables are also included in alternative specifications: the inflation
rate (measured by the GDP deflator), a measure of the cost of the financing needed to cover the
operating needs which was intended to cover with the trade credit (for which a 3-year interest
rate is used), a measure of the degree of financial tightness of the economy (through the volume
of loans from the financial sector to the non-financial private sector, excluding house purchase
loans to households) and a measure of the financial situation of the business sector (proxied by
the real gross value added of the market economy). The sample available to estimate the models
consists on quarterly data and covers the period 1995Q1-2015Q4. A constant and a linear trend
are included in all specifications.
The VAR lag structure is determined employing the usual statistical criteria. For the basic
specification, the number of lags according to the Akaike information criteria is 3, while for the
Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria is 2. Our basic specification will therefore take
into account 3 lags. Nevertheless, the results do not change qualitatively with 2 lags.
The upper panels of Figure 3.6 show the impulse-response functions of real GDP and trade
credit (both variables are in logarithms) when there is an unexpected decrease (shock) in the
latter variable.20 The Figure depicts the generalized impulse-response functions of Pesaran and
Shin (1998), which are robust to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. The confidence bands
are calculated by asymptotic methods.
The model dynamics behave as expected. GDP responds by increasing from the first quarter
in which the shock occurs and continues to rise persistently in the ensuing periods.21 Also,
the decrease in trade credit is accompanied by an increase in government expenditure (bottom
panel of the figure). Thus, according to our model, a decrease in trade credit is likely to have a
19Unlike real GDP, which is taken from the Quarterly National Accounts, trade credit and government expen-
diture are not seasonally adjusted. We seasonally-adjust the former using the TRAMO/SEATS program, and
take the latter from the quarterly fiscal database of de Castro Ferna´ndez et al. (2018).
20The initial shock is equivalent to one standard deviation of the variable. The path of trade credit in Figure
3.6 has been normalised to show a cumulative change of 1% so that the panels are simpler to read.
21In the model, moreover, trade credit exhibits high persistence, i.e. an initial reduction in trade credit generates
decreases in the following quarters, so the total shock received by the economy is bigger than the initial one. For
this reason the results should be analysed in cumulative terms, as in the figure.
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positive effect on real GDP over the course of several years. In particular, if the results of the
figure are taken at face value, a 1% unexpected decrease in trade credit would give rise to an
increase in real GDP of around 0.2 pp, in cumulative terms after 3 years (see upper left-hand
panel of Figure 5). This result is robust in all the specifications. In terms of the ratio of trade
credit to government expenditure (see lower right-hand panel of Figure 3.6), the shock would
reduce that ratio by close to 25% in 3-years, 3 pp in cumulated terms, taking as starting point
its value in 2011Q4.
Figure 3.6: Var model: impact of a reduction of general government’s trade debt
(a)
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Based on these results, an estimate can be made of how GDP would be affected by the
decrease in trade credit associated with the supplier payment plan. According to the information
in Figure 3.3, the ratio of all general government accounts payable to non-financial corporations
(our measure of trade credit in the VAR) to government expenditure decreased by around 4.0
pp between 2011 Q4 and end-2013. If it is assumed that all the change in this ratio is due to
the supplier payment program, based on the estimate obtained from the model and given that
this is linear, the positive impact of the program on real GDP may be around 0.3 pp of GDP in
3-year cumulated terms. These estimates do not, however, take into account the possibility that
the funds made available may have had differing impacts on the economy, depending on whether
they were paid directly to financial institutions, on the size of the recipient firms and on other
factors. In addition, the evolution of government expenditure in this period was determined by
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numerous factors. Moreover, this plan was implemented during a fiscal consolidation process.
As figure 3.7 shows, the fiscal effort was significant in the years 2012 and 2013. Therefore, the
Plan has probably compensated a portion of the negative effects of this consolidation on GDP.
Figure 3.7: Annual amount of supplier payments and structural balance of the
general government
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3.3.3 The impact of supplier payment mechanisms through the lenses of a
macroeconometric model
In addition to the above VAR-based analysis, we simulate in this Section the impact of the
supplier payment plan on the main macroeconomic variables by making use of the Quarterly
Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de Espan˜a (Hurtado et al., 2014). This is a large-scale
macro-econometric model used in the elaboration of the medium term macroeconomic forecasting
of the Spanish economy, as well as for performing policy and scenario simulations. The model
is specified as a large set of error correction mechanism equations, and, especially in the short
run, is mostly demand driven: the usual main transmission channel for most shocks is that
they affect a demand variable (consumption, investment or exports), and this change in demand
forces firms to adjust employment and investment, affecting households’ income (which in turn
generates second-round effects on consumption and housing investment), prices (through the
Phillips curve) and unemployment (which, together with prices, also affects wages).
As a means of including the various channels mentioned in earlier sections, the supplier
payment plan is simulated as an increase in transfers from the public sector to households and
firms, and through an increase in the credit available in the economy, for the various quarters in
which payments were made between 2012Q2 and 2014Q4. Both transfers and credit availability
have a direct effect on consumption, housing investment, and private productive investment.
This triggers all the transmission channels described above: firms react to higher demand,
households to higher income, prices move according to the Phillips curve, and so on, until the new
general equilibrium is reached. The magnitude of the effect, though, will depend on a set of initial
assumptions regarding the size of the shock. The difficulties in using a macroeconomic model to
estimate the impact of the supplier payment fund are, however, numerous. As mentioned above,
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we do not have an accurate knowledge of the final use of the funds or of how they are used by
the various agents, so various assumptions have to be made to carry out the simulations.
An initial simulation (scenario 1) is performed under the following assump-tions. First, it is
necessary to allocate the amounts of the plan funds according to their use by economic agents
(financial institutions, households and firms), given that, as indicated in a previous section,
the expected impact depends crucially on this factor. Under scenario 1 it is assumed that
all the amounts paid by supplier payment financing funds and the FLA directly to financial
institutions do not increase household income, but rather raise the availability of credit in the
economy. Specifically, on the available information it can be estimated that around 17.6% of
the total funds were paid directly to credit institutions. As noted above, the economic activity
multiplier derived from this part of the funds is expected to be lower, given that the effect
depends on the extent to which this higher available credit is used by financial institutions to
grant more credit and, in turn, depends also on how firms and households used this fresh credit
granted to them.
Under this first scenario it is also assumed that, disregarding the aforementioned amounts,
all the payments of funds to individuals and half of those to SMEs correspond under the model
to a transfer to households. The other payments to SMEs and large firms are considered as
injections of funds into firms. According to these assumptions, around 60% of the total funds
entailed a transfer to firms and the remainder to households.
Under this first scenario it is also assumed that the main effect of the plan is to bring forward
the payment of amounts which creditors of general government expected to receive late but which
they had not written off. Subsequently, this assumption, which has important implications in
terms of the macroeconomic effects simulated with the model, will be relaxed. Additionally, it is
assumed that after the transfer relating to payment of arrears, households keep their saving rate
unchanged, i.e. that the percentage of these payments that they save is equal to what they were
saving before the transfer. This assumption, which increases the consumer response to shocks
which raise disposable income, is intended to describe the situation of economic crisis in which
the plan was carried out and in which agents encountered more liquidity constraints.
Figure 3.8 summarizes the estimated impact on GDP and employment for the period 2012-
2014. The results obtained suggest that the supplier payment plan had a cumulative positive
effect on GDP of 0.3 pp to 2014. The effect on employment was 0.4 pp. This resulted from in-
creased consumption and, above all, from increased private productive investment. The increase
in imports derived from the increase in domestic demand seems to have neutralized part of the
expansionary effect of the plan.
In a second simulation (scenario 2), all the foregoing assumptions are maintained, with the
difference that the impact of the plan is generated not only through the bringing-forward of the
creditors’ expected collection date, but also because a portion of this collection is unexpected, i.e.
the economic agents expected that they would not collect a percentage of their trade accounts
receivable from general government. An unexpected transfer from general government to private
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agents naturally has a higher multiplier effect on activity. Under this scenario 2, the positive
effect of the plan increases to 0.6 pp of GDP in cumulative terms to 2014 and to 0.7 pp of
employment.
Figure 3.8: MTBE model: simulation of impact of the supplier payment mechanism
on GDP and employment
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Table 3.3: Simulations with the quarterly macroeconometric model of Banco de
Espan˜a
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014
GDP 0.27 0.19 0.29 0.55 0.37 0.59
Private consumption 0.39 0.28 0.36 0.79 0.55 0.73
Gross fix capital formation 1.02 0.73 1.39 2.07 1.47 2.8
Exports -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07
Imports 0.57 0.36 0.59 1.14 0.72 1.19
Employment 0.29 0.31 0.37 0.59 0.63 0.73
Consumer price index 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.15
Credit 0.13 0.38 0.56 0.26 0.75 1.12
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
In short, the above results confirm the plan’s positive effects on activity, although they
also illustrate the difficulty in accurately quantifying the size of these effects, given that the
direct channels through which it presumably operates can only be captured imperfectly and
approximately in the available macroeconomic models (i.e. the selected model is an appropriate
tool for the calculation of how the initial increase in consumption and investment is spread to
the rest of the economy through several channels, but requires all these additional assumptions
in order to calculate the initial response of consumption and investment to begin with). For
additional details on the effects of these policy scenarios on different macro variables, see Table
3.3.22
22In a similar exercise using the REMS model, the BBVA Research Department estimated that the impact of
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3.4 Conclusions
The initiatives taken by the Spanish government as of 2012 to reduce the trade debt of
regional and local governments enabled their stock of outstanding debt and the time taken to
pay suppliers to be restored to normal in somewhat less than three years.
Since these mechanisms were implemented after a significant increase in regional and local
government payment periods and against a background of severe economic weakness, fiscal
consolidation and tight credit, they seem to have acted as a stimulus on private agents and
the economy as a whole, helping to mitigate some of the adverse effects of the economic crisis.
The various estimates presented in this study confirm a significant positive impact on activity,
although it is complex to estimate its size accurately, given the variety of channels on which plans
of this type may operate and the difficulty in capturing them with the available macroeconomic
models.
As a whole, the measures implemented have proved highly effective in providing liquidity
to the suppliers of local and regional government, the outstanding invoices payable of which
increased significantly during the economic crisis. Simultaneously, they entailed a major in-
crease in local and regional government indebtedness to the State. To prevent this kind of aid
from generating inappropriate incentives in the behaviour of local and regional government, the
financing mechanisms agreed envisage the fulfilment of adjustment plans. It is now crucial to
require strict observance of those plans.
the first supplier payment plan ranged from 0.4 pp to 1 pp of GDP in the first year, depending of the use of the
funds and on the percentage of constrained agents (see BBVA, 2012).
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Chapter 4
Decision making in primary debt
market: empirical analysis of
Spanish Regional Governments
“Markets can remain irrational
for longer than you can remain solvent”
John Maynard Keynes
93

4. Decision making in primary debt market: empirical analysis of Spanish Regional Governments
4.1 Introduction
Subnational governments securities have increased both in volume and diversity over the
past decades, encouraging the emergence of some studies focusing on this matter. Several
factors render these assets interesting to analyse that include: the investors willingness to buy,
the contagion effects from a region’s possible bankruptcy, the role of the central government
and the existence of a no bailout clause. In particular, Autonomous Communities’ (CCAAs
henceforth) market behaviour is worth studying due to their elevated market activity and the
recent bailout experience of some CCAAs.
The fundamental aim for this chapter is the analysis of the CCAAs primary debt market.
The analysis covers two different aspects: first, the factors that may affect securities’ spreads;
and second, the decision making of the CCAAs in terms of timing, quantity issued and term to
maturity. CCAAs were among the most active subnational issuers in debt markets, ranking in
sixth place in 2009, according to Canuto and Liu (2010b).1 Issuance behaviour among CCAAs is
very heterogeneous regarding quantity issued, frequency and international presence. Moreover,
the recent economic crisis entailed strong difficulties in accessing the market and, as consequence,
a new Facility was created to provide funding for the CCAAs, changing debt market behaviour.2
The analysis is built on all information available for all CCAAs securities issued from 1995
to 2017 and includes the information available at the moment of issuance of all indicators
considered. Nevertheless, the central analysis is based on the period 1995 to 2010 to avoid the
crisis distortion on debt issuance. I developed several empirical models to answer the main
questions related with the issuance behaviour. In a first stage, I used an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression model to study possible determinants of spreads, considering the security
characteristics and, economic and risk level indicators. In the second one, I divided the analysis
in three different issues: timing, quantity issued and term to maturity. For the timing question
I estimated a non-linear probit model to evaluate factors that may change the probability of
issuance. For the two remaining questions, models are affected by a selection bias because both
decisions, quantity issued and term to maturity of securities issued, depend on the decision of
the moment of issuance. In order to cope with this problem, I estimated a Heckman selection
sample model that is the most suitable to solve this methodological problem.
Some of the results are as expected. Thus, spreads appear to be higher when the amount
issued is larger, when sovereign risk and markets spreads rise, when economic situation and
CCAAs worsens and when the security is issued in a foreign currency. Possibly, the most
interesting results is that CCAAs seem to optimise their issuance strategy, taking into account
1They ranked sixth after United States, Germany, Japan, Canada and China. Annex C presents an interna-
tional comparison of subnational issuances and a description of several kinds of cooperation among different level
of government to resort to the market.
2This Facility reduced the need to resort to the market changing therefore the Spanish subnational debt
landscape. The Financial Liquidity Fund (FLA) was created in 2012. Annex B provides a detailed description of
the central government Funds and the crisis impact on CCAAs issuance behaviour.
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their financing needs, their economic situation, the behaviour of other competitors and the
structure of their debt, whereas spreads seem to have a weak role in the whole process. The
lack of effect of spreads over the issuance behaviour may indicate some sort of malfunctioning
in the market due to existent bureaucratic rigidities. Nevertheless, the data may also have some
flaws that may distort the estimation results. Finally, the amounts received from the central
government through the FLA have discourage the issuance of debt, and thus a debate is still
pending about the role of this facility and the optimal time to return to the markets.
Most studies focused on the analysis of spreads evolution and the effect of possible bailouts
and some of them develop a cross-country comparison. For instance, Beck et al. (2017) examined
the existence of a credible no bailout clause, finding that the link between spreads evolutions
and expected fundamentals is weaker when the clause is not credible. Some studies used data on
both primary and secondary market for numerous countries (see Jenkner & Lu, 2014; Schuknecht
et al., 2009). While other studies focus on the analysis of a single country, generally a federal
one. For instance, Feld et al. (2013) evaluate the Swiss Cantons yield spreads studying the
particular role of fiscal rules and no bail-clause. Looking at the Canadian subnational debt
market, Booth et al. (2007) studied Canadian Provinces’ spreads behaviour. Building on this
literature, this chapter goes beyond and focuses on a different aspect of subnational securities,
the issuance decision.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, in section 4.2 there is a description of the main
characters of the CCAAs’ debt market. Second, section 4.3 describes the models proposed.
Third, section 4.4 contains a detailed description of the data included in this research. Fourth,
the main empirical results appear in section 4.5. Finally, in section 4.6 some conclusions are
provided.
4.2 The Autonomous Communities’ primary debt market
The Organic Law on the Financing of the Autonomous Regions (LOFCA) articulates the
power of CCAA to issue debt.3 Yet, CCAAs require prior authorization from the central gov-
ernment. This requirement has a direct impact on the CCAAs’ issuance behaviour, subduing
the issuance timing. The amount of debt issued quarterly is shown in figure 4.1. CCAAs tend
to issue more debt in the first quarter, followed by the fourth an second. This time profile may
be explained by the process of issuance authorisation. Generally, in the beginning of the year,
the central government grants the authorization to issue the debt necessary to cover the deficit
target and the maturities. Additional authorisations may be granted.
From 1995 to 2009, the presence of the CCAAs in debt markets was relatively stable (see
figure 4.2). Nevertheless, the recent economic crisis had a direct impact on the CCAAs’ mar-
ket activity. In the middle of the debt crisis, CCAAs needed extra funding for their soaring
3This law follows the Article 157 of the Spanish Constitution prescription, which establishes that the CCAAs
may finance themselves with debt.
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deficits. They sought financing in debt markets, reaching a historical peak in 2010. However,
the increasing cost of financing in markets hampered the fiscal sustainability of some CCAAs.
In order to prevent any risk of bankruptcy for the CCAAs, the central government set up a
Fund to ensure financing for the CCAAs. This fund reduced their incentive to resorting to debt
markets. Following this measure, there was a steep reduction of annual issuances in the market,
that extended to 2015. In the last two years of the period of to study (1995-2017), the amount
issued has recovered slightly.
Figure 4.1: Average quarterly amount of securities issued by CCAA (as a percentage
of annual regional income)
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
AND ARA AST BAL CAN CANT CYL CLM CAT VAL EXT GAL MAD MUR NAV PVA RIO
Amount/Annual Income (in %)
SOURCE: Banco de Espan˜a, General Intervention Board of the State Administration, own elaboration.
AND=Andalusia; ARA=Aragon; AST=Asturias; BAL=Balearic Islands; CAN= Canary Islands;
CANT=Cantabria; CAT=Catalonia; CL=Castilla and Leon; CM=Castilla la Mancha; EXT=Extremadrua;
GAL=Galica; MAD=Madrid; MUR=Murcia; NAV=Navarra; PV=Basque Country; RIO=Rioja; VAL=Valencia.
Figure 4.2: Amount of securities issued by regional subsector (as a percentage of
annual regional income)
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SOURCE: Banco de Espan˜a, General Intervention Board of the State Administration, own elaboration.
Therefore, the recent economic crisis transformed drastically the CCAAs’ debt market. At
the core of the debt crisis, investors were not keen to buy Spanish regional debt, as it was
perceived as risky due to the large fiscal imbalances accumulated. The cost of financing increased
rapidly. To cope with this illiquidity problem, the central government created the Autonomous
Liquidity Fund (FLA), which was a fund that settled CCAAs’ maturities and interest coupons
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transforming securities and bank loans into loans with the central government.4 Thus, CCAAs’
did not need to issue new debt to obtain financing. This fund was voluntary and it implied a
reinforced control over CCAAs. Some of the CCAAs that entered the fund stopped issuing debt
some years later (such as Catalonia and Valencia) and others reduced drastically the amount
issued. Other CCAAs decided not to join and even increased drastically the amount issued (e.g.
Madrid) taking advantage of low market interest rates, partially due to the loosening in ECB
monetary policy.
In recent years, the central government has focused more intensively on the sustainability of
CCAAs’ finances. In June 2015, a new law added an article to the LOFCA including the Finan-
cial Prudence Principle.5 This principle implies a maximum spread for the CCAAs securities
over central government ones. This limit is now determined by the General Secretariat of the
Treasury and Financial Policy. Thus, by imposing a limit to their issuance activity, CCAAs can
only issue if the cost in the market is lower than the maximum determined by the Treasury.6
Finally, CCAAs are very heterogeneous in different aspects: size, economic structure or even
culture. The funding strategy is not an exception. Hence, some CCAAs have relied more on loans
while others have been very active in national and even international debt market. This diversity
is shown in the figure 4.3 where three CCAAs stand out: Andalusia, Catalonia and Valencia.
These three CCAAs have been highly active in the markets up to 2014, with a regular agenda of
issuance and with international market issuance programmes. As explained by Jannone Bellot et
al. (2017), these three CCAAs had a Euro Medium Term Notes (EMTN) programme. In the case
of Valencia it dates from 1998, and in the case of Catalonia and Andalusia from 2009. Valencia
also has a Euro-Commercial Papers (ECP) since 1993 and Catalonia since 2010.7 Meanwhile,
other CCAAs started to issued again (Asturias) or significantly increased their activity (e.g.
Madrid) after the crisis.8 For a more detailed analysis of the CCAAs issuance evolution see
Annex B.
4.3 Model specification
This sections describes the empirical strategy of this chapter. The approach is based on 2
stages: First I analyse the spreads behaviour that corroborates results found in the literature.
Next, I evaluate the choice of issuance. This choice has two parts: first the timing decision and
second the quantity and the term to maturity decisions.
4For a more detailed description see Annex B. This fund was transformed into the current “regional financing
fund”.
5Organic Law 6/2015 article 1.2.
6In its resolution of the 4th of July 2017, the Treasury fixed a maximum spread of 50 basis points
7These are programmes of debt issuance in the Euromarket. These programmes are currently on hold, until
these CCAAs regain a normal issuance activity. The description of these programmes is still available for instance
in the Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas.web page.
8Asturias issued some debt back in the 1980’s.
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4.3.1 Spreads evolution
I begin with the study of the main determinants of the individual cost of financing, that
is measured as the internal rate of return (IRR).9 In order to have a comparable variable,
spreads of each security are calculated as the difference between the IRR of each security and
the secondary market interest rate of the central government securities with equivalent term to
maturity. The reasoning behind this specification is that an investor that would be interested in
buying CCAAs’ securities would compare it to an equivalent security of the central government
in the secondary market.10
Investors may buy CCAAs’ securities for two main reasons: higher yields and a portfolio
diversification strategy. Thus, the demand of a specific security (BDt ) depends mainly on the
yield of the security (ibt) positively, and negatively on the yield of an equivalent security (i
∗
t ),
11
and on the risk of non-payment: BDt (
+
ibt ;
−
i∗t ;
−
non− payment risk).
Therefore, the yield required by an investor to buy a certain security is higher the larger the
yields of other CCAAs’ securities and the stronger the repayment risk. The model of spreads
analysis is represented by equation 4.1:
Si,tk = α Qk + β tmk + η crk + γ PRt +
∑
j 6=i
t+15∑
T=
t−15
υj,TSj,T + µ Ωi,t + 
i,t
k (4.1)
where the spreads of a specific security k of the CCAA i, at a specific day t (Si,tk ), depend
on the amount issued of that security (Qik), its term to maturity (tmk), the currency of issuance
(crk), the sovereign risk premium at the moment of issuance (PRt), the spreads of others CCAAs
(Sj,T ) over the previous and following 15 days,
12 and some economic indicators for the CCAA
i at the moment of issuance (Ωit).
4.3.2 Issuance decision
Having established a relationship between spreads and the economic fundamentals, I now
focus on the decision making process. Issuance depends mainly on CCAAs financing needs
that comprise deficit (Deft), corrected by the net variation of real assets (∆RAt), and of loan
9Internal rate of return is a discount rate that makes the net present value (NPV) of all cash flows from a
particular project equal to zero. IRR calculations rely on the same formula as NPV does. NPV =
∑T
t−1
Ct
(1+r)t
−
C0, where Ct is the net cash inflow during period t, C0 is the total initial investment cost, r is the discount rate,
and t is the number of periods. Thus, the IRR is the r that renders NPV equal zero.
10The reason for the election of the secondary market data for the central securities is twofold. First, data
are available for every day of the period examined while the primary market data is only available in the day of
issuance. Second, due to the contemporary substitutability, an investor can buy securities from CCAAs or central
government in the secondary market on the same day.
11Where an equivalent investment is defined as the securities issued by the other CCAAs.
12The election of a time range of 15 days is due to the low frequency of issuances. Thus a month around the
issuance date seems reasonable.
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(∆LMt) and securities maturities (∆SMt):
FNt = Deft −∆RAt + ∆LMt + ∆SMt (4.2)
CCAAs decide their funding strategy, by deciding between issuing debt or applying for a bank
loan. Furthermore, a CCAA must decide the weight of loans and securities over total debt as
well as the temporary structure of its debt. For small CCAAs it is harder to enter the debt
market as there is a fix cost of entry. Thus, it is not surprising that the biggest and wealthiest
CCAAs are the ones that have issued more debt over the past 30 years. Once the CCAA has
entered the debt market, it is easier to continue issuing debt. Thus, each CCAA would issue
securities to cover its financing needs net of the change in Loans Stocks:
New Securitiesit = Deficitit +Maturitiesit −∆Stock Loansit (4.3)
There are three main decisions a CCAA confronts once it is in the market that include:
when to issue, the amount issued and the term to maturity. For the first decision I estimated a
non-linear model of the probability of issuance (Probit), while for the 2nd and 3rd I employed a
Heckman Sample selection model.
4.3.2.1 Timing Decision: Probit Model
CCAAs consider various factors when deciding to issue new securities in the market. First,
they have to choose the specific moment to resort to the market. A CCAA needs an authoriza-
tion from the central government for issuing new debt in the markets. Generally, the central
government gives the authorization with a validity up to the end of December of each year.
Nevertheless, if the authorization is approved near the end of the year, it may be valid up to the
first months of the following year. The CCAA may need various authorizations over the year,
thus making it more difficult to choose the optimal portfolio strategy.
The probability of issuance is analysed by the estimation of a probit model (Bliss, 1934). It
is based on the existence of a latent variable y∗i that follows y
∗
i = xiΘ+ei where ei is independent
of the explanatory variables xi and ei Normal(0, 1) . But y
∗
i is not observable, rather yi is as
follows:
yt =
1 if y∗t > 00 if y∗t ≤ 0 (4.4)
The target of this model is to calculate the impact of the explanatory variables on the
probability of issuance. yt is a dummy variable that takes value equal 1 when the CCAA issues
a security and zero otherwise. The probability of issuance is then:
P (yi = 1|xi) = P (y∗i > 0 | xi) = P (xiθ + ei > 0 | xi) = Φ(xiθ) (4.5)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Therefore, the probability
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of non issuance is P (yi = 0|xi) = 1− Φ(xiθ).13
The main hypotheses tested with this model are the following: first, the probability of is-
suance is expected to depend positively on the financing needs (amount of deficit and maturities);
second, the probability of issuance should be affected by the behaviour of other CCAAs and the
central government in the debt market; third, it would be expected to depend negatively on the
evolution of the cost of financing in the market; and, finally, it would depend on the economic
situation of the CCAA, as it would affect the market access. For the quarterly model, I included
dummies for the quarters (for the first, second and fourth quarter as the CCAAs issue more
debt in those three quarters).14
4.3.2.2 Amount and maturity structure decisions: Heckman Correction Model
The other two decisions the CCAA has to make, that are consecutive to the timing decision,
are how much to issue and at what term to maturity. Both decisions are analysed through a
Heckman selection model. Heckman developed a new approach for the sample selection bias
in Heckman (1979). The main idea underlying the Heckman model is that previous decisions
taken by the CCAA can render the sample biased and hence violate the assumption of random
sampling. The model is specified as:
E(y1|x, y2 = 1) = x1β1 + γ1λ (xδ2) (4.6)
where the dependent variable y1 is only observable when y2 is equal to 1, being y1 the amount
issued and y2 the binary variable of issuance. λ is the inverse Mills ratio defined as: λ(·) = φ(·)1−Φ(·) ,
where φ and Φ are, respectively, the density and distribution function of a standard normal
variable. If γ1 is equal to zero, the sample would be unbiased, and an OLS model would produce
a consistent estimator of β1. On the other hand, if γ1 is different from zero, then the sample is
biased, and the OLS model would omit the γ1λ (xδ2) term, producing an inconsistent estimator
of β1.
The Heckman model is calculated in two consecutive steps: in the first one, a probit model
is estimated to obtain δˆ2.
15 After the corresponding inverse Mills ratio is obtained (λˆi2), βˆ1 and
γˆ1 are calculated via an OLS regression model on the selected sample.
For the estimation of the Heckman selection model, I chose a x vector different from the
x1.
16 Thus, for the probit stage, the variables used are the ones included in the last column of
tables 4.5 or 4.8 depending on the frequency of the model. Basically, the probit model used is
the simplest version of the probits constructed, that does not lose its explanatory power. The
variables chosen would affect the timing decision and not the amount.
13The density function for yi given xi would be f(y|xi = [Φ(xiθ)]y[1− Φ(xiθ)]1−y, y = 0, 1.
14Section 4.5.2 expands this analysis using daily and quarterly data.
15By estimating the probit model P (yi2 = 1|xi) = Φ(xiδ2).
16If xi = x, the collinearity among the regressors in equation 4.6 would lead to large standard errors of the
elements of βˆ1.
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The underlying question in the analysis is whether the CCAAs have followed a specific
issuance strategy. Hildreth (1993) provides a list of incentives and disincentives to issue. On
the incentives side, a sub-national government would borrow because of its financing needs but
also because of the political agendas and the exploitation of capital markets opportunities. For
instance, a government would have incentives to issue new debt for financing investment projects,
that would be paid by future governments. The disincentives are mainly driven by legal, political
and economic factors. Thus legal limits to the level of debt, the voters disapproval of debt surge
and the increase in market cost would generally disincentive new issues. Thus, CCAAs would
try to reduce costs of financing by issuing when the spreads and the risk premium are lower.
The model includes as controls the financing needs, the behaviour of other CCAAs and the
central government, the cost of financing, the level of debt and some economic indicators. The
probit phase of the model is constructed as a simplified model of the section 4.3.2.1, including
only the factors that account for most of the variability of the probit model.17 In order to
differentiate the probit estimator and the Heckman one, the probit estimators includes the
number of issuances of other governments and the number of maturities, while the Heckman
uses the amounts of this variables. The justification for this choice lies on the expected behaviour
of the CCAAs that would focus more in the moment other CCAAs resort to the market, than
the amount issued by those CCAAs.
The Heckman models estimated test the relation of the quantity issued with respect to
the financing needs, the behaviour of competitor governments, the cost of financing, and the
economic situation.
Finally, the third important issue related with market behaviour of the CCAAs is the tem-
poral structure of the debt issued. The CCAA may choose to issue short, medium or long-term
debt. The optimal temporal structure depends on the CCAA government and the economic
situation. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) analyse the main arguments in favour and against the
short/long term decision. On the one hand, short term liabilities magnify financial vulnerabil-
ity, as CCAAs face significant needs of new funding more frequently. There are two negative
consequences associated with this namely: first, a sudden surge of interest rates would enlarge
the cost of financing as the CCAA must refinance a portion of its debt; second, the probability
of debt crisis appears to increase the shorter and more concentrated the debt maturity. On
the other hand, the CCAA would most commonly have to pay a premium for the long term
maturity, depending on the liquidity and on the expectation of repayment.
A second Heckman sample selection model specification is used to study the term to maturity
measured in years. Unlike former models, this model tests whether the decision of the term to
maturity is associated with the interest curve. The remaining explanatory variables are the
same as in the amount decision model.
17The probit model only includes the number of other CCAAs days of issuances, the number of maturities, the
stock of central government loans, and the IPI growth. With these four variable the R-squared is almost similar
to the most complex probit model.
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4.4 Data description
This study takes into account the information of the securities issued by the CCAA from
1995 to 2017. Although, CCAA have issued securities since the 1980’s, the information published
by the official bulletins and other sources of information is not always available. Moreover, most
of the regional economic indicators are only available from 1995 onwards. To take into account
the usual CCAAs’ issuance behaviour, the main models only include the period 1995 to 2010,
to extract the effect of the bail out on the issuance behaviour. Nevertheless, Annex D includes
all estimations for the whole period available.
A description of the sources of data used in the analysis is available in table 4.1. I constructed
three different databases from the individual data of securities that are used in different stages
of the analysis. The first database has as dependent variable the spreads categorized by term
to maturity and currency. The second and third databases have the same dependent variables,
the quantity issue and the term to maturity of the securities issued in the specific period. The
only difference between them is the frequency of the data (daily or quarterly). In the case of
the daily database, the number of observations is lower than the total securities issued daily
because the CCAAs sometimes issue more than one security per day.
Table 4.1: Databases description: 1995-2010
Main variable Spreads Quantities Quantities
Total number of observations 5,738 99,348 1,088
Non-zero observations 5,738 2,699 368
Frequency Not applicable Daily Quarterly
Description of the
dependent variable
Spreads by
term to maturity
and currency
Three main variables:
- Dummy variable = 1 when amount issued is
positive and zero otherwise
- Amount over income (with zeros when no issues)
- Average maturity: Number of years.
Starting with the spreads database, from the 6924 securities issued between 1995 and 2017
classified by term to maturity and currency (national or foreigner), only 5738 of those securities
have a known spread.18 In some cases the primary market price is not available in the sources
consulted. In others, the spread resulting is unreasonable high or low, and it creates doubts
of its validity for analysis purposes. Thus a limit of minus 50 and plus 250 basis points has
been established to eliminate the outliers. The maximum spread is determined by the spread of
the securities in the middle of the crisis prior to the creation of the FLA, while the minimum
comprises the vast majority of spreads and it seems very unreasonable that securities from
regions with lower rating would have a lower IRR than the central government.19
18Between 1995 and 2010 there were 6,197 issues, 4,787 with a known spread.
19Only two CCAA have historically better rating than the central government: Navarre and Basque Country,
as shown by Canuto and Liu (2013). Those two CCAA have not being very active in the markets over the whole
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The second database includes the amount of securities issued daily by each CCAA. Over
the whole period (142,817 observations) there has only been 3410 in which there is a positive
amount issued. An the third data bases replicates this second one but with a quarterly temporary
frequency. In this database, from the 1564 observations, there are only 552 that are positive.20
As mention before, there are significant differences among CCAA. There are three CCAA
that stand out: Andalusia, Catalonia and Valencia. These three CCAA have issued securities
regularly, thus they have issued between 1000 and 2500 securities over this period. The rest of
the CCAA have issued far less, being Madrid the next Autonomous Community that has issued
the most.
All these three databases have similar indicators that are the ones that were available in
the moment of the issuance. As shown in table 4.2, all indicators used are available with a
specific delay. For instance, regional GDP is only available annually and the data for one year
is available the next year at the end of march. Thus, in January 2017, the GDP used is the one
of 2015 and in April 2017 the GDP used is the one belonging to 2016.
Table 4.2: Indicators Timetable
 
*
Source Freq (a) Date
GDP INE Y March 30th
Budgetary 
Balance
IGAE Y March 30th
Debt BDE Q  15th/30th
EPA INE Q 25th
IPI INE M 8th Oct
Rating D
Risk 
Premia
Bloom-
berg
D
a. Y stands for yearly, Q for Quarterly, M for Monthly and D for Daily
April
Q2
JulyNov
Q3 Y-1
Dec Jan Feb
Y-2
Q3 Y-1
Aug
Sept. Oct. Nov.
Q3
Q4 Y-1 Q1 Q2 Q3
March May June
Q4 Y-1 Q1
Composite index, calculated from the rating of the Rating agencies: Fitch, Moody's, S&P 
Sep Oct
Difference between yield of the 10 year bond for Spain and for Germany
Dec.
Y-1
Y-2
Feb. March April May June July August
Y-1
Jan.
The main indicators used in the models specification can be classified in five categories:
the need of funding, the behaviour of other CCAAs and the central government, the cost of
financing, the structure of debt, the economic indicators.
The need of funding category is formed by the maturities in the period,21 the deficit in the
previous year and the variation of the stock of loans in percent of GDP. For the daily analysis, the
amount of maturities is the sum of maturities over the next thirty days following the issuance.22
The use of deficit in the previous year is because at the moment of issuance, the only available
data is the execution of deficit in the previous year or the budgetary deficit for the current one.
Nevertheless, the difference between the budgetary data and the final execution is generally
significant. For the analysis of the issuance decision, the relevant data is the execution one.
period.
20The summary statistics are provided in table D.9 and table D.10.
21In percentage of the last available annual revenues.
22A CCAA is expected to be forward looking and would issue debt to face coming maturities. In the quarterly
model, the CCAA would take into account the maturities of that specific quarter.
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The second category includes the issuances made by other CCAAs and the central govern-
ment. It includes both the number of issuances and the amount issued over the last known
annual revenues. In the daily estimations, the total amount issued by the central government
is the sum of the amount issued in the five previous and following days from the specific date.
Whereas the total amount issued by the CCAAs correspond to the period of minus/plus ten
days from the specific date.
Third, the cost of financing category contains the sovereign risk premium, the spreads, and
the interest curve. The sovereign risk premium is derived from Reuters data, and is defined as
the difference between the ten year bond secondary market yield of Spain and Germany. The
spreads of other CCAAs are used in the spreads estimations. It is calculated as the average of
the spreads of all CCAAs in a period of plus/minus fifteen days. On the other hand, the spreads
variable used in the decision models is the average of the spreads of all CCAA as a CCAA would
analyse its own spreads and the rest of the CCAAs spreads at the moment of issuance. Finally,
the interest curve is the central government interest difference between the ten year bond and
the three month treasury bill in the secondary market.
Fourth, the CCAA’s debt structure category encompasses the level of debt, the amount of
funds received from the central government (since the creation of the FLA in 2012), the stock
of loans (net of the central government ones) and the stock of securities. All these variables are
published quarterly by Banco de Espan˜a, and are in terms of the regional GDP.
Fifth, the economic indicators are all estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics (INE).
The indicators included are the Industrial Production Index (a monthly indicator), the Labour
Force Survey (EPA) (a quarterly indicator), Annual regional GDP growth, and Quarterly na-
tional GDP growth.
4.5 Results
This section focuses on the results of the models described in section 4.3. It is divided in
two parts: first the spreads behaviour in section 4.5.1 and second, the three main decisions of
the issuance process in section 4.5.2. The estimation results for all models are shown in tables
4.3 to 4.10.
4.5.1 Spreads analysis
The spreads analysis tests the hypotheses described in section 4.3.1 through an OLS model.
Table 4.3 shows the main results for the 1995-2010 period, considering the spreads as a hundred
basis points measure. Results are quite similar for the 1995-2010 that for the whole period
available.23 The factors considered are divided into three categories: first, the characteristics
of the security, i.e. the amount issued, the term to maturity, and the currency; second, other
23Table D.1 shows the results for the whole period.
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measures of risk in the market, i.e. the sovereign risk premium and the spreads of other CCAAs’
securities issued near; and third, the economic situation of the CCAA, that includes the level
of debt, of funds received from the central government, of deficit, the ratings, the change in
unemployment and the IPI and regional GDP growth. For robustness of the main results, three
different specification are shown in table 4.3. The difference among them is the inclusion of
some specific variables that may distort the estimation results: ratings and issuance currency.
Ratings are extremely stable until the beginning of crisis, and issuance currency is a dummy
that takes in most cases a value equal 1. Specific OLS models are estimated for the three most
active CCAAs in the market: Andalusia, Catalonia and Valencia.
The characteristics of the security issued are an essential element of the spreads evolution.
The higher the amount issued the larger the spreads, as the risk of non-payment would increase as
benefits from bankruptcy would be larger. The impact of term to maturity is inversely related to
the spreads so that there are higher spreads for short term debt. This result is puzzling because
it is expected that the longer the term to maturity the less probable would be the payment.
Nevertheless, some studies have argued that this behaviour is not uncommon. Sometimes,
investors perceived long term debt as less risky because bailout may seem more probable in the
long term, and because even if a CCAA has a worse economic situation in the present, it may
recover in the future (see Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009)). This result is also obtained in previous
studies such as Beck et al. (2017) in which secondary market spreads depend negatively on the
term to maturity. Other possible explanation is related with the underlying variable, the rate
of return of the State Securities. As the term to maturity rises, so would the rate of return.
Thus, the spread of the CCAAs’ securities could be larger in good than in bad times. Securities’
spreads also seem to depend on the currency they are issued in, being costlier to issue in a
foreign currency than in a national one.
Sovereign risk premium and other CCAAs’ spreads are a consistent indicator of spreads
increases. Both variables are a proxy of the risk perception in the debt market. When investors
perceive a surge in debt market risk, the risk premium rises. The impact is higher for the spreads
of other CCAAs than for the risk premium, as an increase of 1 perceptual point in other CCAAs
spreads entail a surge of around 0.6 pp the spread of the CCAA, while the same increase
in the risk premium implies a rise of near 0.1 pp. In a risk aversion environment, investors
would probably buy the less risky assets, that in this case would be the central government
bond, pushing upwards the cost of the sub-national government securities (i.e. the spreads).
Although this relation may be bidirectional, as Jenkner and Lu (2014) show that the impact the
funds created by the central government to help the CCAAs under fiscal distress had affected
Spain’s credit risk premium. Finally, the relation among spreads of the CCAAs shown a sort
of co-movement of the spreads that could implied that investors consider CCAAs’ securities as
complementary, and demand them equally following a portfolio diversification strategy.
Economic indicators have a significant relation with the spreads. The higher the debt level,
the lower the ratings and the better the economic situation (i.e. the larger the IPI and GDP
growth and the smaller the unemployment variation), the smaller the spreads are. These vari-
106 Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda
4. Decision making in primary debt market: empirical analysis of Spanish Regional Governments
ables represent the economic vulnerability as, for instance, the higher the debt, the stronger
the probability of default. A CCAA will take advantage of the additional liquidity of the
non-payment the larger the amount of debt owed. The only puzzling result is the sign of the
budgetary balance implying that a better fiscal situation increase spreads. Nevertheless, the
budgetary balance has not historically been publicly accessible. The transparency of regional
data has emerged after the crisis, and this may explain the apparently counter-intuitive result
of this particular coefficient.
The central government funds have a positive effect on spreads, due to an increase of central
government financing cost, or a decrease of the regions’ one.24 As explained before, the bailout
may increase the cost of financing of the higher lever administration. Meanwhile, investors
consider a sudden drop of bankruptcy probability thanks to the bailout.
Finally, it is worth noticing that these results are not as strong in a disaggregated perspective
because only the amount issued, and the spreads of other CCAAs are consistent and significant
with the aggregated results. In conclusion, the spreads seem to follow more or less the expected
behaviour and thus they can be used as a reliant explanatory variable of the following decision
models.
In conclusion, spreads depend essentially on the investors risk perception of security, which
consider the characteristics of the security, debt market and economic situation of the CCAA
when assessing this risk.
4.5.2 Issuance Decisions
This section focuses on the three main issuance decisions models: timing, amount and term
to maturity. Tables 4.5 to 4.10 show the main estimation results for the daily and quarterly
models and 4.4 encompasses a summary of the main results of the models estimated. The first
important remark is that the parameter estimations are sometimes very small, specially in the
daily probit model due to the reduced probability of issuance. This probability is just 2.7% in
the daily model as there are only issuances in 2,699 days, while the probability rises for the
quarterly model to near than 34%, because the CCAAs issue in 368 quarters over the 1,088
quarters studied.25
The three financing need components seem crucial in the CCAAs market behaviour. As
expected, a fundamental factor underlying the three issuance decisions seems to be the num-
ber and amounts of maturities in the period, with an estimated positive impact for the three
questions, meaning that the larger the maturities, the most probable is that a CCAA would
resort to the market, with a higher amount and at a larger term to maturity (see tables 4.5
and 4.8 for the timing decision (daily and quarterly)), 4.6 and 4.9 for the amount and 4.7 and
24Delgado and Pe´rez (2018) develops an extensive description of the evolution of these funds and the effect on
CCAAs’ securities.
25In this calculation the total amount is the result of the 17 CCAAs times the 64 quarters studied, from the
1st quarter of 1995 to the 4rd quarter of 2010. Probabilities are similar for the period 1995-2017.
Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda 107
Essays on the subnational government’s indebtedness
4.10 for the term to maturity decision).26 The opposite impact appear to exert the variation
of the loans, following its substitutive role in the financing, although it is only significant for
the timing decision.27 An increase in the stock of total loans would reduce the probability of
issuance. Finally, the budgetary balance effect on issuances is not clear. On the one side, a
fiscal deficit seems to discourage the number of times issued, but encourage the amount and
the length of the term to maturity. This variable encompass two opposing effects rendering the
effect on the market activity far from clear. Firstly, a bigger deficit increases financing needs.
Secondly, market financing costs would rise in the presence of unhealthy fiscal accounts.
CCAAs consider the activity of market competitors when acting in the debt market. An
increase in number of issuance and in amount issued by other CCAAs has a positive impact on the
probability, amount and term to maturity. One possible explanation for this behaviour is based
on the idea that investors consider securities issued by different public actors as complementary
and, they would buy different CCAAs’ securities following a portfolio diversification strategy.28
If a CCAAs knows there is not a real competition with other CCAAs, it would have incentives
to resort to the market when it seems a good moment to do so. It would follow market results
of other governments issuances. Thus, the probability and the amount issued and even the
term to maturity would increase in parallel to the activity of other governments in the market.
Meanwhile, Central Government issuances seem to only affect the term to maturity and in the
opposite direction.29
Financing cost effect does not seem conclusive. The combination of the premium risk and
the spreads seem to counterbalance both for the timing and the amount models. The only
conclusive results is the effect of the interest curve seems that reduces the securities’ term to
maturity as expected.
Debt level and its structure appear to affect the issuance decisions process. The higher the
debt level, the higher the probability of issuance, but lower the term to maturity of the securities
issued.30 A significant level of debt would increase the cost of market financing, and the CCAA
would find it difficult to issue at a reasonable cost, especially in the long term. Nevertheless,
the increase in costs would depend on the existence of a credible no bailout clause. If this clause
is not credible, the cost would be subdued, as investors would expect the central government
to rescue the CCAA. As mentioned in section 4.5.1, the link between spreads of sub-national
debt and its economic fundamentals are weaker when the bailout is expected. The composition
has a coherent estimated impact with an opposing effect of loans and securities stocks over the
amount issued. Thus, and increase in securities and a decrease of loans stocks would decrease
the amount of new securities. It seems that CCAAs tend to equilibrate their two sources of
financing to maintain their weight more or less stable, as has been common over the whole
26Nevertheless, this last result only holds in the daily model.
27In the estimations for the whole period, this variable is significant for all decisions.
28This could be true only if investors have not reached a maximum desirable stock of Spanish securities.
29This result must be taken with caution as the model for the whole period seems to have a different effect.
30The effect on the amount issued is not clear.
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period (see Delgado and Pe´rez (2018)). In the longer period analysis, the Central Government
funds that have a negative impact on the three decisions, as CCAAs that entered the facility
have reduced and even stop all market activity.
Finally, strong economic growth measured by the IPI reduces slightly the probability of
issuance, as financing needs are smaller. Nevertheless, the opposite would have been acceptable,
as a region with higher economic growth would be better perceived by investors and, therefore,
financing would be easier.
In conclusion, CCAAs consider numerous factors when resorting to the market. They try to
optimise its issuance strategy, taking in account their financing needs, their economic situation,
the behaviour of other competitors and the structure of their debt.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have analysed the different aspects that may affect the process of the
issuance decision taken by the Spanish regional governments. The analysis has been twofold:
first an analysis of regional bond spreads determinants, and second a more complex analysis of
the three main decision of the issuance process.
The CCAAs have been fairly active in the debt markets over the last 22 years. Nevertheless,
the issuance behaviour has not been homogeneous among regions, with three CCAAs outstanding
the others (Andalusia, Catalonia and Valencia). Also, the economic crisis changed the issuance
panorama with the exit of Catalonia and Valencia from the market, while other CCAAs have
even increased their activity (e.g. Madrid). This heterogeneity boosts the interest for sub-
national debt market functioning.
The results from the empirical analysis show that spreads follow an expected behaviour
with respect to the securities characteristic, the risk perception in the market and the economic
situation of the CCAAs. Therefore it seems that investors take into account most of the infor-
mation available when buying CCAAs securities. One surprising result is the effect that central
government funds have over the spreads of the recipient CCAAs. Interestingly, it seems that
spreads were lower, the larger the funds received are. This could be explained by the change
in issuance behaviour, as theses CCAAs reduced the term to maturity and amount issued and,
consequently spreads fell. In addition, the bailout reduced significantly the risk of non-payment.
Thus, investors did not punish specifically the CCAAs that entered the FLA.
The second main result of the analysis is that CCAAs seem to issue debt when needed be-
cause of upcoming maturities. Also, they tend to resort to the market more when there is more
market activity, but they do not specifically take into account the evolution of the cost of financ-
ing. This last result may be related with the bureaucratic requirements that may impede the
optimisation of the issuance strategy. There are some rigidities in the process such as the prior
authorisation needed that may prevent the optimisation of the process. Nevertheless, these legal
restrictions are needed now more than ever, as the no bailout clause has been factually elimi-
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nated. Spain governments should rethink the best possible system to ensure CCAAs financing
while discouraging moral hazard problems.
Finally, Spain needs a comprehensive debate about the existence of a no bailout clause and
the compatibility with a financial facility (such as the FFCCAA). Restoring a credible clause
is not an easy task, and it will require an effort for increasing the reinforcement of existent
and future laws. The main question is whether the central government would let a region
to go bankrupt, considering the plausible political and economic consequences. If the central
government is more likely to rescue the CCAA, then the system should be reform to establish
forehand the specific procedure to follow in a liquidity or in a solvency crises.
A second question that deserves further analysis is the optimal timing for the return to the
market of the CCAAs that have stopped their activity. The economic situation and the stock
of debt are going to be essential in the cost CCAAs will find for new issuances. After several
years of strong economic growth it seems a good moment to start again issuing debt, specially
if we take into account, as Cantalapiedra and Jime´nez (2017) point out, that market interests
rates are at a historical minimum.
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4.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.3: Amount of securities issued by regional government (as a percentage of
annual regional income)
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Figure 4.4: Average term to maturity of daily securities issued by regional govern-
ment (in years)
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Table 4.3: Spread determinants: daily 1995-2010
Dependent variable: Individual spreads
TOTAL CCAA AND CAT VAL
Amount/Revenues CCAAi
6.29∗∗∗ 7.15∗∗∗ 6.98∗∗∗ 21.97∗∗∗ 13.36∗∗∗ 13.05∗∗∗
(1.07) (1.10) (1.09) (3.84) (4.11) (2.49)
Term to maturity
0.03 -0.78∗∗∗ -0.40∗ 0.41∗ -0.55∗ -4.08∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.31) (1.15)
Sovereing risk premium
0.02 0.02 0.04∗∗∗ -0.02 0.14∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Spread CCAAj 6=i
0.63∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Debt/GDP
2.93∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ -2.74∗∗∗ -0.03 5.95∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.22) (0.20) (0.48) (0.54) (0.63)
Industrial Production Index
0.20∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.00 -0.24∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15)
Currency
-21.67∗∗∗ - - - - -
(1.38) - - - - -
Rating
- -0.15 - - - -
- (0.22) - - - -
Budgetary balance/GDP
- - 5.24∗∗∗ -6.54∗∗∗ -3.92∗ 17.22∗∗∗
- - (0.63) (1.08) (2.08) (1.84)
Unemployment
- - 1.57∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 4.66∗∗∗ -2.81∗∗
- - (0.62) (0.64) (1.00) (1.22)
GDP growth
- - -0.87∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗ -0.52 -6.40∗∗∗
- - (0.25) (0.39) (0.46) (0.92)
Number of observations 4,787 4,787 4,787 1,364 1,104 2,207
R-square 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.60 0.62 0.37
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
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Table 4.4: Decision Result Summary: 1995-2010
Timing Amount Term to maturity
Daily Quarterly Daily Quarterly Daily Quarterly
Budgetary balance/GDP P - N - N N
Maturities/Income P P P P - -
∆ Loans/GDP N N - - - -
Number/Amount issued
Central Gov.
- - - - N N
Number/Amount issued
other CCAA
- P P - P P
Sovereign risk
premium
P - N -
Spreads CCAAj 6=i N - P -
Interest Curve N N
Debt/GDP P P N P N N
Net Loans/GDP - P N N
Securities/GDP N N - -
National GDP growth P - - - - -
IPI growth N N
∆ Unemployment N - N N
Empty cells mean that these variables are not included in the specific model, while cell with and dash
symbol mean that the results are not significant. P represents a positive (increasing) impact on the prob-
ability or the amount of issuance, or the term to maturity, whereas N represents a negative (decreasing)
impact.
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Table 4.5: Probability of issuance: daily 1995-2010
Dependent variable: Dummy of issuance
OLS Probit
Probit Probit
Marg. Ef. for Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
0.002∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -
(0.001) (0.012) (0.000) -
Number Maturities/Income
0.030∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003)
∆ Loans/GDP
0.000 -0.044∗ -0.001∗ -
(0.001) (0.026) (0.001) -
Central Gov. number of issues
0.000 0.007 0.000 -
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) -
CCAAj 6=i number of issues
0.000∗ 0.004 0.000 -0.006∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Sovereign risk premium
0.002∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.015)
Average CCAAs spreads
0.002 -0.100∗ -0.003∗ -
(0.003) (0.057) (0.002) -
Debt/GDP
0.003∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) -
National GDP growth
0.000 0.023∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) -
IPI growth
-0.000∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant
-0.012∗∗∗ -3.021∗∗∗ - -2.299∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.059) - (0.030)
Number of observations 92,004 92,004 92,004 92,004
R-squared 0.153 0.279 0.279 0.257
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
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Table 4.6: Amount issued: daily 1995-2010
Dependent variable: Amount/Income
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.24∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Number Maturities/Income
0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ Loans/GDP
0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Central Gov. (+/-10 days) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Import issued/Income (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CCAAj 6=i(+/- 10 days) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.14∗∗
Import issued/Income (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Sovereign risk premium
-0.09∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Average CCAAs spreads
0.39∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Debt/GDP
-0.12∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ - -
(0.01) (0.01) - -
Net Loans/GDP
- - -0.02 0.03
- - (0.02) (0.02)
Securities/GDP
- - -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
- - (0.02) (0.02)
National GDP growth
-0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ Unemployment
-0.04 -0.03 -0.05∗∗ -0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant
1.40∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.23) (0.14) (0.23)
Number of observations 2,592 92,004 2,592 92,004
R-squared 0.08 - 0.10 -
λ - 0.200 - 0.215
ρ - 0.166 - 0.181
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
The first step of the Heckman model (Probit Model) is not included in this table for
simplicity. It includes the same variables as the last column of table 4.5 shows.
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Table 4.7: Term to maturity decision: daily 1995-2010
Dependent variable: Number of years
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.65∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Number Maturities/Income
-0.05 0.13∗∗ -0.03 0.15∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
∆ Loans/GDP
0.16 0.15 0.05 0.01
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Central Gov. (+/-10 days) -0.14∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
Import issued/Income (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CCAAj 6=i(+/- 10 days) 0.95∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
Import issued/Income (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Interest curve
-0.24∗∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.22∗ -0.23∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Debt/GDP
-0.40∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ - -
(0.03) (0.04) - -
Net Loans/GDP
- - -0.27∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
- - (0.05) (0.05)
Securities/GDP
- - -0.56∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗
- - (0.06) (0.06)
National GDP growth
-0.25∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ Unemployment
-0.09 -0.08 -0.12∗ -0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant
6.05∗∗∗ 3.26∗∗∗ 6.23∗∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.71) (0.44) (0.71)
Number of observations 2,592 92,004 2,592 92,004
R-squared 0.15 - 0.16 -
λ - 1.006 - 1.022
ρ - 0.293 - 0.298
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
The first step of the Heckman model (Probit Model) is not included in this table for
simplicity. It includes the same variables as the last column of table 4.5 shows.
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Table 4.8: Probability of issuance: Quarterly 1995-2010
Dependent variable: Dummy of issuance
OLS Probit
Probit Probit
Marg. Ef. for Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) -
Number Maturities/Income
0.03∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08)
∆ Loans/GDP
-0.11∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -
(0.03) (0.15) (0.05) -
Central Gov. number issued
0.00∗ 0.02 0.00 -
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) -
CCAAj 6=i number issued
-0.02∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.06∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
Sovereign risk premium
0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.13
(0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08)
Average CCAAs spreads
0.02 0.29 0.09 -
(0.06) (0.28) (0.08) -
Debt/GDP
0.06∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) -
National GDP growth
-0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) -
IPI growth
-0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant
0.02 -2.30∗∗∗ - -1.69∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.31) - (0.20)
Number of observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020
R-squared 0.37 0.512 0.512 0.482
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
Estimations include quarter dummies not shown in the table for simplicity reasons.
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Table 4.9: Amount issued: quarterly 1995-2010
Dependent variable: Amount/Income
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.18 -0.02 -0.23 -0.07
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
Amount Maturities/Income
0.68∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
∆ Loans/GDP
0.34 0.25 -0.01 -0.08
(0.46) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Central Gov. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Import issued/Income (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CCAAj 6=i 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.05
Import issued/Income (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
Sovereign risk premium
-0.35 -0.13 -0.41∗ -0.19
(0.23) (0.30) (0.22) (0.28)
Average CCAAs spreads
-0.07 -0.25 -0.21 -0.40
(0.82) (0.79) (0.78) (0.76)
Debt/GDP
0.08 0.15∗ - -
(0.07) (0.08) - -
Net Loans/GDP
- - 0.40∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
- - (0.09) (0.09)
Securities/GDP
- - -0.36∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
- - (0.11) (0.11)
National GDP growth
-0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
∆ Unemployment
-0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21)
Constant
1.37 0.02 1.86∗∗ 0.74
(0.94) (0.96) (0.90) (0.93)
Number of observations 349 1,020 349 1,020
R-squared 0.31 - 0.37 -
λ - 1.377 - 1.151
ρ - 0.435 - 0.383
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
The first step of the Heckman model (Probit Model) is not included in this table for
simplicity. It includes the same variables as the last column of table 4.8 shows.
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Table 4.10: Term to Maturity decision: Quarterly 1995-2010
Dependent variable: Number of years
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.93∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.17) (0.22) (0.17)
Amount Maturities/Income
-0.24∗∗ 0.10 -0.22∗∗ 0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
∆ Loans/GDP
-0.20 -0.52 -0.26 -0.46
(0.62) (0.51) (0.63) (0.51)
Central Gov. -0.07∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.07∗∗
Import issued/Income (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CCAAj 6=i 1.12∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
Import issued/Income (0.24) (0.20) (0.24) (0.20)
Interest curve
-0.75∗ -0.96∗∗∗ -0.77∗ -0.94∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.33) (0.40) (0.34)
Debt/GDP
-0.52∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ - -
(0.10) (0.08) - -
Net Loans/GDP
- - -0.46∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗
- - (0.13) (0.10)
Securities/GDP
- - -0.60∗∗∗ -0.16
- - (0.15) (0.12)
National GDP growth
-0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22
(0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16)
∆ Unemployment
-0.66∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.25) (0.31) (0.25)
Constant
9.15∗∗∗ 4.67∗∗∗ 9.27∗∗∗ 4.54∗∗∗
(1.42) (1.22) (1.43) (1.22)
Number of observations 349 1,020 349 1,020
R-square 0.31 - 0.31 -
λ - 4.328 - 4.361
ρ - 0.994 - 0.999
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
The first step of the Heckman model (Probit Model) is not included in this table for
simplicity. It includes the same variables as the last column of table 4.8 shows.
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Annex B Regional government access to market funding31
B.1 The composition of regional debt
From the onset of EMU, the weight of securities and of loans in overall regional debt held
stable – at around 3% of GDP in both cases – until late 2008 (see Figure B.1). Thereafter,
both the volume of securities and that of loans (excluding loans to other general government
sectors) increased significantly, stabilising as from 2012 and falling in the subsequent years, at
which time central government loans began to play a predominant role. Thus, in 2017 regional
government debt in the form of securities amounted to 4.2% of GDP, compared with 20.6% in
the case of loans, 13.9 pp of which took the form of bilateral loans vis-a`-vis central government.
Figure B.1: Total regional government securities and loans as a percentage of GDP
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Mar-04 Mar-05 Mar-06 Mar-07 Mar-08 Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 Mar-14 Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17
SECURITIES LOANS (EXCLUDING INTRA-GENERAL GOVERNMENT LOANS) LOANS FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
% of GDP
SOURCE:Banco de Espan˜a
In terms of composition by maturity, in 2017 99.3% of regional government securities were
long-term, a figure higher than that of 94.4%, on average, for the pre-crisis period (2000-2007).
In the case of loans, long-term instruments are also predominant, albeit with somewhat lower
percentages: 97% in 2017 and close to 85% on average for the 2000-2007 period (see Table 1 once
more). With regard to the holders of loans, excluding central government, in 2017 somewhat
more than 68% were in the hands of residents and the rest with non-residents, a percentage
slightly up on the figure of 60% for 2000-2007, and on the figure for the State.
B.2 Regional government access to debt securities markets
Figure B.2 shows the annual volume of debt issues by regional governments as a whole in
the period 2000-2017. The increase in the volumes issued in the economic crisis period can be
seen in the figure, as can the subsequent reduction as from 2012, a tendency which came to a
halt in 2015, when the low for the last two decades was recorded. The volume issued increased
slightly in 2016 and 2017, standing at around e5.3 billion in this latter year, up 25% on 2015.
31This annex reproduces some sections of Delgado and Pe´rez (2018).
Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda 123
Essays on the subnational government’s indebtedness
Nonetheless, this figure is still low in historical terms, given that from 2000 to 2017 somewhat
more than e10.5 billion per annum was issued on average, peaking at e25.25 billion in 2010.
Figure B.2: Regional government debt issues: 2000-2017 (a)
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a. Total securities issued in a year, without considering term structure of redemptions of securities issued.
Figure B.3 shows the annual average yield on regional government and Treasury debt issues
for two representative instruments: 12-month notes or bills (left-hand panel) and 10-year bonds
(right-hand panel). During the pre-crisis period, the issuance costs of regional government debt
securities, taken as a whole, were practically identical to those of the State, a situation likewise
attained in 2013 for 10-year debt, and somewhat later, around 2015, for 12-month securities. The
interim period largely matches the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which affected the regional
governments to a greater extent. Thus, the year 2012 saw the biggest spread between 10-year
bonds issued by regional governments, taken as a whole, and 10-year Treasury bonds, standing
at 280 bp, compared with approximately 15 pp and 40 bp for the averages for 2000-2011 and
2013-2017, respectively. In the case of 12-month bills or notes, the maximum spread between
the regional government and Treasury instruments in the period was in 2010, when it stood at
290 bp, compared with the average of 10 bp for the 2000-2009 period, and it held at over 100
bp between 2011 and 2013, on a declining path, narrowing to 26 bp in 2017.
The breakdown of the foregoing figures at the regional level reveals a high degree of hetero-
geneity, although there are some common patterns. Specifically, there appears to be a positive
association between the size of the region and the number of issues, as well as between size and
annual amount issued, in euro per inhabitant (see Figure B.4). Likewise, within the group of
the biggest regions, Andalusia, Catalonia and the Valencia region tended to record, on average,
from 2000 to 2017, a higher percentage of short-term issues than the rest, in relative terms.
From a historical standpoint, these three regions have been very active in raising resources on
international markets, if the recent years are excepted (see figure B.5). Indeed, from 2012 to
2017 the Catalonian regional government made no long-term issues, or short-term issues from
2013, while the annual average for total issues from 2000 to 2011 was somewhat over 80 per
annum. A similar case is the Valencia region, which has not made long-term issues since 2012,
or short-term issues since 2014, compared with an annual average of over 175 from 2000 to
2011. In the biggest regions, both Andalusia and the Madrid regional government maintained
a continuous presence on markets throughout the 2000-2017 period, although with an issuance
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Figure B.3: Annual average return on state and regional government debt issues
 
ANNUAL AVERAGE RETURN ON STATE AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT DEBT CHART 5
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. 12-MONTH BILLS OR NOTES
Return, as a %
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
2. 10-YEAR BONDS
Return, as a %
STATE (a) REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS (b)
SOURCES: Secretar´ıa General del Tesoro y Pol´ıtica Financiera, banco de Espan˜a, CNMV, Bolsas y Mercados
Espan˜oles, official Regional Government gazettes and Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas.
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volume in the case of Andalusia that has fallen most significantly since 2012.
Figure B.4: Heterogeneity of regional governments in their patterns of debt issuance
on markets (a)
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Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda 125
Essays on the subnational government’s indebtedness
Figure B.5: Debt issues by the most populated regions(a)
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a. The amount of the issues is the sum of the total amount not weighted by the redemption period of the debt
security.
Generally, the differing degree of regional government participation in the State’s extraor-
dinary financing mechanisms, between 2012 and 2017, has brought about differentiated capital
market access dynamics. It should be recalled that, since 2015, the extraordinary funds are
structured in the so-called “Regional Government Financing Fund” (RGFF). This fund is di-
vided essentially into two vehicles. The first is the so-called “Regional Government Liquidity
Fund” (RGLF), which regional governments not fulfilling budgetary stability, public debt or
average supplier payment period objectives must obligatorily join, and which provides continu-
ity to a similar, previous fund of the same name created in 2012. The regional governments
included in this fund are subjected by the State to accepting budgetary conditions, with re-
inforced budgetary control measures, in keeping with the demands of the Law on Budgetary
Stability and Financial Sustainability (see Herna´ndez de Cos and Pe´rez, 2013 for a description
of these measures]. The second fund is the “Financial Facility” (FF), intended for those regional
governments meeting stability objectives.
Compliance with the membership conditions for the various funds (the original RGLF, the
new RGLF and the FF) have varied over time, as has the willingness of individual regional
governments to belong to them, in cases in which they had decision-making power, meaning
that regional government membership of the funds has differed in different years. In December
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2017 nine regions (Andalusia, Arago´n, the Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha,
Catalonia, Extremadura, the Murcia region and the Valencia region) had acceded to the RGLF,
and four to the FF (Asturias, the Canary Islands, Castile-Leo´n and Galicia) . The remaining
ordinary-regime regions (the Madrid region and La Rioja) did not receive any funding either
from the RGLF or the FF in 2017, as did neither the specific-status regions (Navarre and the
Basque country).
As can be seen in figure B.6, from 2015 to 2017 those regions not availing themselves of the
above funds (Navarre and the Basque country) or which availed themselves only occasionally
of them (the Madrid region and La Rioja in 2015, in the case of the FF; Castile-Leo´n and
Asturias in 2015 and 2017, also the FF) resorted to the markets for funding. The exception was
Andalusia, which mainly made short-term issues in these years. The remaining regions did not
issue securities from 2015 to 2017, and received funding either from the RGLF or from the FF.
Of note has been the behaviour of some regions which have decided to resort to issuing again
following years of inactivity, as is the case of Asturias (which had not issued since the 1980s)
and the Basque country (since the 1990s). Castile-Leo´n, for its part, has significantly increased
its issuance volumes, far exceeding past dynamics. All these developments appear to reflect the
sound current conditions of financial markets.
Given the exceptional nature of the State funds and the favourable macroeconomic and
financial conditions in place, the muted progress observed in the more active role being played
by regional governments in tapping the capital markets for funds will foreseeably strengthen in
the medium term, in a context marked by the fulfillment of the budgetary stability objectives.
In any event, while these mechanisms are operational, the explicit factors of conditionality
governing the budgetary conduct of the governments concerned must be strictly applied so as to
avoid incentives to pursue inappropriate budgetary policies (see Delgado et al., 2016; Herna´ndez
de Cos & Pe´rez, 2015).
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Figure B.6: Regional government debt issues: recent years
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Annex C Regional government access to market funding: in-
ternational experience and recent developments32
C.1 Regional and local debt in the international context
Debt issues by local and regional governments have generally grown in significance in interna-
tional financial markets in recent years. There is little uniformity, however, at the international
level, in terms of the weight of sub-central debt in the economy as a whole and as a share of total
government debt, as figure C.1 shows. Moreover, there are also differences in the way countries
are organised into local and regional governments. The figure shows regional and local debt
as a share of GDP (see upper panel) and relative to total government debt (lower panel) in a
group of developed countries in 2007 and 2016, using Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) data. In Spain’s case, the ratio of subcentral debt to GDP in 2016
was higher than that in some countries organised along federal lines, such as the United States,
Switzerland or Germany. After Germany, Spain has the euro area’s largest share of this type of
debt in its total government debt.
According to the specialised literature, one of the main factors driving this upward trend
in sub-central debt in recent decades has been the global process of budgetary decentralisa-
tion. This has led many countries, both advanced and emerging, to transfer a growing share of
spending and tax raising powers to sub-central government levels, and it has made it possible in
practice to take on debt by issuing debt securities on financial markets. In particular, rapid ur-
banisation in emerging countries has driven large-scale infrastructure projects, which it has been
necessary to finance from the markets (Canuto & Liu, 2010a, 2013). Decentralisation processes
have also tended to be asymmetric as regards spending and revenue-raising powers, which, in
“soft” budgetary constraint scenarios33 may have encouraged sub-central governments to take
on more debt than they would have done if there were more shared fiscal responsibility between
government subsectors. In this regard, figure C.2 shows how the degree of decentralisation of
public expenditure responsibilities (represented on the horizontal axis) has been higher than
that of revenues (regional and local, taken as a whole) for which they have regulatory capacity34
(on the vertical axis), for OECD member countries as a whole, for which comparable 2011 data
are available. This reflects the fact that the points on the figure lie to the right of the main
diagonal, even for the main federal countries, such as Canada, Switzerland, the United States
and Germany. The figure also shows how that year Spain also had one of the highest levels of
decentralisation of the 26 countries considered, viewed from both the sub-central expenditure
and revenues viewpoint, ranking sixth in both cases.
32This annex is based on some sections of Delgado et al. (2016) with some data updates.
33The specialised literature refers to a situation in which a sub-central level of government adopts fiscally irre-
sponsible policies because it builds in expectations of a central government bailout as “soft budgetary constraint”.
For more details and a discussion of the experience in Spain, see Ferna´ndez Llera and Garc´ıa Valin˜as (2013).
34Revenues over which sub-central governments have regulatory authority as a proportion of total government
revenues, against total sub-central government expenditure as a ratio of total government expenditure.
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Figure C.1: Sub-national debt by government sectors in percentage of GDP: Inter-
national Comparison (year 2016)
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c. 2015 data used for 2016 due to lack of data.
d. Only sum of regional and local data available.
A second driver of increased recourse to debt security issues by sub-central governments has
been the way the market for this type of debt has developed (Canuto & Liu, 2010a, 2013). This
trend, which has been particularly visible in emerging countries, has enabled a diversification
away from traditional funding sources for sub-central debt, such as bank loans. The develop-
ment of new mechanisms of market access, such as project finance vehicles or special purpose
vehicles (SPV) has also contributed. However, in most countries, recourse to bank loans (or cen-
tral government) remains the dominant alternative. This is illustrated by figure C.3, showing
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Figure C.2: International Comparison of Autonomy indicators (year 2016) (a)
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data on the breakdown of regional and local debt into securities and loans, for a group of Euro-
pean countries for which uniform data are available. In Germany, Spain, Belgium and Austria,
regional governments financed themselves through both loans and securities issues, the former
being more significant in all cases except Germany, where around 60% of debt was obtained from
capital markets. Bank finance predominated in the case of local government. Finland, Norway
and Sweden have a higher relative volume of securities than the other countries. This is related
to the existence of local funding agencies that are able to aggregate the borrowing requirements
of numerous local government bodies to enable larger bond issues. The following section, which
describes the commonest means sub-central levels of government use to access market funding
in developed economies, looks closer at this issue.
Figure C.3: Structure of debt by subsector in 2014
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C.2 Sub-central governments’ mechanisms for accessing markets on the in-
ternational level
There are a series of common elements that determine market access capacity and conditions
for sub-central administrations, such as issuer size and institutional framework. In this respect,
one major determinant is whether or not the country has fiscal rules that set targets and limits
for debt or other budgetary indicators. The role of central government as a guarantor (or not)
for issues is another important factor, and in particular, whether there is a “no bailout” clause.
Clauses of this kind aim to avoid the cost of one government subsector’s fiscal irresponsibility
being passed on to the rest and are essential to ensure that the capital market keeps discipline
by differentiating between government subsectors in terms of their risk premiums. Finally,
having a credit rating is usually a requirement for market access. This imposes information
requirements to promote standardisation and to meet the market’s demands for more information
transparency.
The way in which these elements are effectively combined determines the make-up of the
issue mechanisms, which also differ in terms of the debt issuer’s level of individual responsibility.
First of all, it is possible to distinguish those cases in which regions or other sub-central bodies
are able to issue individually and so are subject to a higher level of market discipline. Secondly,
there are others that make joint issues, either at the same level of government or otherwise, such
that a large part of the risk is pooled. Lastly, there are those cases in which central government
assumes all the risk of the issue, for example when it taps the market for funds that, in turn, it
channels towards sub-central governments, or when it guarantees issues by the latter.
The first group, in which sub-national governments issue debt directly, includes the cases
of the United States, Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany in particular. The United
States presents one of the largest and most active sub-national debt markets, where the municipal
bond market includes bonds issued by the states, municipalities and other government entities,
such as publicly owned ports and airports. There is a wide variety of securities, in terms of
types and yields,35 and bankruptcy is only possible in the case of local governments.36 Canada’s
provinces also have a long tradition of issuing debt on markets. In 2014, 25% of total private and
public long-term bonds were issued by the provinces, slightly more than the federal government,
which accounted for 23%.37 As in the case of the United States, debt issues by Canadian
provinces are not backed by the federal government (Joffe, 2012). In Belgium, where there are
several interconnected levels of government, all regions and communities are authorised to issue
debt and habitually tap the markets, although they require central government authorisation.
35Other common types of bonds include general obligation bonds (GOs, for short), where both the principal
and interest are guaranteed by the issuer’s credit and tax-raising capacity, and revenue bonds, which are paid
with income generated by a specific project, such as tolls.
36The Municipal Insolvency Act (Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code) was passed by Congress in 1937 in
response to the numerous municipal bankruptcies during the Great Depression. Although bankruptcies of local
authorities have been relatively rare, the case of the city of Detroit in July 2013 stands out. See Canuto and Liu
(2013) and Cuadro-Sa´ez (2013) for examples of local- and state-government crisis resolution in the United States.
37Report by the Ontario Securities Commission: “The Canadian Fixed Income Market 2014”.
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In Switzerland, each sub-national government is responsible for its own debt. In the case of
Germany, the federal states (La¨nder) usually issue bonds on the capital markets individually.
As regards the second group or type of issues described above, joint issues have also been
common in Germany, involving either groups of La¨nder (to issue bonds known as Jumbos)38
or the La¨nder and the federal government (through Bund-La¨nder-Bonds).39 Joint issues also
include those involving local financing agencies, which are specialist credit institutions for local
bodies, part-owned by municipalities, and sometimes by central government. There is a long
history of this type of agency in the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, where
they date back furthest (created in 1898), and they usually have a high credit rating. Along
similar lines, France and the United Kingdom have recently set up local financing agencies.40
In France, Dexia’s bankruptcy meant the loss of the largest lender to local authorities, making
creating a local agency a way of keeping local authorities’ access to finance open. Outside Europe
there are institutions of this kind in Canada, Japan and the United States.
Lastly, in some countries central government taps the markets to subsequently provide funds
to sub-central governments, typically as bilateral loans. One example is that of Austria’s La¨nder,
which are authorised to access the market directly, but can also ask the “Federal Financing
Agency” to tap the markets for them and subsequently make loans to each individual Land.
This category could include those countries that have public financial institutions equivalent to
a development bank to finance sub-national government projects, such as the KFW group in
Germany41 or Kommunalkredit in Austria (99.8% owned by the federal government).
38To date, 49 joint issues have been carried out, with varying numbers of states involved in each. The partici-
pants are usually between five and seven of the smaller La¨nder (in terms of size or population) although there have
been issues in which a larger number of La¨nder have taken part, such as that in 1997, which had ten participants.
The volume of Jumbo issues has usually been significantly higher than that of issues by individual La¨nder.
39These bonds first came on the market in June 2013. This was a joint issue by ten states (with a share of 86.5%
of the total issued) and the federal government. This issue obtained the maximum rating from Fitch (AAA), i.e.
the same rating as the federal government (UNICREDIT, 2013).
40The Agence France Locale was created in late 2013 and is 100% owned by a total of 91 local authorities.
In the United Kingdom, the Municipal Bonds Agency was proposed as an independent agency in 2014. Outside
Europe, for example in New Zealand, the New Zealand Government Funding Agency was set up in 2011.
41Created after the Second World War to channel Marshall Plan funds. Ownership is currently divided between
the federal government (80%) and the La¨nder (20%). It finances specific housing, education and environment
programmes. Its issues are fully guaranteed by the federal government.
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Annex D Additional tables
Table D.1: Spread determinants: daily 1995-2017
Dependent variable: Individual spreads
TOTAL CCAA AND CAT VAL
Amount/Revenues CCAAi
2.20∗∗∗ 2.35∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗ 18.61∗∗∗ 12.66∗∗∗ 13.76∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.86) (0.86) (4.78) (4.38) (2.46)
Term to maturity
-0.01 -0.41∗∗ -0.37∗∗ 0.22 -0.49 -4.25∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.27) (0.33) (1.15)
Sovereign risk premium
0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Spread CCAAj 6=i
0.63∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Central Gob. Funds/GDP
-1.10∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗ -1.16∗∗∗ -1.13∗ 14.04 -6.05∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.35) (0.35) (0.65) (28.61) (0.99)
Debt/GDP
2.28∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 0.31 -1.05∗∗ 5.01∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.48) (0.53) (0.41)
Industrial Production Index
0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.43∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
Currency
-16.42∗∗∗ - - - - -
(1.28) - - - - -
Rating
- -0.73∗∗∗ - - - -
- (0.16) - - - -
Budgetary balance/GDP
- - 4.69∗∗∗ 1.19 -2.50 12.52∗∗∗
- - (0.61) (1.24) (2.17) (1.48)
Unemployment
- - 0.60 2.58∗∗∗ 4.99∗∗∗ -4.61∗∗∗
- - (0.61) (0.76) (1.04) (1.15)
GDP growth
- - -1.12∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ -4.92∗∗∗
- - (0.18) (0.35) (0.38) (0.56)
Number of observations 5,511 5,511 5,507 1,559 1,173 2,441
R-square 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.71 0.66 0.52
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
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Table D.2: Decision Result Summary 1995-2017
Timing Amount Term to maturity
Daily Quarterly Daily Quarterly Daily Quarterly
Budgetary balance/GDP P N N - - -
Maturities/Income P P P P P -
∆ Loans/GDP N N N N N -
Number/Amount issued
Central Gov.
- P P P - -
Number/Amount issued
other CCAA
P P P - P P
Sovereign risk
premium
P - N N
Spreads CCAAj 6=i P P - -
Interest Curve - N
Debt/GDP - N N N N N
Central Gob. Funds/GDP N N N N N N
Net Loans/GDP P P N -
Securities/GDP N N P -
National GDP growth N N - - N -
IPI growth N N
∆ Unemployment - - - N
Empty cells mean that these variables are not included in the specific model, while cell with and dash
symbol mean that the results are not significant. P represents a positive (increasing) impact on the
probability or the amount of issuance, or the term to maturity, whereas N represents a negative (decreasing)
impact.
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Table D.3: Probability of issuance: daily 1995-2017
Dependent variable: Dummy of issuance
Probit
Probit
Probit
Probit Probit
Marg. Ef. Marg. Ef. for Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
0.052∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -
(0.009) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) -
Number Maturities/Income
0.213∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
∆ Loans/GDP
-0.039∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.000 -
(0.015) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) -
Debt/GDP
0.001 0.000 - - -
(0.002) (0.000) - - -
Central Gob. Funds over GDP
- - -0.024∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
- - (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Central Gov. number of issues
-0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -
(0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) -
CCAAj 6=i number of issues
0.014∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Sovereing risk premium
0.067∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.007)
Average CCAAs spreads
0.062∗ 0.002∗ 0.053 0.002 -
(0.035) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) -
National GDP growth
-0.002 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -
(0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) -
IPI growth
-0.003∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.000∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant
-2.493∗∗∗ - -2.400∗∗∗ - -2.392∗∗∗
(0.039) - (0.034) - (0.023)
Number of observations 135,082 135,082 135,082 135,082 135,082
R-squared 0.236 0.236 0.238 0.238 0.237
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
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Table D.4: Amount issued: daily 1995-2017
Dependent variable: Amount/Income
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.13∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Maturities/Income 0.03∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
in the following month (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ Loans/GDP
-0.11∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Central Gov. (+/-10 days) 0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗
Import issued/Income (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CCAAj 6=i(+/- 10 days)
0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Sovereign risk premium
-0.02 -0.08∗∗ -0.03 -0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Average CCAAs spreads
0.15 0.10 0.16∗ 0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Debt/GDP
-0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ - -
(0.01) (0.01) - -
Central Gob. Funds/GDP
- - -0.04∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
- - (0.01) (0.01)
Net Loans/GDP
- - 0.01 0.07∗∗∗
- - (0.01) (0.01)
Securities/GDP
- - -0.15∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
- - (0.02) (0.02)
National GDP growth
-0.02 -0.03∗ -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Unemployment
-0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant
0.73∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.18)
Number of observations 3,297 135,080 3,297 135,080
R-squared 0.04 - 0.05 -
λ - 0.663 - 0.718
ρ - 0.459 - 0.493
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
The first step of the Heckman model (Probit Model) is not included in this table
for simplicity. It includes the same variables as the last column of table D.3 shows.
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Table D.5: Term to maturity decision: daily 1995-2017
Dependent variable: Number of years
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.31∗∗∗ -0.10 -0.36∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Maturities/Income -0.34∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
in the following month (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ Loans/GDP
-0.16 -0.27∗∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.29∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Import issued/Income 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05
Central Gov. (+/-10 days) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Import issued/Income 0.42∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.27∗
CCAAj 6=i(+/- 10 days) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Interest curve
-0.15 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Debt/GDP
-0.14∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ - -
(0.02) (0.02) - -
Number Maturities/Income - - -0.09∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
in the next month - - (0.04) (0.04)
Net Loans/GDP
- - -0.09∗∗ 0.08∗∗
- - (0.04) (0.04)
Securities/GDP
- - -0.32∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗
- - (0.05) (0.05)
National GDP growth
-0.29∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ Unemployment
-0.19∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.18∗∗∗ -0.12∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant
4.51∗∗∗ -1.40∗∗∗ 4.98∗∗∗ -2.38∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.51) (0.39) (0.58)
Number of observations 3,297 135,080 3,297 135,080
R-squared 0.08 - 0.09 -
λ - 2.456 - 2.705
ρ - 0.552 - 0.595
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
The first step of the Heckman model (Probit Model) is not included in this table for
simplicity. It includes the same variables as the last column of table D.3 shows.
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Table D.6: Probability of issuance: Quarterly 1995-2017
Dependent variable: Dummy of issuance
Probit
Probit
Marg. Ef.
Probit
Probit
Marg. Ef.
Probit for
Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.10∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) -
Number Maturities/Income
0.56∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
∆ Loans/GDP
-0.42∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -
(0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) -
Central Gov. number issued
0.02∗ 0.01∗ 0.02∗ 0.01∗ -
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) -
CCAAj 6=i number issued
0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Sovereign risk premium
0.06 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.17∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Average CCAAs spreads
0.28∗ 0.11∗ 0.20 0.08 -
(0.16) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) -
Debt/GDP
-0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ - - -
(0.01) (0.00) - - -
Central Gob. Funds - - -0.10∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
over GDP - - (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
National GDP growth
-0.07∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.06∗ -0.02∗ -
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) -
IPI growth
0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant
-1.47∗∗∗ - -1.59∗∗∗ - -1.56∗∗∗
(0.20) - (0.20) - (0.12)
Number of observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496
R-squared 0.373 0.373 0.393 0.393 0.377
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively. Estimations include
quarter dummies not shown in the table for simplicity reasons.
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Table D.7: Amount issued: Quarterly 1995-2017
Dependent variable: Amount/Income
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.15 -0.06 -0.05 0.04
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Amount Maturities/Income
0.65∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
∆ Loans/GDP
-0.82∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25)
Central Gov. 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗
Import issued/Income (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CCAAj 6=i 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.10
Import issued/Income (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Sovereign risk premium
-0.49∗∗ -0.37∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.41∗
(0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.22)
Average CCAAs spreads
0.29 0.20 -0.00 -0.06
(0.55) (0.57) (0.54) (0.56)
Debt/GDP
-0.06∗ -0.06∗ - -
(0.03) (0.03) - -
Central Gob. Funds over GDP
- - -0.27∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗
- - (0.06) (0.06)
Net Loans/GDP
- - 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗
- - (0.06) (0.06)
Securities/GDP
- - -0.13∗ -0.11
- - (0.08) (0.08)
National GDP growth
-0.13 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
∆ Unemployment
-0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Constant
2.28∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗ 1.93∗∗ 1.31∗
(0.75) (0.77) (0.76) (0.79)
Number of observations 533 1,496 533 1,496
R-squared 0.28 - 0.30 -
λ - 0.841 - 0.824
ρ - 0.254 - 0.254
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
The first step of the Heckman model (Probit Model) is not included in this table for
simplicity. It includes the same variables as the last column of table D.6 shows.
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Table D.8: Term to Maturity decision: Quarterly 1995-2017
Dependent variable: Number of years
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Budgetary balance/GDP
-0.42∗∗ -0.12 -0.33∗ 0.07
(0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
Amount Maturities/Income
-0.36∗∗∗ 0.11 -0.41∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
∆ Loans/GDP
-0.36 -0.26 -0.25 0.06
(0.36) (0.32) (0.36) (0.34)
Central Gov. 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01
Import issued/Income (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
CCAAj 6=i 0.20 0.45∗∗∗ 0.20 0.48∗∗∗
Import issued/Income (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15)
Interest curve
-0.54∗ -0.60∗∗ -0.64∗ -0.70∗∗
(0.33) (0.29) (0.33) (0.30)
Debt/GDP
-0.14∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ - -
(0.05) (0.04) - -
Central Gob. Funds over GDP
- - -0.32∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗
- - (0.08) (0.08)
Net Loans/GDP
- - 0.00 -0.02
- - (0.08) (0.07)
Securities/GDP
- - -0.11 0.15∗
- - (0.11) (0.08)
National GDP growth
-0.07 -0.22 -0.05 -0.20
(0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
∆ Unemployment
-0.63∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.20) (0.24) (0.20)
Constant
6.81∗∗∗ 3.69∗∗∗ 6.41∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗
(1.28) (1.14) (1.30) (1.19)
Number of observations 533 1,496 533 1,496
R-square 0.14 - 0.15 -
λ - 5.043 - 5.304
ρ - 0.982 - 1
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ respectively.
The first step of the Heckman model (Probit Model) is not included in this table for
simplicity. It includes the same variables as the last column of table D.6 shows.
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Table D.9: Summary statistics: data 1995-2017
Quantity issued data: daily 1995-2017 Spreads data
Days Amount/ Amount/Income Average Number
Spreads
issued Income with zeros Maturity Securities
TOTAL mean 3,410 0.63 0.01 2.0 5,738 0.35
CCAA Std. Dev. - 1.39 0.23 4.2 - 0.51
AND
mean 629 0.25 0.02 1.3 1,587 0.27
Std. Dev. - 0.32 0.11 3.3 - 0.43
ARA
mean 59 1.95 0.01 7.5 19 0.67
Std. Dev. - 2.59 0.27 7.5 - 0.52
AST
mean 5 1.46 0.00 5.6 4 0.53
Std. Dev. - 0.84 0.04 2.6 - 0.29
BAL
mean 17 4.70 0.01 4.3 2 0.81
Std. Dev. - 5.68 0.33 4.0 - 1.01
CAN
mean 62 1.00 0.01 3.6 56 0.12
Std. Dev. - 1.19 0.13 5.7 - 0.19
CANT
mean 3 2.92 0.00 8.3 - -
Std. Dev. - 3.39 0.08 5.8 - -
CyL
mean 60 1.37 0.01 7.3 36 0.67
Std. Dev. - 1.66 0.18 3.8 - 0.62
CM
mean 41 1.53 0.01 7.0 30 0.12
Std. Dev. - 1.37 0.14 6.5 - 0.28
CAT
mean 556 0.52 0.03 1.6 1,225 0.29
Std. Dev. - 1.20 0.34 3.5 - 0.38
VAL
mean 1,606 0.36 0.07 0.5 2,588 0.40
Std. Dev. - 0.72 0.34 1.5 - 0.56
EXT
mean 13 1.07 0.00 8.2 7 1.27
Std. Dev. - 1.64 0.08 4.9 - 0.57
GAL
mean 60 2.03 0.01 5.9 24 1.15
Std. Dev. - 1.74 0.23 4.9 - 0.69
MAD
mean 183 1.20 0.03 8.1 100 0.85
Std. Dev. - 2.60 0.42 7.6 - 0.75
MUR
mean 18 3.69 0.01 7.1 8 0.78
Std. Dev. - 3.66 0.24 5.4 - 0.77
NAV
mean 41 3.06 0.01 7.2 22 0.57
Std. Dev. - 2.39 0.27 3.9 - 0.45
PV
mean 42 2.34 0.01 7.0 14 0.47
Std. Dev. - 1.46 0.19 3.5 - 0.49
RIO
mean 15 3.54 0.01 3.7 16 0.57
Std. Dev. - 2.16 0.17 1.5 - 0.37
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Table D.10: Summary statistics: quarterly database 1995-2017
Quantity issued data: Quarterly 1995-2017
Quarters Amount/ Amount/Income Average Dummy
issued Income with zeros Maturity Issuance
TOTAL Mean 552 3.88 1.4 5.0 0.35
CCAA Std. Dev. - 3.81 2.9 4.9 -
AND
Mean 92 1.74 1.7 1.7 1.00
Std. Dev. - 1.20 1.2 1.0 -
ARA
Mean 25 4.60 1.3 9.4 0.27
Std. Dev. - 4.06 2.9 7.0 -
AST
Mean 3 2.43 0.1 5.2 0.03
Std. Dev. - 1.37 0.5 2.3 -
BAL
Mean 11 7.27 0.9 6.8 0.12
Std. Dev. - 6.20 3.1 6.6 -
CAN
Mean 34 1.82 0.7 4.3 0.37
Std. Dev. - 1.69 1.3 4.2 -
CANT
Mean 3 2.92 0.1 8.3 0.03
Std. Dev. - 3.39 0.7 5.8 -
CyL
Mean 34 2.41 0.9 8.3 0.37
Std. Dev. - 1.94 1.7 3.6 -
CM
Mean 19 3.30 0.7 8.9 0.21
Std. Dev. - 1.66 1.5 6.7 -
CAT
Mean 75 3.88 3.2 2.0 0.82
Std. Dev. - 3.38 3.4 1.3 -
VAL
Mean 80 7.15 6.2 0.8 0.87
Std. Dev. - 5.17 5.4 0.4 -
EXT
Mean 8 1.74 0.2 8.8 0.09
Std. Dev. - 2.07 0.8 3.9 -
GAL
Mean 37 3.30 1.3 7.5 0.40
Std. Dev. - 2.28 2.2 5.3 -
MAD
Mean 46 4.78 2.4 8.8 0.50
Std. Dev. - 5.08 4.3 6.0 -
MUR
Mean 14 4.74 0.7 7.7 0.15
Std. Dev. - 4.00 2.3 4.8 -
NAV
Mean 33 3.80 1.4 8.6 0.36
Std. Dev. - 2.53 2.4 3.1 -
PV
Mean 29 3.39 1.1 8.0 0.32
Std. Dev. - 2.22 2.0 2.8 -
RIO
Mean 9 5.90 0.6 3.9 0.10
Std. Dev. - 3.73 2.1 1.2 -
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Table D.11: Summary statistics: Explanatory variables 1995-2017
Daily data Quarterly data
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of issues Central Gov. 0.14 0.34 12.42 4.11
Amount issued Central Gov. 2.82 2.32 22.75 10.43
Risk premium 1.16 1.36 1.16 1.35
Interest curve 2.01 1.21 2.01 1.20
Number of issues CCAAj 6=i 0.38 0.63 5.65 2.58
Amount issued CCAAj 6=i 4.58 4.82 2.13 1.26
Spreadj 6=i 0.42 0.40 0.45 0.40
Debt/GDP 9.53 7.90 9.53 7.90
∆ Loans/GDP 0.19 0.65 0.19 0.65
Central Gob. Funds/GDP 1.68 4.84 1.71 4.89
Loans/GDP 4.92 3.43 4.92 3.43
Securities/GDP 2.90 2.64 2.90 2.64
CCAA Revenues 6,607 6,572 6,606 6,574
Deficit/GDP -1.06 1.41 -1.06 1.41
IPI growth 0.56 8.18 0.40 6.40
Regional GDP growth 4.64 3.97 4.64 3.98
National GDP growth 2.21 2.44 2.22 2.45
∆ EPA 0.00 1.44 -0.01 1.14
Term to Maturity ordered dummy 1.37 0.64 2.02 0.70
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Concluding remarks
This section summarizes and discusses the general contributions of this Ph.D. dissertation.
This thesis analyses the fiscal sustainability of the CCAAs following an alternative approach
to the traditional study of the design of the financing system. It tries to enlighten the problem of
regional indebtedness and offers some policy advices to prevent regional fiscal misbehaving. Over
the last four decades, CCAAs have progressively gained responsibilities, both from a tax and
an expenditure point of view, transforming Spain into one of the most decentralised countries
in the world.
The economic crisis has raised some important questions in relation with who is responsible
for the subnational debt. Subnational governments from several countries suffered some fiscal
stress during the economic crisis, as soaring deficits where difficult to fund. Several central gov-
ernments helped subnational governments to cope with the liquidity shortage through transfers
or financial facilities. Spain created two different facilities in the core of the debt crisis, the
suppliers payment fund (FFPP) and the Autonomous liquidity facility (FLA). Both funds im-
plied a transformation of CCAAs loans and securities into loans with the Central government,
converting the central government into the main creditor of CCAAs. Thus, the bailout of the
CCAAs increased the central government vulnerability towards CCAAs behaviour.
This thesis analyses four specific subjects that have affected CCAAs public accounts, putting
in danger the fiscal stability of the CCAAs: the debt-GDP ratio evolution, the fiscal non-
compliance, the commercial debt and the debt market behaviour of CCAAs. The main results
point out the necessity to discuss the current design of the financing system of the CCAAs as a
global matter, i.e. the discussion must go beyond the share of revenues and expenditures that
the CCAAs are assigned. The debt sustainability and the clarification of who is responsible for
this debt are key matters in the fiscal decentralisation design. Should the central government
prevent possible CCAAs’ bankruptcies? Should Spain have a permanent facility to cope with
CCAAs liquidity crisis? What should be the consequences of resorting to this facility?
Chapters 1 and 2 conclude that debt and deficits are more subdued when CCAAs have
higher fiscal autonomy, and vertical fiscal imbalances are lower. Thus, increasing fiscal co-
responsibility could enhance fiscal target compliance and reduce its pressure over the debt. A
striking result in both chapters is that fiscal rules do not seem to affect neither the debt evolution
nor the deficit target compliance. The strength of fiscal rules has risen since 2012, with a higher
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accounts transparency and data availability. Nevertheless, the 2012 budgetary stability law
enforcement is still weak, with a lack of sanctions applied in the case of non-compliance. A
further reinforcement of fiscal rules is advisable to ensure its effectiveness in preventing new
episodes of elevated levels of fiscal non-compliance.
Another factor that may have played a relevant role in fiscal responsibility is market disci-
pline. Nonetheless, due to the effect of the economic crisis and the gradual transformation of
some CCAAs debt into loans with the central government, market discipline has probably been
harmed. In chapter 4, the CCAAs issuance behaviour is described and analysed. Some CCAAs
have stopped issuing debt in the markets in the last years, and the full return to the markets
is still at stake. Moreover, the role of the Financing Fund for the CCAAs is still unclear in a
situation of normal access to the market. As the non-bailout clause has been violated during the
crisis, the financing system should be redesigned in order to prevent the moral hazard problem
generated by this sort of funds. The future of the Financing Fund for the CCAAs is a conun-
drum (the FFCCAA has substituted the FLA and the FFPP). Its role in future crises should
be strictly defined, establishing the circumstances and procedure to access the financing from
this Fund and the control of the conditions CCAAs must fulfil. Another possibility could be the
elimination of this fund and the return to only market funding.
Finally, another key factor in debt accumulation has been the large amounts of commercial
debt during the crisis and the excessive lengthening of the arrears. These excessive delays in
paying suppliers may have a negative impact on Spanish economic activity. The control of
commercial debt is now one of the main points of action in the Budgetary Stability Law, but
there are still CCAAs not complying with the maximum legal delay.
In conclusion, CCAAs debt has become a worrying matter during the economic crisis due
to its rapid increase. Some related matters have been object of an increasing public attention
such as the commercial debt and the issuance in markets. The recovery of a normal issuance
and commercial debt situation and the gradual fiscal consolidation should improve the fiscal
sustainability for the CCAAs. In times of economic prosperity, CCAAs should try to reduce
their stock of debt to increase their room for manoeuvre to face future crisis. The fiscal design,
the strength of fiscal rules, the market discipline and the political responsibility could help to
ensure a healthier fiscal situation for the CCAAs, with less debt and deficit and better access
to the markets at a lower cost.
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Abstract
Essays on the subnational government’s
indebtedness
Introduction
This Ph.D. dissertation offers an extensive analysis of the Spanish regional governments’
(Autonomous Communities, CCAAs) indebtedness from complementary perspectives: debt evo-
lution, deficit target non-compliance, commercial debt and securities issuance.
They make for an interesting case to study for a number of reasons. First, Spain has a
high level of fiscal decentralisation and CCAAs are responsible for some of the largest and
social-targeted spending items: health and education. Their proper functioning, stability and
fiscal sustainability are essential for the well-being of the Spanish society. Second, they have
gained significant political and fiscal autonomy over the past four decades. This process of
decentralisation has been asymmetric, with a different decentralisation speed for revenue and
expenditure depending on the region, leading to both temporal and cross-sectional variations in
fiscal and political autonomy indicators. Third, they account for around a third of the General
Government debt increase from 2007 to 2017. Fourth, they accumulated a significant amount
of commercial debt during the core of the crisis. Finally, CCAAs, as a group, have been fairly
active in debt markets during the last two decades.
CCAAs’ debt became more relevant in the outburst of the European debt crisis, as the debt
sustainability of some European countries was at stake. Spain was one of these countries that
suffered a sudden increase in both public deficits and debt levels in all tiers of government. As
a consequence, sovereign risk premium surged. Subnational debt added to the sustainability
problem, as CCAAs struggled to face new funding needs generated by the accumulation of
significant deficits. Soaring CCAAs’ deficits and debt were accompanied by two additional
concerns: first, the enlargement of commercial debt and the delay in payment of suppliers;
second, the difficulties some CCAAs found to issue new debt in the markets at a reasonable
cost. The central government created two facilities to cope with these two specific problems,
transforming the central government in the main creditor of the CCAAs, and increasing its
vulnerability to fiscal developments of the CCAAs.
147
Essays on the subnational government’s indebtedness
Objectives and Results
This Ph.D. dissertation aims at studying the fiscal soundness of the CCAAs by analysing
four specific matters in four chapters: debt evolution, deficit target compliance, commercial debt
and securities issuances. These chapters are closely related as all matters are intertwined.
The first two chapters analyse the evolution of debt ratio over GDP and the budgetary target
compliance through the estimation of a Generalised method of moments model (GMM). Both
variables are related because deficits are one of the main drivers of debt increases, while higher
debt would enlarge deficits through the interest payments. In both cases, fiscal autonomy and
market discipline have played a central role in reducing incentives for regional governments to
misbehave in term of public accounts, whereas fiscal rules have not been very effective in en-
couraging further fiscal consolidation when needed. This is probably due to the lack of sanctions
and to the moral hazard effect caused by the factual bail-out produced by the creation of some
financial facilities. CCAAs government may believe now that the central government would
always prevent any possible bankruptcy.
Debt developments have also been affected by its structure. CCAAs with higher weight
of securities over loans have increased less their debt amount, probably due to the stronger
discipline private investors exert on their investments, raising rapidly the cost of refinancing.
Commercial debt has also been an essential factor in debt increases, as parts of the accumulated
commercial debt was directly transformed into standard debt from 2012 onwards.
In relation specifically to budgetary target compliance, CCAAs’ governments involvement in
target determination appears to be crucial for compliance. Governments would only feel bound
by targets they consider as their own. Increasing the collaboration in the target setting be-
tween the different levels of governments would probably guarantee a higher level of compliance.
Moreover, the feasibility of the targets is fundamental as CCAAs will not feel obligated towards
targets that are not achievable. In the process of targets setting, the economic situation of each
region should be considered, as they are not homogeneous.
The third chapter focuses on the evolution of commercial debt and the macroeconomic
impact of the Supplier Payment Financing Fund (FFPP), which was a facility created in 2012
by the Central government to repay subnational commercial debt. This fund existed from 2012
to 2014 paying a total amount of 6.3% of GDP to regional and local governments supplier.
The impact is evaluated by two different models, an Autoregressive Vector Model (VAR) and
the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de Espan˜a. Both models conclude that
during the three years the programme was in force, the cumulated impact on GDP was around
0.3pp. This programme took place in a period of economic downfall, financial stress and low
banking liquidity. Thus, it probably had a significant impact on investment and employment
growth. Simultaneously to this positive effects, CCAAs commercial debt was transformed into
standard debt, entailing a sudden expansion of debt levels. Thus, controlling for commercial
debt developments has become an essential concern of CCAAs fiscal sustainability.
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Finally, the last chapter develops an innovative study of CCAAs’ securities issuances that
encloses two different questions: what are the determinants of the CCAAs securities spreads, and
what drives the CCAAs decision to issue debt. The first question is analysed by an OLS model
and considers securities characteristics, economic variables and the sovereign risk premium.
Spreads depend basically on the amount issued, the term to maturity, the sovereign risk, the
spreads of securities of other CCAAs and the stock of debt. All these factors, with the exception
of the term to maturity, tend to push upwards the spreads.
The second question is divided into three aspects: the timing, the amount issued and the
term to maturity. The timing decision is analysed through a Probit model, whereas the amount
and the term to maturity are estimated by a Heckman sample selection correction model. The
main forces driving the issuance decision are the funding necessities, the behaviour of other
issuers in the Spanish public debt market (other CCAAs and the central government) and the
stock of debt.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the recent economic crisis has triggered the debate of who is the ultimate
responsible for the public debt. Both the CCAA and the central government must ensure
that debt is sustainable: The CCAA as direct responsible for paying the debt and the central
government because, in the end, regional debt may affect its cost of financing and it may even
have to face the payment in the case of a possible bankruptcy. Better institutions, stronger
control of deficits and debts and an increase of co-responsibility are advisable to ameliorate
fiscal sustainability. Moreover, authorities from all levels must be responsible for their behaviour
and face consequences for the mismanagement of public resources. Finally, Spanish authorities
should reach an agreement about the procedure to follow in case of future fiscal crises. A clear
crisis solution mechanism would help to deal with future liquidity and sustainability challenges.
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Resumen
La problema´tica del endeudamiento de las
administraciones pu´blicas territoriales
Introduccio´n
Esta tesis ofrece un extenso ana´lisis de la problema´tica del endeudamiento de las Comu-
nidades Auto´nomas Espan˜olas (CCAA), desde distintos puntos de vista: la deuda, el incumplim-
iento de los objetivos de de´ficit, la deuda comercial y de las emisiones de deuda.
Las CCAA constituyen un interesante caso de estudio por varias razones. Espan˜a es un pa´ıs
con un elevado nivel de descentralizacio´n, siendo las CCAA responsables de dos de los gastos
ma´s cuantiosos de cara´cter social, la educacio´n y la sanidad. Por lo tanto, la estabilidad de las
CCAA es clave para el bienestar de la sociedad espan˜ola. Por otro lado, las CCAA han adquirido
un creciente nivel de autonomı´a tanto pol´ıtica como fiscal en las u´ltimas cuatro de´cadas, a trave´s
de un largo proceso de descentralizacio´n. Este proceso ha sido asime´trico, con una velocidad
diferente de descentralizacio´n de los ingresos y los gastos, y por regiones, de forma que el proceso
se ha caracterizado por una elevada heterogeneidad en los niveles de autonomı´a fiscal y pol´ıtica.
Asimismo, el aumento de la deuda de las CCAA ha sido muy significativo en la u´ltima de´cada.
De hecho, un tercio del total del aumento de la deuda soberana de Espan˜a se ha debido a la
acumulacio´n de deuda de las CCAA. Por u´ltimo, el elevado nivel de deuda comercial durante la
crisis y las recurrentes emisiones de deuda durante todo el periodo hacen de las CCAA un caso
de estudio de especial intere´s.
Las CCAA tomaron relevancia durante la crisis de la deuda europea, periodo en el que la
estabilidad financiera y fiscal de algunos pa´ıses se puso en duda. Espan˜a no fue una excepcio´n.
Los niveles de deuda y de´ficit de todos los subsectores de las Administraciones Pu´blicas experi-
mentaron un fuerte incremento. En consecuencia, el riesgo soberano aumento dra´sticamente. La
deuda subnacional agravo´ el problema, puesto que las CCAA tuvieron que enfrentarse a fuertes
dificultades a la hora de encontrar financiacio´n a un coste razonable para sus crecientes de´ficits.
A los elevados niveles de deuda y de´ficits se le an˜adieron dos problemas. Por un lado, la deuda
comercial aumento´ y los retrasos en el pago de los proveedores se dilataron. Por otro, las CCAA
se enfrentaron a la falta de liquidez en los mercados y en el sistema bancario. El gobierno central
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establecio´ dos facilidades para ayudar a las CCAA a solucionar estos dos problemas, y como
consecuencia, parte de los valores y pre´stamos de las CCAA se transformaron en pre´stamos
con la Administracio´n Central y, por lo tanto, aumento´ su vulnerabilidad a la situacio´n de las
CCAA.
Objectivos and Resultados
Esta tesis estudia la solvencia de las CCAA a trave´s del ana´lisis de cuatro cuestiones es-
pec´ıficas desarrolladas en cuatros cap´ıtulos: la deuda, el cumplimiento de los objetivos de de´ficit,
la evolucio´n de la deuda comercial y de los valores emitidos en mercados. Los cuatro cap´ıtulos
esta´n fuertemente relacionados debido a que las cuestiones son complementarias.
Los dos primeros cap´ıtulos analizan la evolucio´n de la ratio de deuda sobre el PIB y del
cumplimiento de los objetivos de de´ficit. Para ello se estima modelos de me´todo de momentos
generalizados (GMM). Ambas variables esta´n relacionadas ya que los de´ficits son la principal
fuente de acumulacio´n de deuda, mientras que un nivel mayor de deuda aumentar´ıa los de´ficits
a trave´s de mayores pagos de intereses. En ambos casos, la autonomı´a fiscal y la disciplina de
mercado han jugado un papel fundamental en desincentivar comportamientos nocivos para la
estabilidad de las cuentas pu´blicas. Mientras que las reglas fiscales no parecen haber tenido el
impacto esperado sobre la necesaria consolidacio´n fiscal. Probablemente esta falta de efectividad
se deba a la inexistencia de sanciones y al problema de azar moral generado por el rescate
producido con la creacio´n de las facilidades financieras. Las CCAA pueden considerar ahora que
el gobierno central hara´ lo posible para evitar una posible quiebra de cualquier de ellas.
La evolucio´n de la deuda tambie´n ha dependido de su estructura. As´ı, CCAA con deudas
formadas por una mayor cuant´ıa en valores con respecto a los pre´stamos han acumulado menos
deuda debido posiblemente a la mayor disciplina exigida por los inversores con respecto a los
bancos. Por u´ltimo, la deuda comercial tambie´n ha sido una fuente principal de acumulacio´n
de deuda, ya que una proporcio´n elevada de la misma acabo´ convirtie´ndose en deuda estandar
a partir del an˜o 2012.
En relacio´n al cumplimiento de los objetivos de de´ficit, la implicacio´n de los gobiernos re-
gionales en la determinacio´n de los objetivos es ba´sica para asegurar el cumplimiento, puesto que
e´stos los considerar como propios. Adema´s, los objetivos debera´n ser alcanzables, ya que unos
objetivos excesivamente exigentes desvinculara´n a los gobiernos de sus obligaciones de cumplim-
iento. Si un objetivo no es alcanzable, es como si no existiera. Por lo tanto, en el proceso
de determinacio´n de los objetivos, la situacio´n espec´ıfica de cada CCAA deber´ıa ser tenida en
cuenta, dando lugar a objetivos individualizados.
El tercer cap´ıtulo se centra en la evolucio´n de la deuda comercial y el impacto macroe-
cono´mico del Fondo de Financiacio´n del Pago a Proveedores (FFPP), facilidad financiera creada
en 2012 por el gobierno central para pagar la deuda comercial pendiente. Este fondo existio´
entre 2012 y 2014 y pago´ un total de 6,3% del PIB a los proveedores de los gobiernos regionales
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y locales. Se estiman dos modelos para evaluar el impacto de estos pagos, un modelo de vector
autoregresivo (VAR) y el modelos macroeconometrico trimestral del Banco de Espan˜a. Am-
bos modelos concluyen que durante los tres an˜os que el programa estuvo en vigor, el impacto
acumulado sobre el PIB a lo largo de esos tres an˜os fue de entorno 0,3pp. Este programa se
implemento´ durante un momento de fuerte desaceleracio´n econo´mica, con tensiones financieras
y reducida liquidez bancaria, por lo que el impacto fue muy significativo tanto sobre la inversio´n
como sobre el empleo. Por otro lado, este programa supuso la transformacio´n de la deuda com-
ercial en deuda esta´ndar, implicando la necesidad de controlar este tipo de deuda en episodios
futuros.
Finalmente, el u´ltimo cap´ıtulo contiene un estudio innovador sobre las emisiones de deuda de
las CCAA que engloba dos cuestiones diferenciadas: Los determinantes de los spreads de estos
valores, y las decisiones de emitir de las CCAA. La primera cuestio´n se analiza con un modelo
de regresio´n de mı´nimos cuadrados y considera la cantidad emitida, el plazo de vencimiento,
el riesgo soberano, los spreads de los valores emitidos por otras CCAA, y el stock de deuda
acumulado. Todos estos factores, con la excepcio´n del plazo de vencimiento han presionado al
alza a los spreads en estas u´ltimas dos de´cadas.
La segunda cuestio´n se divide en decisiones espec´ıficas: el momento de emitir, la cuant´ıa
emitida y el plazo de vencimiento. Para el ana´lisis sobre el momento de emitir se estima un
modelo Probit, mientras que para las decisiones de cuant´ıa y plazo se desarrolla un modelo de
correccio´n de la seleccio´n muestral de Heckman. Las CCAA han emitido ma´s y a ma´s largo
plazo en momentos de mayor cuant´ıa de vencimientos, cuando otras CCAA han accedido a los
mercados y cuanto menor es su stock de deuda de partida.
Conclusiones
La reciente crisis econo´mica ha despertado el debate sobre quie´n es el responsable final del
pago de la deuda pu´blica. Ambos, las CCAA y el gobierno central, han de asegurar que la deuda
sea sostenible: las CCAA como responsable directo y el gobierno central para prevenir que al
final se convierta en su responsabilidad a trave´s de un rescate. Mejores instituciones, controles
ma´s estrictos sobre el de´ficit y la deuda , y el incremento de la corresponsabilidad fiscal son
deseables para incentivar una mejor gestio´n de los recursos pu´blicos. Las autoridades de todos
los niveles de gobierno han de ser responsables de sus actos y de su mala gestio´n. Finalmente,
ser´ıa recomendable un acuerdo global sobre cua´l deber´ıa ser el procedimiento a seguir en futuras
crisis.
Mar Delgado Te´llez de Cepeda 153

